Off the hook for now?

Legal eye
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.
Being self-critical is a good thing. But we in Pakistan are so critical of ourselves, our abilities and performance, that even when things go our way we wonder in our state of disbelief as to what we might have missed.
Before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif headed to the US, ‘seasoned’ diplomats were warning us that Obama would be bending his ear so hard that it was in Sharif’s interest to cancel the state visit. After the Obama-Sharif joint statement that is pleasantly pro-Pakistan, we are saying: what else did anyone expect?
So what were our three worst fears? One, that the US would push Pakistan to rollback its nuclear policy geared toward full-spectrum nuclear deterrence, and threaten us with sanctions if we didn’t halt plans to pursue tactical weapons aimed at deterring ‘cold-start’ type doctrines. Pakistan’s stance was that the security component of its nuclear policy isn’t up for discussion. There might have been tense background conversations on the issue. But official statements don’t project Pakistan’s nuclear rollback as a core US policy interest at this time.
Two, that with Obama’s term ending and his natural focus on his legacy and shaping the narrative on how well he did, his administration would lay the blame on Pakistan for its inability to pull US troops out of Afghanistan before Obama left office. That the explanation for retaining US troops in face of the brief Taliban takeover of Kunduz and heightened violence across Afghanistan would be that Pakistan is again running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. The ‘do-more mantra’ has, however, been conspicuous by its absence during this visit.
Three, after the US-India Joint Declaration on Combatting Terrorism issued by Secretary Kerry and India’s Sushma Sawaraj this September that reiterated the threat posed to South Asia by terror groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and D-Company, Pakistan might again be painted as a terror proliferator and the US policy on terror might incorporate and project India’s thinking and aspirations on the issue. This hasn’t happened either. The joint statement frames Pakistan not as South Asia’s whipping boy but as a US partner.
The content, tone and emphasis of the US-Pakistan joint-statement is probably the most favourable it has been in the recent past. Nuances aside, on Afghanistan the US appears to be asking Pakistan to do what we have stated we wish to do. Since Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan’s declared policy has been that the time for hosting Haqqanis in our tribal belt is over. But that not allowing Taliban to plan and launch military operations from Pakistani soil is one thing and ending engagement with them is another.
Through the joint-statement the US seems to be implicitly endorsing Pakistan’s policy that fight-fight-talk-talk won’t work. Pakistan can either fight the Taliban or it can try and use whatever leverage it has to nudge them toward peace talks. By appreciating Pakistan’s role in facilitating the first public talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in July 2015, the US seems to be saying that, notwithstanding lingering doubts, the Pakistan proposed approach to Afghan peace might still be the best shot at peace in Afghanistan.
Part of the statement on nuclear non-proliferation seems to endorse Pakistan’s position that our programme is intrinsically driven by our concerns about strategic stability in South Asia. It speaks of ‘all sides’ acting with maximum restraint and not just Pakistan. The entire world has a stated interest in preventing the growth of Pakistan’s stockpile and evolution of tactical weapons. But notwithstanding this, the statement accepts the linkage between our nuclear programme and the desired balance of power in South Asia – ie Indo-Pak.
On India-Pakistan, the US has not picked sides. But we were operating in an environment where those who though the US would pick a side, though it would be India’s. Instead, here we find the US recognising Pakistan’s concerns. The PM spoke of Kashmir at the UN and raised it again during this state visit. It is India’s policy that it won’t speak about any issues at this point other than terror. It is Pakistan’s policy that there must be talks, and that they must focus on all outstanding issues, including Kashmir.
The joint statement explicitly mentions the need for a sustained dialogue that helps resolve all outstanding territorial disputes, including Kashmir, which India is loath to do. In the same sentence it highlights the need to address “the mutual concerns of India and Pakistan regarding terrorism”, and not just eradicate India-centric terror groups such as the LeT. And it further expresses concern for continuing violence across the line of control. If this isn’t an endorsement of our approach to normalisation of India-Pakistan relations, what else would be?
But before we congratulate ourselves too much, let us acknowledge that diplomacy or inter-state relations are not a zero-sum game. India is a much bigger country than Pakistan. Given the size of its population and economy it will always have more international clout than Pakistan. And Pakistan’s success and prosperity isn’t contingent on India’s decline either. But in resolving our lingering disputes, it is much more important for Pakistan as the smaller country that the world understands the legitimacy of its position and claims.
The overall impression one gleans from the joint statement is that the US is willing to assume for now that Pakistan can be part of the solution to Afghanistan’s stability. That Pakistan can’t be forced to rollback its nuclear programme without addressing the India-centric security threats that the programme is geared to neutralise. And that while India’s position on Pakistani terror groups perpetrating violence in India is known, Pakistan’s concern regarding India sponsored terror in Pakistan is also worth a mention.
The tone of the statement is also measured, which caters to Pakistani sensibilities always agitated by Uncle Sam dictating to a hapless Pakistan. For example, the LeT finds mention in Pakistan’s reiteration of its resolve to take action against UN-designated terror entities. On the whole, Pakistan’s worse fear that the US will abandon this region post-2015 with its dwindling interest in Afghanistan and revert to the Pressler era of sanctioning Pakistan hasn’t come true.
The US seems conscious that even with a considerably impaired Al-Qaeda new threats such as that of Isis are emanating and a vacuum within Afghanistan could provide them with a natural habitat to proliferate. Meanwhile Pakistan has turned a corner with Zarb-e-Azb and its evident resolve to root out terror from its fabric. At a time of turmoil across the Middle East, it is thus a better bet to strengthen the hand of this Muslim state, especially with its powerful and disciplined army resolutely fighting terror groups, than painting it as a villain.
There are two common-sense propositions that need to be emphasized in the context of PM’s US visit. One, Pakistan’s stated commitment to: (a) Afghan-own-and-led peace and reconciliation; and (b) taking action against the LeT and its affiliates, isn’t just good PR but the only sane and sensible policy we can have. The losses inflicted on us by our foolhardy jihadi and strategic depth policies have been immeasurable. Let’s not equivocate anymore. Our commitment to the Kashmir cause notwithstanding, we must cleanup even the India-focused jihadi infrastructure in our own interest.
And two, we must not use inter-state relations to address intra-state differences. Some of us might wish to fix our civil-military imbalance for democracy’s sake. And some might wish for one party to succeed and another to fail at all times in view of our partisan affiliations. But the international arena is no place to wash our dirty laundry.
Whether PM Sharif deserves credit or General Sharif for steering Pakistan in a direction that makes us safer and stronger can be debated. What is certain is that Operation Zarb-e-Azb would not have been possible had the two not been working together.
Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu