The new shape of Cold Start

The Indian Army is planning to raise three new integrated battle groups (IBGs) along the border with Pakistan. It also plans to raise similar IBG units along the Chinese border. The plan was discussed in the Indian Army commanders conference in October 2018 and now awaits defence ministry’s final approval, which may be forthcoming.

Indian military officials claim that the IBGs will enhance India’s battle readiness and capabilities for swifter action along the borders with Pakistan and China.

“The Indian Army has carried out successful test of the new integrated battle group concept which will be a battle formation with heavy firepower including armoured, infantry and all other war fighting capabilities. We are going to raise three of these formations by October this year,” the army officials said according to Indian media reports.

The reports said the “integrated battle groups will aid swifter troop and equipment mobilization into the enemy territory. It could be done at a short notice — even before the enemy gets ready to tackle the thrust.”

Another report said: “The IBGs are a part of Army Chief General Bipin Rawat’s initiatives to reorganise and right-size the operational structure. They integrate different components of the Army like artillery guns, tanks, air defence and logistical elements. The new battle formations will also come up on the China border after they are successfully tested and established on the front with Pakistan.”

As against the fighting formation of corps — each comprising 8-10 brigades, with a brigade having 3-4 battalions of 800 fighting men each — an IBG is likely to have just about six battalions. An IBG will comprise of around 5,000 troops and will be commanded by officers holding the rank of Major General. Indian Army claims that IBGs can be utilised for both offensive and defensive roles, and are an important military innovation to keep up with the needs of modern warfare.

Indian analysts claim the Cold Start doctrine was devised following the Indian Army’s failure to mobilise quickly in response to the alleged December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. They say India’s mobilization along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, codenamed Operation Parakram, occurred at a slow pace and it took three weeks for the Indian military to move 500,000 troops and three armored divisions and support units (the strike corps) to the border. (The Indian military also sustained around 400 casualties during mine-laying operations.) The Indian Army lacked strategic surprise and withdrew after a 10-month standoff.

In January 2017, Indian Army chief General Bipin Rawat had stated in an interview: “The Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military operations. Whether we have to conduct conventional operations for such strikes is a decision well thought through, involving the government and the Cabinet Committee on Security.”

However, the Cold Start’s fate remains murky. According to an Indian analyst: “Notably, there is very little public evidence that the Indian Army is capable of executing CSD in the event of a new military confrontation between India and Pakistan at the moment or in the near future. Next to the ambivalent results of a number of Indian war games practicing various aspects of CSD in the last years, a cursory look at Indian military hardware reveals major deficiencies and capability gaps that would hinder the current execution of large-scale offensive operations against Pakistan. For example, the Indian Army still lacks a sufficient number of operational modern main battle tanks, in particular T-90SMs, the most advanced version of the T-90. Also, the majority of indigenously developed third generation Arjun MK-I main battle tanks are currently grounded due to various technical problems and missing spare parts. An upgraded version of the Arjun is currently under development but it is unclear when it will become operational. Furthermore, the Indian Army lacks self-propelled tracked howitzers for close artillery support. Only in May 2017 did the Indian Ministry of Defence decide to go ahead with the purchase of the first batch of 100 modified K-9 Vajra 155 mm/52 caliber guns. Overall, the Indian Army will need at least 250 self-propelled guns for its strike corps. In addition, the army lacks advanced mobile air defense systems to cover the advance of armored forces. Even more critically, the Indian military has been suffering from a chronic ammunition shortage for the past two decades. Current ammunition levels would only last for about 10 days of high intensity war.

“Additionally, the Indian Air Force currently lacks the close-air support capability necessary for swift armored thrusts into Pakistani territory. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) Light Combat Helicopter only completed weapons trials this month. The inter-service rivalry, partially influenced by the fact that CSD has been developed by the Indian Army, has also made integration and synchronization of air-ground operations challenging (air assets of the Indian Navy only play a minor role in CSD). For example, the Indian Air Force insists that its principal mission remains air-to-air combat and strategic bombing, which has caused consternation between the former and the Indian Army Air Corps. “For a number of years, the Indian Army has been engaged in a tug of war with the Indian Air Force over who should operate [a] future fleet of Apache gunships. The Army initially asked for the gunships to be inducted into its ranks, or for the Air Force to at least share the helicopters with the ground forces.”

Besides the analyst’s opinion, one wonders if the Indian Army has taken into equation the Pakistani response to its Cold Start pipedream. Will the IBGs allowed to march on without resistance into the Pakistani or Chinese territory? The truth is IBGs or the concept of SNIPE - Short Notice Intense Proactive Escalatory operations - will have little chance of working when put into operation.

There will be little element of surprise or competitive advantage for India followed by unexpected confusion, mistakes, collateral damage besides massive retaliation in the localised war theatre.