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Tuesday March 19, 2024

The talk of talks

Legal eye
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.
Can there be anything more tragic than a

By Babar Sattar
May 25, 2013
Legal eye
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.
Can there be anything more tragic than a Muslim killing a Muslim in the name of Islam? Can there be anything more abominable than a citizen killing a fellow citizen in the name of religion? Can there be something more dangerous for the future of state legitimacy than its inability to guarantee the most foundational right of a citizen – the right to life? Can there be something more damaging to the notion of state responsibility than its inability to ensure that its territory isn’t used to plot, administer and export terrorism? And if changing all this requires the state to request those in the business of terror to close shop, what’s wrong with such talks?
If all that was required to shut terror factories and their patrons and profiteers was asking them politely to stop, there would probably be realpolitik arguments in support of such talks that would trump arguments against them. Let’s assume for a second that there was a guarantee that talks would succeed and there would be no more deaths and acts of terror thereafter. Would we still oppose them? The point is that if the choice was between killing the killers or preventing any further killing (of the killers and their prospective victims), the rational mind would choose the latter notwithstanding countervailing principles.
The issue of those opposed to talks is that they have no faith in the prospect of their success. And in doing a cost-benefit analysis, the sense of naysayers is that failed talks will further hurt the interests of the state and jeopardise the lives of its citizens and soldiers, and benefit the terrorists. Logically speaking, negotiations are about give and take. What is it that the TTP wants and the state of Pakistan can give as part of such negotiations?
There is no sense that the TTP is looking to rejoin the fold of civilised society and return to being law-abiding citizens after it is granted amnesty for past crimes. At best it will make a series of ridiculous demands such as territorial autonomy within Waziristan, a self-administered legal code and liberty to attack infidels outside Pakistan’s borders. In short, the TTP will demand a state within the state of Pakistan in lieu of the concession to not attack Pakistani soldiers and citizens in mainland Pakistan.
No responsible state will be able to live with such a deal. If the TTP is seen as the new de facto government in any tribal agency, its recruitment drive will go up, its criminal franchises will become more brutal and effective and its tyrannical ways will become more obvious to all and sundry. The capitulation of the state before the TTP will make its leaders even more pig-headed. Allegiance to their ideology and expansion of their programme will necessitate that they violate terms of the deal struck with the state. And they will. Essentially we’ll see a replay of Swat.
It is here that we find the real difference between the advocates and the opponents of talks. The argument of informed advocates is that our nation is still confused about what to do with the TTP. If not backed by overwhelming public opinion, the use of force to rout terror is not an option. Talks with the TTP and the state’s compromising posture will neither dilute the hateful and renegade ideology of the TTP nor its murderous ways. But it will project its ugliness and expose the danger it poses to Pakistan and its citizens. And this will help build the required public support to take the TTP on.
The opponents believe that in the process the state will compromise principles, confuse law-enforcement personnel fighting the TTP and becoming its victims and the eventual fight that the state will have to fight against the TTP will be bloodier. Thus the costs of talking to the TTP as a means to building public opinion to eventually fight it outweigh its benefits. Notwithstanding their pros and cons, with the PML-N and the PTI’s commitment to talks, and given the army’s Swat success story and lessons learnt there, talks with the TTP will take place.
Some of those who claim to know Nawaz Sharif argue that he is neither a closet Taliban nor entertains any romantic ideas about their ideology and its roots. They argue that the PML-N’s policy in Punjab – hobnobbing with terrorists where it made political sense, and letting terror outfits alone on the condition that they do their business elsewhere – was one of pragmatism in a situation where Nawaz Sharif couldn’t control all the pieces of the puzzle. Now that the PML-N will be running the federal government, the story will be different and Sharif won’t shy away from using force against terror outfits if the less violent options don’t work.
A couple of hundred years ago, John Austin explained that a sovereign is someone who is habitually obeyed within his territory and doesn’t habitually obey anyone else within such territory. State sovereignty entails two related requirements: control over territory and monopoly over violence. In negotiating with the TTP, should Pakistan agree to cede control over some of its territory or choose to share monopoly over violence with an armed militia that practices an ideology of hate and wishes to export it across Pakistan and beyond, it will dilute its sovereignty.
The concept of state responsibility is equally relevant in this equation. You cannot claim respect for your territorial sovereignty and simultaneously argue that you exercise no control over territories used by non-state actors to plan and execute attacks on your own citizens and plot attacks on other states and their citizens. Whether lack of control or influence over non-state actors is a façade to disown responsibility for their actions or whether it is real, until we make zero-tolerance for non-state militant actors – the TTP, sectarian outfits or militant wings of political parties – a central plank of our anti-terror policy, it won’t click.
And this brings into focus our foreign and security policies. As the US starts packing up from our neighbourhood, we can’t go back to business as usual in Afghanistan and Kashmir. That was the big mistake we made in the 1990s. Keeping terror outfits gainfully employed elsewhere so long as they don’t attack the security forces and citizens of Pakistan will be a terrible choice. The linkages between terror organisations are such that we can’t deal with the TTP or any single terror outfit in isolation. You can’t take on the TTP and let the LeJ and the LeT carry on. If we are committed to routing terror, the policy will have to be uniformly applied.
To formulate a coherent anti-terror policy we need the federal government, provincial governments, the army, the ISI, the IB, the Nacta and provincial home ministries on the same page. Our anti-terror policy will need to be in sync with our policy toward India and Kashmir and our desired regional role as the future of Afghanistan unfolds. We will need to sever all links between intelligence agencies and militant groups and also develop zero-tolerance for patrons of terror outfits whether they are religious parties within Pakistan or benevolent foreign friends (who generously finance Pakistan and maybe even its terror outfits).
And once we have a coherent policy some parts of which don’t contradict other parts, in order to narrow the gap between policy and its implementation, we’ll have to focus on institutional capacity, delivery and governance: rebuild our police force as the frontline law-enforcement agency; develop a statutory framework for oversight of intelligence agencies (to provide for checks and balances without compromising organisational efficiency); and focus on governance, education and social safety nets especially in areas used as recruitment grounds by terror outfits.
The proposed talks will be a tactical manoeuvre for both the army and federal government, and the TTP. As we move forward to talk to our home-grown killing machines, let’s simultaneously put together a policy, a strategy and a plan to disassemble them by force so it is readily available once talks fail.
Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu