Endless wars

Trump knows next to nothing about ISIS, one of many gaps in his education that his impending encounter with actual reality is likely to fill.  Trump’s unhappy verdict – that the senior U.S. military leadership doesn’t know how to win – applies in spades to the two principal conflicts of the post-9/11 era: the Afghanistan War, now in its 16th year, and the Iraq War, launched in 2003 and (after a brief hiatus) once more grinding on.  Yet the verdict applies equally to lesser theaters of conflict, largely overlooked by the American public, that in recent years have engaged the attention of U.S. forces, a list that would include conflicts in Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.

Granted,our generals have demonstrated an impressive aptitude for moving pieces around on a dauntingly complex military chessboard.         Brigades, battle groups, and squadrons shuttle in and out of various war zones, responding to the needs of the moment.    The sheer immensity of the enterprise across the Greater Middle East and northern Africa – the        sorties flown, munitions expended, the seamless deployment and redeployment of thousands of troops over thousands of miles, the vast stockpiles of material positioned, expended, and continuously resupplied – represents a staggering achievement. Measured by these or similar quantifiable outputs, America’s military has excelled.       No other military establishment in history could have come close to duplicating the logistical feats being performed year in, year out by the armed forces of the United States.

Nor should we overlook the resulting body count.  Since the autumn of 2001, something like 370,000          combatants and noncombatants have been killed in the various theaters of operations where U.S. forces have been active. Although modest by twentieth century standards, this post-9/11 harvest of death is hardly trivial.

Yet in evaluating military operations, it’s a mistake to confuse    how much with how well. Only rarely do the outcomes of armed conflicts turn on comparative statistics.       Ultimately, the one measure of success that really matters involves achieving war’s political purposes. By that standard, victory requires not simply the defeat of the enemy, but accomplishing the nation’s stated war aims, and not just in part or temporarily but definitively.

By that standard, having been ‘at war’ for virtually the entire twenty-first century, the United States military is still looking for its first win. And however strong the disinclination to concede that Donald Trump could be right about anything, his verdict on American generalship qualifies as apt.

In earlier eras, the very structure of wars provided a relatively straightforward mechanism for testing such claims to expertise.   Events on the battlefield rendered harsh judgments, creating or destroying reputations with brutal efficiency.

Back then, standards employed in evaluating generalship were clear-cut and uncompromising.         Those who won battles earned fame, glory, and the gratitude of their countrymen. Those who lost battles got fired or were put out to pasture. Today,     public drunkenness,   petty corruption, or   sexual shenanigans   with a subordinate might land generals in hot water.       But as long as they avoid egregious misbehavior, senior officers charged with prosecuting America’s wars are largely spared judgments of any sort.  Trying hard is enough to get a passing grade.

With the country’s political leaders and public conditioned to conflicts seemingly destined to drag on for years, if not decades, no one expects the current general-in-chief in Iraq or Afghanistan to bring things to a successful conclusion.

The United States may today have the world’s most powerful and capable military – so at least we are constantly told.         Yet the record shows that it does not have a corps of senior officers who know how to translate capability into successful outcomes.

The article has been excerpted from: ‘Donald Trump and the Swamp of Endless War?’

Courtesy: Commondreams.org