Bartering sovereignty for money

Pakistan is making a grave error of judgement by aligning itself with an interventionist philosophy in Syria. The fact that it is Saudi Arabia that is the convenor of the interventionism is secondary to the larger issue in Syria. The larger issue is quite simple.
Syria is too complex for any external actor to completely understand properly, much less enact a solution. This was as true for Iraq in 2003 as it is for Syria in 2014 – but the difference is the mass slaughter of innocent Syrians, including children at the hands of a brutal and inhuman Iran-supporter dictatorship, led by Bashar Al-Assad, and a brutal part Al-Qaeda, part not, hatred-fuelled, Saudi-supported insurgency, led by whoever gets a microphone pushed in their face on that day.
The slaughter in Syria is an unforgiveable tragedy. But it is neither Saudi Arabia’s job, nor Iran’s, nor America’s nor the European Union’s, nor Turkey’s, nor Russia’s and most certainly not Pakistan’s tragedy to solve. Syria is a hornet’s nest and intervention in that country is a fool’s errand that can only exacerbate and complicate the bloodletting.
Unfortunately, there is no shortage of fools in the global political arena, and worse still, there is no shortage of money to sustain international folly.
Intervention in Syria is a bad idea whether it is in support of Saudi Arabia’s decidedly sectarian concern for Syria, or in support of US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power’s decidedly humanitarian “responsibility to protect” concern for Syria.
What about Pakistan? In a brilliant blog post this week at the Five Rupees blog, George Mason University professor Ahsan Butt has put it most succinctly. “Is it wise and advisable,” he asks, “to wade into a sectarian civil war two thousand miles away?”
The answer? “Obviously not. Some states can afford to do so, and bless their heart, they are intervening to their heart’s content. So be it. We do not have to join them.”
To understand the reason for Pakistan’s sudden change of heart, we need to revisit the structure of the Pakistani state and the model of governance that has been in place, regardless of the kind of government we’ve had, since at least 1979.
Arguably, the structure of the Pakistani state is primarily patronage-based. Whether general, or professor, or World Bank vice president, or classical South Punjab feudal, or neoclassical Central Sindh Wadera, every manner of Pakistani ‘leader’ employs patronage as the first and last port of call to create, enhance and deepen his or her legitimacy. Every Pakistani leader needs a pot of patronage that he can distribute.
This pot, (later pool, and later reservoir) of patronage cannot be produced by appeals to Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, or Rehman Baba or Data Ganj Baksh. It requires hard cash. Hard cash is unavailable in the bowels of our syncretic Sufi culture.
For hard cash, we must turn to our other saints: Saeen America Bahadur, Hazrat Saudi Arabia Al-Ikhwan Al-Ummah, and Baba Cheen Tse Dong. Occasionally, we must also seek the blessings of Daata Le European Union and Peer Dubai Oasis Fil-Desert Wal-Cristal.
In short, we are now suddenly pro-intervention in Syria not because we love Muslims. And not because we are pro-Sunni or anti-Shia. And not because we love human rights. And not because we are sickened by the slaughter of innocent people. No.
We are now pro-intervention in Syria because we cannot pay our bills, and if we cannot pay our bills, then somebody won’t get re-elected. And since the state structure and model of governance is patronage-based, governments need to be able to not only pay Pakistan’s bills, but also have some left over so that Pakistan can do both good and not so good things: sparkplug entrepreneurship with youth loan schemes, protect the poor and vulnerable with the Benazir Income Support Programme (all good), and continue to subsidise an array of rich farmers, richer brokerage firms, and even richer textile magnates (all not so good).
This model of governance, any halfwit can tell you, is unsustainable, if there isn’t a steady supply of hard cash. And given the appetite around the world for fool’s errands, like intervention in Syria, it stands to reason that there are plenty of fools willing to underwrite Pakistan’s unsustainable model of governance with hard cash, ad infinitum, because, let’s face it, it really is true – there is no shortage of fools in the global political arena, and worse still, there is no shortage of money to sustain international folly.
This treadmill of unsustainablility and dysfunction in Pakistan continues unaffected by power cuts, or the laws of thermodynamics because just like Pakistan is willing to foolishly wade into the Syria hornet’s nest, many countries are willing to foolishly wade into Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance, with offers small enough to embarrass any Pakistani with a smidge of pride, but large enough to entice our servile economic and financial bureaucracy, and the political incompetence that sustains it.
Since 1979 Pakistan has consistently refused to appoint a people’s politician as finance minister. The reason is simple. No self-respecting man of the people could possibly manage to do what Pakistani finance ministers regularly do. Use other people’s hard cash to sustain Pakistan’s internal dysfunction. The parade of highly effective bureaucrats, accountants and economists that Pakistan employs as finance ministers is an international who’s who.
Whether under Gen Musharraf or Gen Zia, or under Shaheed BB, or PM Sharif, this corps of highly competent men have successfully enabled Pakistan to go from one failed IMF programme to the next, from one enthusiastic international partner to the next. The three repeating themes in those partners? America loves the Pakistan Army. Saudi Arabia loves the Pakistan Army. China loves the Pakistan Army. On the two existential tests of Pakistan’s core interest, they all fail. All three countries have consistently failed Pakistani democracy and all three countries have consistently failed to create international pressure for a resolution to the Kashmir issue.
And still Pakistan keeps turning to them. And still Pakistani leaders alternately keep expressing ‘trust’ in them. Over and over and over again. Why?
The secret is not embedded inside the vaults of the CIA at Langley, or in RAW files, or even at the ISI offices at Aabpara. The secret is embedded in our national accounts. We cannot pay our bills, and we are ruled by people who are part of the problem – because they do not pay their taxes.
Their solution is to barter Pakistani sovereignty for the sake of hard cash. This would be ok if the transactions of Pakistani leaders, democratic and military both, did not have adverse effects. But there are adverse effects. The fallout is both intense and long term. As a result of these transactions, Pakistan’s relations with its neighbours (Afghanistan and Iran) are badly broken and its internal harmony is deeply compromised.
Many will misdiagnose Pakistan’s swing toward Saudi Arabia as a confirmation of some sort of sectarian-inspired policy shift. This is a misdiagnosis. The actual disease is much more malign. Increasingly, Pakistan’s mood swings are almost entirely informed by financial concerns.
Pakistan keeps doing things to please countries and organisations that have money to spare – the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the US, China, and increasingly, once again, Saudi Arabia.
No country is deliberately trying to ruin Pakistan. But international relations is not constructed entirely of altruistic motives. If it was, Saudi aid would have preceded – not followed – the Syria policy shift and American F-16s would have preceded, not followed the Afghanistan intervention. Countries act out of self-interest, not friendship or brotherliness.
The writer is an analyst and commentator.