Comment: Troops everywhere, intelligence nowhere — the Pahalgam failure

Fact 1: Pahalgam is part of South Kashmir’s Anantnag district.

Fact 2: Pahalgam is situated along the Amarnath Yatra route.

Fact 3: The entire corridor is routinely flooded with troops.

Fact 4: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which has the primary responsibility for counterinsurgency and internal security operations, has an estimated strength of 65,000 to 75,000 personnel in the area.

Fact 5: The Indian Army’s 15 Corps (Chinar Corps), headquartered in Srinagar, covers the Kashmir Valley with an estimated strength of 120,000 to 140,000 in the area.

Fact 6: The Jammu and Kashmir Police, with a deep local network, especially in intelligence and counterinsurgency roles, operate check posts, conduct raids, and collaborate with paramilitary forces, and have an estimated active force of 83,000 (including Special Operations Group).

Fact 7: The combined estimate of total security personnel in J&K stands at 270,000 to 300,000.

Fact 8: India maintains a security deployment of at least one soldier for every 9–10 civilians in the region — an extraordinary ratio for any counterinsurgency theatre.

Fact 9: Yet, the attack, deeply reprehensible, still took place.

Fact 10: India operates thousands of ‘OGWs’ (Overground Workers) and informants in the area.

Conclusion 1: This level of force density makes any surprise attack a failure of intelligence coordination, not troop scarcity.

Conclusion 2: If Indian intelligence agencies could not detect attack planning within a demography they monitor so closely, the lapse lies squarely within India’s domestic counterterrorism architecture — not across the border.

Fact 11: South Kashmir’s demographic profile, particularly in districts like Anantnag, Kulgam, and Pulwama, includes a large population of youth affected by unemployment and alienation.

Fact 12: India’s security doctrine has classified this zone as a ‘hotbed of hybrid militancy’, where attacks are often executed by local recruits with minimal external coordination.

Conclusion 3: The ability of local actors to organise and strike in this environment reflects a failure of human intelligence (HUMINT).

Fact 12: Indian forces have been conducting counterinsurgency operations in the Anantnag district since the 1980s.

Fact 13: The Indian intelligence apparatus has access to advanced surveillance and human intelligence resources.

Conclusion 4: The recurrence of attacks in a known high-risk area like Pahalgam suggests serious gaps in preempting militant plans.

Conclusion 5: India’s failure to anticipate the attack suggests inadequate real-time intelligence.

Conclusion 6: The demographic youth bulge in South Kashmir, combined with unemployment and historical grievances, has been exploited by militants.

Conclusion 7: India’s intelligence machinery did not sufficiently monitor or counter these dynamics in Pahalgam, allowing terrorists to execute the attack undetected.

Conclusion 8: The above facts highlight systemic issues in intelligence-gathering and analysis.