Operation Raddul Fasaad

Operation Raddul Fasaad (RAF) has been launched at a critical time in national history. In almost two decades, this nation has witnessed over a dozen large, heavily-publicised military campaigns and a number of smaller operations to eradicate terrorism. RAF, therefore, seems to be just another name on this long list of impressive titles that have been used to threaten troublemakers.

This cynicism is partially justified. The previous operations were all awe-inspiring. Operations Black Thunder, Sherdil, Rah-e-Haq (1, 2 and 3), Rah-e-Rast, Sirat-e-Mustaqeem, Daraghlam, Bia Daraghlam, Khwakh ba de Sham, Khyber (1, 2 and 3) and Rah-e-Nijat were led by General Kiyani. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was planned earlier and implemented in its modified form by former COAS General Raheel Sharif.

The first 13 cleared a long and vast stretch of territory – from Shangla in the north to South Waziristan in the north west along with six agencies and as many adjoining areas. The last one focused on North Waziristan. Earlier forces had been inducted in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas by General (r) Musharraf who gingerly moved across a terrain that the state had always avoided treading. Now, 15 years later, after losing thousands of men, women and children and incurring costs worth billions of dollars to the national exchequer, why do we need another operation?

Such cynicism also rides high on the back of the over-marketing of Zarb-e-Azb by General Raheel’s spin stars. The general claimed many times on the record that the country had rid itself of terrorism and that he, singlehandedly, had delivered lasting peace. Such bombast created a large bubble of popular notion that a collective nirvana was around the corner and eternal bliss – free of the cycle of death and destruction – had started to descend on the land. Statistics of falling rates of terrorism were shown as evidence of his claims.

This hid the ugly reality that while the nation was made to stand in praise of General Raheel, displaced terrorists were being networked by Afghan, Indian and Western agencies into a diabolical new force of terror. This was happening not deep inside Afghanistan, but barely a kilometre away from our border. For instance, the Afghan military check post across Torkham hosted two camps to facilitate bombers and their hosts into Pakistan. Despite knowledge about it, little was done about it.

Since all debate on the weaknesses of Operation Zarb-e-Azb was choked, equated with treason or met with a torrent of abuse from hired guns on social and mainstream media, these dimensions became a blind spot for the nation. Now that RAF has been unfurled, the victims of the crass propaganda of ‘100 percent success’ are having a hard time digesting the reality of where we actually stand on the matrix of progress against organised terror – and we don’t stand very high.

However, this context makes RAF more relevant, important, and critical for the future than all other previous operations combined. It has to succeed entirely for the country to have a real chance at planning a prosperous future for itself. If not implemented ruthlessly and allowed to become hostage to power politics and PR, it can cause collateral damage.

From what we have read about and seen of RAF so far, it is, unlike previous operations, bi-focal. It defines the task of securing Pakistan’s borders as organically linked with securing the home front: the more terrorism is defeated at home, the more secure the borders will become. This co-growth of border and inland security depends on what can be termed the simultaneous co-operationalisation of civilian and military resources and authority.

The model under which the Rangers are now operating in Punjab provides evidence of this strategy. Under the co-authority of military and civilian officers, aided by a committee that joins the intelligence pools of civilian and military institutions, operations are conducted jointly. Depending on the nature of the case, the legal battle to get the accused prosecuted will also be a joint effort.

This model has not come about accidentally: there seems to be a deliberate intent behind it. Inland security is not just a kinetic affair, even though many have been killed in the ongoing operations. It is primarily an intelligence-based effort. While the broad intelligence of new urban networks is available with the military institutions, when it comes to local networks of distant or congested neighbourhoods, civilian institutions like the counterterrorism department (CTD) offer a better and more accurate assessment.

One of the cardinal goals of RAF– deweaponisation and explosives control – hinges crucially on cooperation from the civilian government and with civilian institutions –as do the re-institution of military courts and the fencing of the border with Afghanistan. Both these efforts will not succeed without the government delivering legislation, consensus, and funds.

No previous operation has shown such elaborate sensitivity to the internal battle that the country has to fight to win durable security. In fact, no attention was previously paid to the blowback of military operations on the borders onto Pakistan’s cities and hinterlands. Nor did anyone care to find out how the displaced groups simply mutated and revived themselves by grafting themselves onto local hosts. As a result, all success attained through the supreme sacrifices on the forward posts of Fata and Balochistan remained transient – a recess before terrorism resumed.

RAF attempts to plug this hole from where national hope of permanent peace has been leaking regularly. And this is being done – so far at least – without any PR stunts, victory parades and embellished claims which had been the hallmark of Operation Zarb-e-Azb – even though other operations were not devoid of this syndrome either. We hope RAF stays low-key in that respect. Actions ought to speak louder than tweets.

While the criticality of RAF’s success for the country’s prosperous future cannot be emphasised enough, its smooth functioning depends on a few conditions that need to be constantly met for it to stay on course.

First, civil-military cooperation and a stable political environment is the key. From operational friction to strategic misunderstanding, both ought to be avoided or a mechanism formed for them to be resolved quickly through direct communication. So far, the model of owning important decisions as mutual endeavours has worked. The federal government and the GHQ have acted as two wheels of the cart, with neither trying to outrun the other. It should stay that way. Countering terror is not a publicity war against each other.

Second, empowering the police and reorienting the judiciary is a must to secure the long-term gains of RAF. The deployment of the Rangers in Punjab creates more space for the provincial police to carry out modernisation and upgrade their institutional infrastructure. A Sindh-like situation, where the Rangers practically have replaced the police, is not practical in Punjab. Extending paramilitary forces’ stay in urban areas is long-term trouble. Police capacity has to be increased to take full control of cities in the final phase of RAF.

The judiciary has to become a willing and active partner in RAF. So far, the honourable judges have operated from their protected and haloed silos, in their reflections concerning themselves mostly with matters of political morality. Cases like Panama have showered much publicity on the independence of the judiciary. However, Pakistan’s future rests on defeating terrorism, not on judicial populism. Without prosecuting those waging war against the state, the country isn’t moving an inch. Politicians are easy pickings. Anyone can lay into them and claim glory. Dealing with terrorists requires guts and commitment.

We haven’t seen much of that yet. No prosecution. No end to terrorism. It is this simple because hardcore terror is dealt with through the application of force – mostly extra-judicial force, which ideally should not happen but does. It is the grey category that is the heart of the matter and this where judicial activism has been sorely lacking.

Third, media debates need to be injected with realism and some sense of responsibility. This is the job of the media industry itself. Last week’s Lahore explosion coverage shows the destructive power of mindless reporting and poor editorial judgement. An explosion in the basement of a building stunned the country and paralysed the whole city because of irresponsible reporting.

No less significant is the need to contain that malcontent in the media industry which promotes hate and constantly propagates violence in the name of nationalism. These elements are no less dangerous than the terrorists that RAF is chasing. They may be wearing national flags on their chests but their tongues are IEDs set to demolish the Quaid’s Pakistan that RAF aims to build.

The writer is former executive editor of The News and a senior journalist with Geo TV.

Email: syedtalathussain@gmail.com

Twitter: @TalatHussain12