The rule of the Ms

With the death of Thailand’s power-broker, General Prem Tinsulanonda, on May 26, 2019, at the age of 99, a long history of political meddling has come to an end. Keen observers of history and politics draw parallels between civil-military relations in various countries. Such comparative discussions and studies help us understand how tugs-of-war unfold in countries where state institutions and functionaries vie against political governments and leaders. In most cases, state institutions retain their preeminence by circumventing political processes, and by maligning politics and politicians as enemies of the state.

For this struggle, a country does not have to be a military dictatorship. For example, if we look at Iran we realize that it is a theocracy wrapped in an electoral democracy of sorts, but the real power remains in the hands of the security establishment and state institutions that are protected by a Guardian Council of religious leaders led by a supreme authority, Ayatollah Khamenei. The security establishment, encompassing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and having multiple organs, enjoys absolute control over the Iranian society. Wide business interests make it an economic elite in which the top brasses of the military and the mullahs can paralyze an elected government at will.

We see a slightly different mechanism in India, especially in the 21st century. In India, the military-mullah alliance of Iran is replaced by an increasingly strong collusion between big money and monks – though it is also supposed to be a functioning democracy. Big capitalists and industrialists have supported and sided with the BJP which, in turn, has used religion almost in the same manner as is done in Iran. To this military-money-monk/mullah equation we may also add another M denoting the media.

The control of the media plays an important role in this game of thrones. Be it India, Iran, Pakistan, or Thailand, state institutions co-opt the media, representing a moneyed class which itself is part of the power elite. In Iran, all media are strictly controlled by the state institutions and no open criticism of the military-mullah elite is tolerated, though one can criticize the elected political government as much as one wishes. Religious elders too off and on disparage the politicians and political leaders as being corrupt, under foreign influence, and even for not being sufficiently religious and reverent toward the supreme leader.

In Pakistan, the military-mullah nexus that was established by General Zia over four decades ago was further cemented by the inclusion of the third M – the media – over the past twenty years. Hindu monks in India are increasingly becoming more powerful and threatening towards the media, and in this game the big media are already on their side, apart from some insignificant electronic and print media outlets.

You move further east towards Myanmar (Burma) and Thailand and again you see the three Ms in collusion. In Thailand, another M is added, which represents the monarchy. In Burma, the military has been in power for the most part of its history. Initially it projected itself as a socialist-leaning army, but after the collapse of socialism the world over in the 1990s, it sided more with the monks who wielded influence among the Buddhist masses. After the 1988 abortive elections in Burma, in which Aung San Suu Kyi was winning a landslide, the military not only canceled the election results but also made a shift to religion.

The use of religion against political forces has been a hallmark in almost all autocratic or dictatorial regimes, even if they are in the garb of a functioning democracy. Iran and Pakistan have Shia and Sunni dominated sectarian forces, in India it is the Hindutva brigade of the Sangh Parivar and in Burma and Thailand there are monks and monarchists. Overtly or covertly supported by the power elite, they all become vocal – and at times violent – against democratic activists, leaders and parties that challenge the dominant narrative of nationalism, patriarchy, militarism, and religious bigotry.

With this background, coming to the recently deceased Thai general, Prem Tinsulanonda, we see that during the past 50 years or so he commanded tremendous authority in Thai politics. He played his role as a staunch monarchist and as a flag-bearer against democracy under the guise of nationalism, monarchy, and patriotism. Since 1932 Thailand has seen 13 coups and the power elite have had the military and the monarchy as their bedfellows. General Prem played an instrumental role in crushing democratic movements in Thailand since the 1970s. He ruled directly as prime minister from 1980 to 1988 and till his death remained influential.

The three defining factors in Thai politics have been the military, the monarchy, and the monks. The military has ruled for most of the period since 1947, though there have been a few interludes in which the country had a democratically elected government. All along, Thai politics has been dominated by the irreconcilable split between supporters and detractors of democracy. Though Thailand is a constitutional monarchy the real power has always been with the army.

The military and the monarchy rely on a powerful Privy Council of royal advisers and General Prem was the president of the Privy Council for more than two decades. The Privy Council works much in the same fashion as the Guardian Council of the Constitution in Iran, or the National Security Council in Pakistan. These councils reflect different contexts specific to their countries, are not always active and don’t interfere in the country’s matters regularly. But when it comes to major decision-making they can suddenly spring into action and make decisions that can override democratic considerations.

In Thailand, the powerful retired general Prem headed the PC till his death. In Iran the GCC is composed of twelve members most of whom are appointed by the supreme leader. In Pakistan, the NSC is nominally headed by the PM but overwhelmingly influenced by the military as far as important decision-making is concerned. So, the deep state can exert its influence in multiple ways – be it a theocracy as in Iran, a controlled democracy such as in Pakistan, or a constitutional monarchy as in Thailand. The supreme decision-making power is thus retained in the name of nationalism, patriotism, religion, or security.

In Thailand, the prime minister might succumb to a vote of no confidence. This, though, has never happened. You may draw a parallel with Pakistan where no PM has completed a full five-year term and no PM has been removed through a no-confidence motion, the constitutional and legal method used in democracies. In Thailand, the PM’s office has mostly been occupied by military leaders from the Royal Thai Army, three of them held the rank of field marshal and seven the rank of general.

Though in Pakistan no military leader has assumed the title of PM, the executive powers have been wielded by generals who were self-appointed presidents – Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf. Such rulers here move into oblivion after retirement, unlike General Prem of Thailand who was a master survivor. He continued to hold tremendous powers with his machinations with the military and the monarchy. He established the Thai military’s influence in politics so much so that it is still ruled by an army general with no desire to relinquish power in the near future.

The writer holds a PhD from theUniversity of Birmingham, UK and works in Islamabad.

Email: mnazir1964@yahoo.co.uk