Litmus test for Russia

The world is stunned. While the Afghan Taliban’s fourth anniversary of seizing power is only a month away, they would be more eager to mark it this time around. The reason is their diplomatic win in the increasingly complex global order.

On July 3, Russia became the first country in the world to recognise the Afghan Taliban’s government officially. The hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan had paved the way for the Taliban to seize power in August 2021. Similarly, the international community's approach to post-American Afghanistan has also provided Russia with an opportunity to fill the diplomatic vacuum.

Russia’s relations with the Afghan Taliban are a case of foresight. It is not just about Afghanistan, but rather one of the elements of Russia’s quest to gain influence in the global competition with the West, led by the US. The formal announcement of recognition came only on July 3, but Russia has been actively engaged with the de facto government in Afghanistan. It didn’t choose to close its embassy in Afghanistan in 2021. In April 2022, Russia signed an economic deal with the Afghan Taliban to enhance the supply of oil, gas and wheat to Afghanistan.

According to an estimate, Afghanistan’s oil imports from Russia rose to 710,000 tons in only 11 months of this deal from 246,000 tons in 2022. In addition to trade, Russia has also tried to enhance security cooperation with the Afghan Taliban. For instance, in April 2024, Russia removed the Afghan Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations. On another occasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin boldly referred to the Taliban as an ‘ally’ in counterterrorism.

The noticeable reason for this cooperation is the fight against a common enemy: the Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP), one of the most lethal militant organisations. In March 2024, the ISKP attacked Crocus City Hall in Moscow, resulting in the deaths of more than a hundred people. Similarly, it bears mentioning that the ratio of bomb blasts and suicide attacks in Afghanistan has significantly declined since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. Notwithstanding, the evolving ISKP threat remains the most significant security challenge to the Afghan Taliban.

The list of ISKP’s crimes is exhaustive. The most recent gruesome incident in Afghanistan claimed by the group is the suicide attack of February 2025, which targeted Taliban officials outside a bank in Kunduz. The attack took place when Taliban security officials were reportedly collecting their salaries. The modus operandi and timing indicate its enhanced operational capacity. Just some weeks back, the ISKP also claimed an IED attack in Bajaur that claimed the life of an assistant commissioner, among others. Understandably, the ISKP threat serves as a valid reason for many players to be on the same page against this mushrooming risk.

While the Afghan Taliban called Russia’s step of their formal recognition a ‘brave decision’, it remains to be seen how this move turns out for other countries in the region and beyond. The impact will hinge on whether Russia leverages its new role to stabilise the region or entrenches the current dynamics.

Pakistan and Russia have cordial ties, but the former’s relations with the Afghan Taliban have strained in recent years. Pakistan has alleged that the Afghan Taliban are throwing their weight behind the TTP, which is involved in cross-border militancy. How Russia addresses this issue will be a litmus test for it.

The writer is a police officer. He tweets/posts @Numanbacha20