Indiscreet conjectures

My motivation to write, though a little late, is an article by one of our former ambassadors to the UN published in a national English daily on October 18, in which he counselled for cancellation of the prime minister’s visit to the US, since in his estimation relations between the two countries were headed for another showdown, like the one that erupted in the backdrop of the Raymond Davis incident, the Abbottabad incursion and the Salala attack.
The ambassador contended that the process had already started when the US National Security Advisor Susan Rice visited Pakistan in the last week of August, when reportedly she threatened Pakistan that the US would slash the Coalition Support Fund unless Pakistan acted decisively against the Haqqani Network. Apparently Pakistan was also asked to halt its long and short missile programmes as well as the production of fissile material.
He further revealed that US Secretary of state John Kerry – during his meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session – was more emphatic and apparently also called the prime minister by the latter’s first name; and that the US president’s special assistant was even more offensive in a meeting with the foreign secretary of Pakistan.
Relying on reports in the US media that the Americans were exploring possibilities of a ‘deal’ with Pakistan to limit the scope of its nuclear programme, he prophesised that Obama in his meeting with Nawaz Sharif would press for Pakistan obliging the US on the nuclear issue as well as action against the Taliban. And that Nawaz would be obliged to give a firm response to these unacceptable demands, insinuating that the US might be tempted to ask thinking that probably a civilian leader was more vulnerable to pressure than the military.
Before dilating on the points that he made in his article regarding relations between the two countries and what the US expects from Pakistan, let me at the outset state that his demand for cancellation of the visit, on whatever grounds, was a most undiplomatic proposition. Diplomacy is about engagement, and relations between states are not conducted and promoted through angry reactions or by disrupting the dialogue process.
By revealing that the US secretary of state adopted a hostile posture towards Nawaz Sharif and called him by his first name, neglecting all diplomatic norms and protocol niceties, was also an undesirable indiscretion on the part of a seasoned diplomat like him.
Though he has readily conceded that the US demand for halting the missile programme – which was a defensive response to the Indian arms build-up –- stemmed from the US tilt towards India for its role in containing China, his assumption that Nawaz Sharif would be more amenable to pressure than the military was probably the most preposterous suggestion.
However, as far as Pakistan’s nuclear programme is concerned, both military and civilian governments have stood firm on the issue, notwithstanding US sanctions and continuous pressure to cap it. The fact is that it was Nawaz Sharif who – ignoring US pressure and offer for assistance of billions of dollars – carried out nuclear explosions in 1998.
Entertaining the thought of a popularly elected leader like him to succumb to US pressure on an issue involving national security, is naiveté of the first order on the part of the former ambassador. He probably failed to take note of the unequivocal declaration by the prime minister himself before the visit: that Pakistan would never compromise on its missile and nuclear programme. The ambassador also did not notice the denials and rebuttals issued before the visit by our foreign ministry, and the spokesman of the White House, regarding any contemplated deal on the nuclear issue.
However, as we now know, the issue of capping Pakistan’s missile programme did not figure in the talks between Obama and Nawaz Sharif. Instead, they talked about stability and balance in South Asia – which in a way was an endorsement of Pakistan’s view in regards to parity with India. The US also seems to have understood Pakistan’s outlook on the Afghan issue. Obama underlined the need for our role in the future in ending conflict in Afghanistan, praising the action against terrorist outfits in North Waziristan.
The US top commander in Afghanistan John F Campbell, while testifying before the Armed Services Committee of US about two weeks before the visit. had said: “Senior Pakistan military officers have repeatedly declared that they can no long discriminate between ‘good and bad’ terrorists. They appear to be taking meaningful actions to back up their words”.
In the context of reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan has invariably stressed that it cannot persuade the Taliban to come to the negotiating table while being asked to take action against them. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, speaking at the United States Institute of Peace, was very candid on this position. Reaffirming Pakistan’s commitment to facilitate an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation, he said that talks and action against the Taliban cannot go together.
It is amazing that the ambassador did not keep track of the foregoing developments and merely relied on press reports to draw the conclusion that the time was not appropriate for the prime minister to visit the US and that the PM would be vulnerable to US pressure, and that he could not afford another Ufa – an insinuation that Prime Minister Nawaz had probably adopted a grovelling stance towards India in the Ufa declaration. I am afraid on the Ufa declaration too he is terribly out of sync with the ground realities.
The US visit and the dialogue with President Obama, contrary to the expectations of the ambassador and many others like him, was a great success since it not only provided the prime minister the chance to sensitise the UN and the US about India’s involvement in terrorist acts as well as our point of view on a possible solution to the Kashmir solution, but also to reiterate Pakistan’s stance on nuclear issues and the developments in Afghanistan at different forums.
The interaction with Obama was probably more productive than any previous meetings with him. Pakistan’s point of view was appropriately understood on the nuclear issue as well as Indian propaganda about Pakistan on terrorism. The joint statement talked about India and Pakistan working together to address mutual concerns on terrorism.
Had Nawaz Sharif cancelled the visit as suggested, it would have created a ‘show-down’ situation, which has been averted through astute and visionary diplomacy. President Obama, reportedly, had invited Nawaz Sharif for an official visit to the US in his meeting with him on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session.
However, the fact is that the invitation was formally extended to him by Susan Rice during her meeting with him when she visited Pakistan on August 30, 2015 in the backdrop of the Taliban attacks in Kabul. The invitation ostensibly related more to discussing the Afghan issue and Pakistan’s role in resolving the Afghan tangle.
The writer is a freelance contributor.
Email: ashpak10@gmail.com