Partition issues in retrospect

This Independence Day sees the region in greater turmoil, as the situation in the west deteriorates toward civil war, and Kashmir-related friction goes on in the east; that is characteristic of the conflictual nature of India-Pakistan relations. Indian policy in occupied Kashmir remains aggressive and unrelenting, with no prospects of rapprochement. This is a bitter legacy of the partition more than seven decades back. This article goes back to the turbulent days of the historic partition of the Indian sub-continent and revisits some important turns that rendered the whole exercise unjust, and whose aftermath can be related to the present state of tensions.

Hindu-Muslim differences, built over many decades under British rule, pushed the independence movement, led by Mr Jinnah and his able lieutenants. Foreseeing no possibility of compromise between the two communities, the Muslim nation reiterated its commitment for an independent Muslim homeland, carved out of British India; this was solemnised in two historic sessions of the Muslim League, at Allahabad in 1930, and at Lahore in 1940. While the two communities as well as the British agreed to divide India into two dominions, it were the details that made it a cumbersome process.

As Mr Jinnah observed in a radio address, in June 1947, ‘It is clear that the plan does not meet in some important respects our point of view...we must galvanise and concentrate all our energies to see that the transfer of power is effected in a peaceful and orderly manner.’ But it was not meant to be so. The division of Punjab and Bengal, accession of Princely states, and the issue of Governor-General posed prickly problems, that would cast a shadow over the two new states; Indian leaders showed no spirit of compromise or equity to settle any of these issues. Sharing of river water confronted Pakistan with serious problems in the coming years.

The British did not make things easier by pushing back the transfer of power date to August 14. The issue of Governor General’s appointment emerged as a major issue. As Mountbatten had been sent to India as Viceroy, to oversee the transfer of power, he was keen to be the Governor-General for both countries. Mr Jinnah proposed three Governor Generals, one each for the two dominions and one Super Governor-General. He played smart, delaying his reply on the issue, as Mountbatten went to England with the partition plan. When he was pressed, he gave a diplomatic reply, reiterating his position, referring to ‘the interests of my people. He bore more pressure and did not give in. This deeply hurt Mountbatten; his becoming the Governor-General would have pleased the Hindus as well. While Mountbatten made sure that Pakistan got an unfair deal in the partition, Mr Jinnah denied him and the Hindus, cherished their desire. Mountbatten would facilitate India’s accession to Kashmir, and prevented rulers of Jodhpur and Jaisalmer from joining Pakistan. Against the wishes of the people, India would secure the accession of Kashmir under its Hindu ruler.

The Hindus were keen on the partition of Punjab and Bengal. A Boundary Commission was established to implement the 3rd June plan, under Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a British lawyer. The Muslim League had its concerns over Radcliffe’s credentials but he was accepted. The main area to be divided was Punjab, and it was expected to adhere to the partition plan and hand over the Muslim majority areas to Pakistan. Three districts, Amritsar, Ferozepur and Gurdaspur were given to India despite having a Muslim majority. Gurdaspur was considered critical as it provided a direct route to Kashmir. In its deliberations and award, the Commission also ignored the river courses. It is believed that an earlier version of maps had a different demarcation. Supposedly, Radcliffe carried out the unfair demarcation under the influence of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. This demarcation in Punjab denied Pakistan a direct route to Kashmir and provided easy access to India.

In an interesting study, Borders and Conflict in South Asia (2009), Lucy Chester re-examines the Radcliffe Award, bringing out some important factors that he ignored in the award. Radcliffe was a foreigner to Indian politics and lacked experience and expertise on such a critical issue. This ‘reinforced the impact of imperialist rule,’ Chester writes and points to the flawed process of partition.

In the less talked about the case of East Bengal, many Muslim majority areas around Sylhet were similarly handed over to India, adding to India’s geographic advantage in the northeast. Pakistani leaders, given the tumultuous times, had no choice but to accept the boundary under the Award.

While the Kashmir issue remains alive and unsettled after seven decades, this was not the only territorial issue causing bad blood. In September 1947, Junagarh, in Gujarat acceded to Pakistan, followed by Manvadar. But the Hindu population rose against the Nawabs decision. India annexed the two states after a referendum held in February 1948. But the same principle-wishes of the people was not applied in the case of Kashmir.

The above offers a glimpse of Pakistan’s predicament at partition. The Muslims had to fight on two fronts, the British and the Indian, for their due share in the Independence formula. As a new state, Pakistan emerged weak due to problems associated with partition. As a bigger state, inheriting developed areas, India undermined Pakistan, exploiting its vulnerabilities. The two neighbours remained at odds over almost everything; they went to war but were unable to settle issues. Kashmir situation remains volatile, with India adamant on settling it through negotiations. Nor is it able to pacify the Kashmiris.

In the regional context, India is braced to play its cards in the unsettling Afghan situation. Are we strong enough to face India in the east and the west? Do we have the requisite economic strength and diplomatic skills to pursue our foreign policy goals? The partition experience carries bitter memories, as do the later encounters. It may be too late to undo many wrongs of the partition; the spirit of the Independence Movement and Quaid’s words can yet guide us in meeting the current challenges.

–The writer teaches at Air War College Institute, Karachi. He can be reached at: pakirish@yahoo.com. (The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own)