Common ground for regional stability

President Ashraf Ghani seems to have succeeded in developing a regional strategy for Afghan stability that capitalises on a shared commitment to Afghanistan and other common interests in the region. To promote convergence between Afghanistan and other states, he has approached a number of leaders in the last three months. He changed Afghan policy – from seeking defeat of Taliban to reconciliation with them – and most importantly accepted Pakistan’s central role in this pursuit.
All regional stakeholders are supportive of President Ghani’s initiative to share power with the Taliban to end the decades-old instability and violence in Afghanistan. It is hoped that the Taliban will take the offer seriously to build a new security framework in Afghanistan. Since coming into power, Ghani introduced major changes in Afghan foreign policy, especially concerning immediate neighbours and regional heavy-weights. Being a pragmatist, he steered Afghanistan away from the India-Iran nexus and towards Pakistan.
Ghani realised that he must build up rapport with Pakistan’s military establishment. He went to great lengths to take the Pakistan Army on board to use its influence over the Taliban to advance the national reconciliation process in the wake of US troops’ drawdown. Some suicide incidents in Pakistan helped consolidate the emerging collaboration. At the same time, he effectively resuscitated fractured links with the civilian government by visiting Islamabad to overcome the mutually nurtured trust deficit.
In an unusual move, President Ghani made his first foreign tour to China. In Beijing, he specifically requested Chinese leaders to leverage Pakistan with the Taliban to open dialogue with the Afghan government to end instability in the country. China did not disappoint him and hosted the Taliban’s delegation. Later its foreign minister offered his services to mediate between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Incidentally, neither the Taliban nor Afghanistan took the mediation offer seriously. In the meanwhile, President Ghani also received the vice president of Iran in Kabul and made a similar request to Iran. Despite differences with the Taliban, Iran assured its full support. Abdullah Abdullah was dispatched to New Delhi last month to secure implicit Indian support for the reconciliation process.
As regards Pakistan’s role, the US appreciates the recent improvement in the Pak-Afghan relations and their focused efforts towards regional stability. The US also acknowledges Islamabad’s stakes in Afghan-Taliban talks. President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah who are on a visit to the US have noted, in a jointly penned opinion piece, in the Washington Post that “our cooperation with Pakistan is increasingly depriving rebels of sanctuaries”. US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Dan Feldman has also confirmed that Afghan-Pakistan relations will certainly be part of the broader discussion during Ghani’s visit.
There is no doubt that the Afghan president’s visit to the US has overtaken the lacklustre Taliban-Afghan government talks. But the talks remain important even if they do not make any significant headway. Both sides apparently failed to develop consensus on basic key issues. They insisted on following different priorities. For the Taliban a share in the national government, quick withdrawal of foreign troops, future treatment of Taliban under detention, assimilation of their commanders in Afghan police etc are important.
The Afghan government considered immediate ceasefire, extension in the withdrawal schedule of the US troops, power sharing formula etc as their objectives. Given the wide gaps in their positions, there is no way that formal negotiations will soon begin. Ghani’s visit to the US may further complicate the process. The Taliban are unlikely to relent in their demand that reconciliation is impossible until foreign troops leave the Afghan soil. They had laid down the same conditions during Karzai’s presidency.
Media reports suggest that the Taliban are bitter and indignant. They are confident that the drawdown of US troops would lead to their assuming control of half of Afghanistan – and the Afghan government should recognise this position. The Taliban think the Afghan government is advancing US influence and interests in talks. They find the Afghan government’s attitude too oppressive and too rigid and anti-Afghan.
Their side presented several negotiating positions, including amendment of the Afghan constitution, share in the control of ministries and removal of their organization and leaders from international sanctions lists. The other side find the Taliban’s pre-conditions very tough. The Afghan government is not ready to accept that all foreign troops must leave the country immediately and is asking the US not to leave.
What is at stake for the Taliban today is not their survival but recognition as a credible power centre. They also want long-term stability and mutually agreeable power sharing in the government. Obviously, the Taliban perceive the objective of dialogue limited to calling off of the Spring Operation which is not an acceptable option when they can perpetuate their invincible self-rule in certain areas.
Presumably, Taliban entered the dialogue on the assurance by Pakistan, China and Saudi Arabia that foreign powers would not be allowed to influence the formation of the new power structure in Afghanistan. The entire process would be Afghan-led and in sync with ground realities, resetting the existing national government to accommodate the Taliban.
Such an assurance calls for changes in the Afghan constitution which may not come through as swiftly as the Taliban wish it to. If it were a question of sharing trivial ministries, some formulation could be worked out without disturbing important ministries like foreign affairs, interior, finance and security. But the Taliban are interested in a sizeable share in the government and governorship of some provinces as well as in rescinding detentions.
President Ashraf Ghani is conscious that his government may not be able to withstand the Taliban’s increased offensive. His government is more divided than that of his predecessor. His relations with his ‘prime minister’ are not smooth. The security team in his cabinet believes that Islamabad holds the key to resolution of Afghanistan’s problems, including reconciliation with the Taliban. Therefore, they are trying to bank on the influence of countries that are Pakistan’s allies to help with the progress of the peace project with the Taliban. This view is not completely owned by the full cabinet.
The sooner President Ghani realises that he cannot depend on China, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to rescue his government, the better it would be for him and his country. Who would know better than the Afghans that regional powers have not ceased their proxy wars in Afghanistan? Also, the Afghan people are not entirely in favour of allowing Talibanisation of Afghanistan, even a part of it. Any arrangement with them may cause a huge problem for the government.
Pakistan is pleased that Ghani’s government has launched operations against the TTP in eastern Afghanistan. There is no more anti-Pakistan rhetoric. But there are concerns that Indian influence in Afghanistan has increased not declined. There is a renewed demand that Pakistan must deliver in terms of the Taliban agreeing to a ceasefire before the spring offensive. Also, Pakistan should not be driving militants into Afghanistan. The Saudis have not done enough to tame the Taliban. China can use its economic lure but it has its limits. Iran has little leverage with the Taliban.
President Ghani has an opportunity to pursue peace negotiations in a manner that will reassure all Afghans that their concerns and interests will be taken into account.
The Afghan government and Taliban officials have to create a new avenue for peace negotiations to move ahead. The path of reconciliation is steep and the matching stamina on both sides is missing. Unless they feel motivated to transform the war ravaged country into a stable state, talks are doomed to fail as in the past. Afghanistan will continue to lose part of its sovereignty to its war lords and elites interested in the status quo.
In this case, Pakistan, Iran and China will feel the brunt of instability in Afghanistan. President Ghani cannot remain reticent over suicide explosions in Afghanistan for long and may have to find a foreign hand in order to cover up his inability to reign in the determined Taliban if the talks fail.
The writer is a former ambassador. Email: mian.sana@gmail.com