Ineffective remedy

In Ethiopia, where ethnic divisions run deep, and inter-communal conflicts coupled with environmental disasters have already displaced close to two million people, the collapse of the government can lead to genocide, the disintegration of the country, and mass migration. All this would not only cause much more suffering for Ethiopians but also destabilise the region.

Even if the government can avoid total collapse, the inevitable reduction in government expenditure in basic services – such as the provision of clean water, health, education, and agricultural services – would disproportionately harm the poor, and deepen existing divisions.

Moreover, the main mechanism through which economic sanctions are expected to cause a change in government policy – by fomenting public discontent against the government – is unlikely to be effective in a country with fledgling democratic institutions, where citizens have little influence over the actions of the government.

In fact, given the absence of a viable opposition party that commands widespread popularity to govern the country, the Abiy government which was recently sworn in for a five-year term is unlikely to lose political support in the short term. The immediate beneficiaries of a weak central government will be armed groups such as the deeply unpopular TPLF – removed from power in 2018 following widespread protests against its 27-year authoritarian rule, and whose return to power will very likely render the country ungovernable – and other separatist forces, whose military edge over the government threatens the territorial integrity of the country.

Faced with heightened security threats, the government is likely to resort to heavy-handed approaches towards peaceful dissenting voices and opposition parties, actions that undermine the development of democratic institutions in the country and threaten the reversal of the political reforms the Abiy administration has undertaken since 2018.

In addition, sanctions carry the risk of reversing or delaying the ongoing economic reforms by the government, including its deregulation and privations efforts, as a cash-strapped government would likely hold on to its revenue-generating state-owned monopolies and private firms face restricted access to cheaper loans to finance their acquisition and development of government enterprises. An example of such detrimental measures is the suspension of a $500m loan by the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to finance the entry of a Vodafone consortium Into Ethiopia’s telecommunication market that is currently monopolised by the state-owned Ethio Telecom.

Most importantly, sanctions do not alter the fundamental calculus of the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments. They perceive the TPLF – which has promised to chase its enemies to the capitals of the two countries – as an existential threat and are thus unlikely to change their behaviour because of them.

Excerpted: ‘Economic sanctions will not

resolve Ethiopia’s conflict’

Aljazeera.com