Lesson of October 12, 1999

There is lot to learn from the debacle of October 12, 1999 when the then Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf overthrow the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in retaliation for his decision to sack him. But, the day led to another long military rule in the country, where democracy was still taking roots. There is a lesson for both the civil and military leadership. Their relationship has improved since then despite “ups and down,” something good for democracy, if it sustains.
After Musharraf, the first civilian government completed its tenure from 2008 to 2013 and ISI’s “Political Cell” was abolished and the present PML-N government had completed its first half. Both the former army chiefs General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani and the sitting Army Chief General Raheel Sharif backed the democratic order.
As we observe Oct 12 anniversary today, major political activities were witnessed in Lahore and Okara. Irrespective of the outcome of results, the fact remains that democratic norms are now being looked after and sense of maturity has come.
What the civilian leaders need to understand is the fact that they have to deliver, if given power, and establish good governance. But, what the establishment needs to understand is the fact that the government, how bad it may be, could only be removed through the 1973 Constitution and not through any extra-constitutional way adopted in 1958, 1968, 1977 or in 1999.
What Nawaz Sharif did on October 12, 1999 could be a wrong way to sack an army chief, but what Musharraf did was extra-constitutional, which could be judged from the fact that on that very day he coined the designation of “Chief Executive,” thanks to Sharifuddin Pirzada, as he was neither the President nor the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
He ruled for almost nine years and despite getting “legitimacy” from handpicked judiciary under the Provisional Constitutional Order, PCO, he could not even get that legitimacy for his action of Emergency Plus on November 3rd, 2007.
It is also a dilemma of our “Democratic Order,” that civilian rulers could be hanged, put in jail for years or sent into exile, while dictators, even if they abrogate or suspend the Constitution could not even be put on trial. This difference creates a gap between the “civil and military establishment and results in a sense of insecurity.
When Nawaz Sharif became prime minister for the third time after 2013, he wanted to put Pervez Musharraf on trial under Article VI, as he had not forgotten what he had done to him after the 1999 coup and nearly got death sentence for him, but foreign intervention withheld the move and Sharif went into long exile under an “agreement.”
Sharif soon realized that Musharraf’s trial may not go well with the establishment and now he doesn’t even discuss the issue.
The situation has improved a lot since the launch of operation “Zarb-e-Azb” and later National Action Plan (NAP). However, when the government initially decided to negotiate with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the establishment did not oppose the move but expressed its serious doubts about the success of talks. It was a better decision on the part of Nawaz Sharif as after the failure of talks even opposition leader like Imran Khan decided to support the army operation.
The role which General Raheel Sharif had played during Imran Khan’s “dharna” clearly showed the resolve of the establishment not to intervene in political affairs unless parties themselves seek their role.
It was Nawaz Sharif, who first asked him to play his role when the situation started getting out of control. This move disappointed opposition parties minus the PTI that that had already stood behind Parliament and put Imran under pressure. Both Imran and Dr Tahirul Qadri returned disappointed after meeting the army chief, as he had rejected their demand of PM’s resignation.
Although the role of the army in the national affairs has increased since the launch of the National Action Plan, it has the backing and endorsement of Parliament. The political leadership also knows that civilian agencies like police or even paramilitary are not trained or strong enough to fight this most difficult war against global terror networks.
In the past, Nawaz Sharif had “love-hate” relationship with successive army chiefs, but with Pervez Musharraf, he always had tense relations. Infect, he did not even know the General, when he appointed him as army chief.
So, October 12, 1999 could be judged from four different perspective.
(1) Musharraf’s nomination: He was not the first choice for Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who today must be regretting why in the first place he felt insecure with a passing remarks of the then Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat about the National Security Council. So, when the PM expressed his displeasure over the statement, Karamat resigned like a professional General.
Sharif initially wanted former General Ali Quli Khan, who was senior to Musharraf, but one of his interviews as Corps Commander in a newspaper or weekly changed Sharif’s mind.
It was the two closest members of Sharif’s “core committee,” Shahbaz Sharif and Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, who went to Murree and met Musharraf. It was after that meeting when the two strongly recommend his name as Karamat’s successor. Some sources said another person who played role in this nomination was Hameed Asghar Kidwai.
(2) Coup or counter coup: Much has been written on this and both Musharraf and Sharif have their views about it. But, not many people know about the relationship between the two prior to Kargil.
According to Pervez Rasheed, who was at that time Chairman PTV and paid a heavy price on the day of the coup on Oct 12, 1999, General Musharraf always looked ambitious as he often took interest in matters other than his professional responsibilities like economy, energy crisis, education, foreign affairs.
“Mian sahab always tried to keep the distance except on professional matters. Yes, Kargil was a turning point but things started getting tense since the visit of former Indian PM Vajpayee,” he said.
The controversy over the alleged meeting between the then Corps Commander Tariq Parvez with the prime minister further created tension after Musharraf reacted. “He never met the PM, but Mian Sahab did not make an issue,” Rasheed added.
Musharraf always denied that he ever had a plan for any Martial Law or to dislodge the government. Sharif’s decision was in haste which reflected from the way it was done. Former ISI chief General Ziauddin Butt’s nomination was rejected. It would be wrong to blame Musharraf alone for October 12 and the coup. The team, which refused to accept the command of Ziauddin Butt, could also be held responsible.
Musharraf wanted both Sharif and Benazir out of politics and kept them out of the mainstream. Yet the PPP emerged as the major party in the elections along with the PML. Thus, factions were created and PML-Q and PPP (Patriots) were made.
The MQM, which till 2002 kept its distance, supported him after he accepted its three demands of disbanding the MQM (Haqiqi), giving additional power to its governor and hading the administrative control of Karachi and Hyderabad and development funds.
The year 2007 was the turning point and it appeared as a section within the establishment wanted Musharraf to hand over power to the elected government. The Charter of Democracy, signed by Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, gave a strong message to the establishment.
(3) Musharraf-Imran relations: Imran supported him as he wanted both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir out. But Musharraf first wanted him to become chairman PCB. Later, in 2002 elections during one of the meetings, Musharraf told Imran that Chaudhries could be better to counter Sharifs. A former PTI leader, who was present in that meeting, told this correspondent that Imran then decided to distance himself from Musharraf.
(4) Way Forward: Better civil-military, relationship, but, how? Respect for the Constitution, rule of law and through policy of non interference in their respective domain. Let, judiciary be more independent but should also be accountable. Media should remain free but has to be As far as Article VI, is concerned...... it can’t be implemented as it threatens “civil-military,” relationship. Perhaps, Musharraf looked powerful after losing power and Sharif looked powerless despite regaining power for the third time.
The writer is the senior columnist and analyst of GEO, The News and Jang.