Triumph of a failed system

The events of the past six years leave no doubt that Pakistan's real problem is not democracy or dictatorship. It is a failed political system that discourages the emergence of new leaders, keeps democracy hostage to family and clan interests and perpetuates conflict between power centers at the top. The best proof – if sixty years of domestic political upheaval is not enough – is Mr Musharraf's reign itself. He did well on the economy and foreign policy but his downfall resulted from ignoring the real problem: domestic political reform.

Pakistan was often accused of obsession with national security issues. The last decade proved that it can be a rising economy and a strong country at the same time. But it also proves that the hard work of several years of economic rise can be wiped out within months by our unstable system.

Does this mean democracy is bad for Pakistan? No, it means the instability inherent in the existing political system is bad for Pakistan. To strengthen democracy on permanent basis, the political system will have to be changed eventually. The only question is: who will do it? Can it be done through elections or will it have to be done through extra-constitutional measures, like a military government?

The Pakistani system has transformed into a monster with three heads: the president, the prime minister and the military chief. This is the reality despite all good intentions, and will continue to be. Almost all Pakistani governments eventually see conflict between these power centres. This would not happen in a stable system. But in our case, decades of alternating civilian and military governments have destabilized the entire system. Political governments continue to be weak because of the inability of political parties to evolve into institutions that create leaders and continue to be controlled by families and interest groups. Military governments may manage to bring some stability but military rulers end up getting busy in their own survival instead of reforming the system. The point is not to apportion blame. This is the system we have today. To let this system continue and hope that it will evolve and improve itself is to ignore a festering wound that is sapping the energies of an otherwise vibrant nation.

This instability will continue to result in incessant bickering and palace intrigues. It provides perfect opening for interference by outside powers that play sides and create unnatural situations. This instability had allowed outside powers to intervene hastening President Ayub Khan's downfall in the 1960s, and the renewed instability last year helped a superpower intervene this time around and hasten Mr Musharraf's demise. Our weak political system is also preventing us now from protecting our own regional interest because it conflicts with the interest of outside powers. There is no question that the outgoing president attracted some lethal enemies who saw him – and the Pakistani military behind him – as insincere in implementing foreign agendas. Empowering Mr. Musharraf's opponents and indirectly increasing pressure in our western regions were some of tactics used to ease Mr Musharraf out of power.

A strong Pakistani political system is one that should eliminate the prospects of 'wild cards'. It should be predictable. Political parties should be democratized by law. Educated and ordinary Pakistanis should be able to hold senior party office through a transparent internal ballot. Multiple provinces and local governments should emerge on administrative and not ethnic lines, devolving power and making all politics local. This is the best way to end ethnicity- and religion-based politics. The localization of all politics will help in achieving another important objective: ending the extreme politicization of Pakistani society. We have become too focused on politics at the expense of culture, education and the pursuit of good life. By getting people busy in improving their lives, creating wealth and finding avenues to spend this wealth, Pakistanis can find the stability that has eluded them so far.

What many Pakistanis don't know is that, in 2000, as the chief executive, General Musharraf did commission work on reforming the political system along those lines. However, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent turn of events, especially his decision to partially restore democracy in 2002 as a way of securing his own survival, derailed the reform plan. Mr. Musharraf's opponents have a right to celebrate. But let us not forget the other side of the coin. Today we are marking a continuation of the instability of the Pakistani system.



The writer works for Geo TV. Email: aq@ahmedquraishi.com