The Taliban factor

Part - IV

The recent deadly assaults in Kabul and Kandahar show that the Afghan Taliban have managed to sustain the power to attack and create fear at will.

Despite the 15-year war, the Afghan Taliban still appear to be an active player in Afghanistan. The mere presence of the Taliban, notwithstanding the death of their prominent leadership, suggests that they have the strength to survive and give a tough time to the fragile coalition government in Kabul.

Though the Afghan government primarily blames Pakistan for the Taliban’s sponsorship, it is a widely acknowledged fact that external powers – such as Iran, Russia and Qatar – have also established links with the Taliban. Iran’s intelligence influence has remarkably increased among the Taliban field commanders of southern Afghanistan. Some insiders even claim that Russia and Iran’s influence has overshadowed Pakistan’s influence in the Taliban circle. Though Kandahar’s police chief has pinned the blame for the recent deadly bombing that killed five UAE diplomats on the Haqqani Network, he also acknowledged the support Iran and Russia have provided to the Taliban. The internal weaknesses of the Afghan government and their own external links have raised the Taliban’s morale and enhanced their striking capabilities.

However, it is believed that the Taliban cannot regain Kabul to establish their orthodox rule. There are many reasons for this. First, though the US and Nato have withdrawn from Afghanistan, they have continued to maintain a formidable presence in the shape of drones and base camps. The Afghan army on the ground and the US drones and jets in the air have made it impossible for the Taliban to occupy even a single province for a sustained period of time. The short-term occupation and quick withdrawal of the Taliban from Kunduz reflects their inability to rule any part of Afghanistan.

Second, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) has become a victim of internal weaknesses and leadership problems. Mullah Haibatullah, the current chief of the Afghan Taliban, is unable to keep a stronghold on the Taliban like Mullah Umar and Mullah Akhtar Mansour did. Being one of the founding and charismatic leaders of the Taliban Movement, Mullah Umar had won the emotional attachment and affection of the Taliban.

Similarly, Mullah Mansour had led the Taliban in the field and had established a close working relationship with field commanders. Mullah Haibatullah lacks both these qualities. He is a religious scholar who lacks both charismatic leadership as well as field experience. At the same time, he has no effective contacts or communication with the field commanders.

In addition, there is a huge difference between the approaches of the Taliban’s political shura and field commanders. The field commanders insist on continuing to fight while the political shura is willing to reconcile with the Afghan government. These conflicting approaches have put the Taliban leadership in a dilemma. If it accepts the approach adopted by the field commanders, reconciliation with the Afghan government will become impossible. However, if it opts for reconciliation and ignores the field commanders, an internal revolt within the Taliban will become imminent.

Third, the Taliban’s audacity and assaults may have spiked to a remarkable degree, public support for the Taliban’s cause in Afghan society is rapidly shrinking. Earlier, due to the presence of the US and Nato on Afghan soil, the public showed widespread support to the Taliban. The indiscriminate killings, night raids and acts of collateral damage by foreign troops pushed the people towards the Taliban camp.

Many people considered Hamid Karzai to be a puppet of the US and viewed the Taliban as liberators who were fighting against the invaders. However, with the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Taliban lost this support. The public is now unwilling to support the Taliban’s fight against the Afghan army and police. Instead, they now consider the Afghan Taliban to be agents of the external powers. In addition, the indiscriminate killing of civilians in suicide bombings and target killings orchestrated by the Taliban have created a wave of fear and insecurity and fuelled hatred against them.

Besides the fear factor, the changing nature of Afghan society has also created anti-Taliban sentiments. Over the last 15 years, Afghan society has fundamentally changed. The vibrant media –with more than three dozen TV channels, 174 radio stations and hundreds of newspapers and journals – has played a critical role in building awareness among the people. The easy accessible electronic and social media and the availability of smartphones have contributed immensely to the transformation of Afghan society. As a result, the new generation is aware of its surroundings and conscious of its rights and duties.

Ashraf Ghani has inducted young talent into the bureaucracy to change governance patterns and public perceptions. Well-educated Afghans, who have returned from the West and are serving the country in various capacities, have also inspired the new generation. Western restaurants have also been opened in big cities and have introduced a new culture and lifestyle. Music concerts are regularly held in many large cities of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s cricket team has also starting playing on the international level.

All these factors have changed the ground realities and reduced the space for the Taliban to rule. Afghan society will never want to go back to the era of 1994-2001 when the Taliban reigned supreme. The external powers will also never let this happen. Ignoring the ground realities, the Afghan Taliban still harbour the illusion of regaining Kabul. They have failed to recognise the new realities and change their perceptions accordingly. However, their perceptions about Pakistan have fundamentally changed.

This article is part of the writer’s ‘Afghanistan’ series.

To be continued

The writer works for Geo TV.

Email: saleem.safi@janggroup.com.pk