Afghanistan: did the US fumble? (Part – II)

Before a strategic pathway is chalked out for Afghanistan, it would be prudent to understand its political landscape. The Taliban have invaded. So, they are the protagonists. The old government-supporting tribes have lost. So, they are the aggrieved players. Pakistan may have residual influence on the Taliban. So, Pakistan’s perspective needs to be appreciated. India, Iran, and some Central-Asian States supported the defeated government. So, their intent calls for attention. In the void left with the US departure, China and Russia may have to step up as regional arbiters. So, they become important. This boiling and sharp-tasting geopolitical broth appears to have one too many actors!

It would be critical to understand the center of gravity of key actors, lest we repeat mistakes. While the Taliban have gained control over the country, they lack governance capabilities and the finances required to run the government. Misgovernance and economic collapse may throw Afghanistan back into a civil war and destabilise the Taliban administration. From the Taliban’s perspective, Al Qaeda may be temporarily safe, but ISIS, Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), and northern tribes may exploit the instability and dethrone them. Therefore, economic and governance support appears to be their center of gravity.

The ex-army and tribes that supported the old government, mostly from the northern areas, suspect an eventual far-reaching purge. They fear fatal cleansing and alienation. Protection and participation may be the pivot of their concerns.

Iran might be troubled with the defeat of the Northern Alliance and its fall out for Shia tribes – though Iran has improved relationships with some factions of the Taliban. Iran’s anxieties may be further accentuated by the Abrahamic Accords which forge an alliance between its adversaries – Israel and mostly Sunni GCC states. Iran may be nervous about pressure on its nuclear programme, and eager to create a new fallback regional block, hopefully sponsored by China and Russia.

China may be troubled by the vocal US opposition to its Belt and Road Initiative, and the continuity of the US trade policy by the new administration. Regional stability is important for China because an unstable Afghanistan may hamper the expansion of its value chain relationships towards Central Asia and may dampen its unprecedented economic growth. However, unlike the USSR and the US, it is unlikely to get involved hands or boots on in Afghanistan.

Russia has shown some willingness to jump into the Afghan void. Both Russia and China may see a new regional political order ascending with the US departure and its stressed relationships with some European partners. Both countries may focus their political capital on carving a new block or web of relationships, extending all the way to Europe.

India is wounded by the success of the Taliban against an army which it so dedicatedly trained. It may be worried about the potential fallouts from the new Afghanistan political dispensation, particularly in the backdrop of Muslims feeling alienated and disenfranchised under the Hindutva doctrine.

Pakistan cannot afford for Afghanistan to become a breeding ground for terrorism or espionage. Terrorist outfits such as the TTP and Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) are of special interest to Pakistan and are deemed as a threat to its security. Pakistan is also deeply concerned by the humanitarian crisis, predicted to occur by next March following atrocious Afghan winters, unless significant monetary support is afforded to Afghanistan. Political instability and civil war can lead to a huge outflux of refugees and cause economic and political distress for Pakistan.

The case of India and Pakistan is rather curious. They are each other’s nemeses. Victory of one is the defeat of the other. Just like India cannot trust the Taliban who maintain friendly relationships with Pakistan, Pakistan would not support an army, or an intelligence agency, trained by senior Indian army officers. In simplistic terms, their mutual hostility may constitute the center of gravity of the Afghan peace process.

On this tumultuous political horizon, the US is challenged to set its policy objectives and options. Clearly the goal of smoking-out the Taliban has become defunct. If a US surge of over 130,000 US troops could not defeat the Taliban, a simplistic over-the-horizon strategy is unlikely to triumph. This narrows the strategic space to three desirable outcomes (CAM): one, contain the current Afghan political dispensation; two, avert future acts of terror; and three, maintain an oversight/influence over the region

The US CAM strategy (contain expansion, avert terrorism, and maintain influence) must take into consideration the locus of political gravity to cast a new geopolitical balance.

In order to ‘contain’, the US would need to keep the current political dispensation harnessed. The US can syndicate a support package that would keep the Afghan administration just-about-stable and have the sway to limit its political expansion. The leverage from economic support can be used to protect and promote the rights of women, minorities, and children.

To ‘avert’ future acts of terror, ground intelligence is critical. With the departure of the US forces, its ground assets have become vulnerable and its capability to gather field intelligence has significantly weakened. Even the slightest suspicion of double-crossing the Taliban administration can lead to atrocious results. The US may need field-partners. It may have to rely partly on its old networks, including its relationships in Islamabad, for effective and timely information gathering.

Alternatively, the US can choose to reignite a proxy war by supporting actors opposing the Taliban and use their field presence for intelligence. This option would lead to an unstable Afghanistan and may make it the breeding ground for future terrorist activities.

Finally, to ‘maintain’ oversight and influence in the region, the US should strengthen its regional presence. It can use India as the regional watchman or develop a broad-based alliance. A broad-based support may have higher credibility as opposed to a unipolar approach. Singularly pegging its strategy with one country would once again unleash political antibodies, and the game will continue.

In order to actualise the above goal, the US may reconsider its approach and repair its relationships with European allies. It may influence multilateral donors, like the World Bank and the IFC, to create debt and grants support packages. Or consider releasing part of the Afghan government’s frozen assets. A collaborative approach may decrease the economic burden of strategy singularly on the US.

A month or so after landing back in Islamabad from the US, I sit at a rustic local joint untangling my thoughts. I try to titrate the declarations of the OIC’s special session on Afghanistan against the US’ new political doctrine of a de-hyphenated Indo-Pak strategy and narrowly defined relationships. I appraise the prudence of the US' policy. I ponder over the OIC’s pleas of cooperation and participation. I wonder if a broad-based alliance is not at the heart of Afghanistan’s stability?

Concluded

The writer is a global strategist, currently serving as a member of the Senate and the chairman of the Senate’s Water Resources Committee.