Struggling Sudan

In a recent volume I co-edited with Professor Khalil al-Anani called After the Arab Revolutions: Decentering Democratic Transition Theory, we identified rampant insecurity as a key obstacle to democratisation. People are not likely to play the ‘game of democracy’ if it becomes a game of Russian roulette, as we put it.

One should not wake up on the day after elections to find the police knocking on their door.

Mutual trust is essential for any democracy, as is confidence in the capacity of the system to protect all. By contrast, fears that amount to paranoia and rampant mistrust are corrosive of any democratic process.

In Sudan, the current resurgent insecurities, lack of consensus and intensi- fication of conflict, are key obstacles to building mutual trust. Such insecurities have also been behind the violent conflicts that have plagued Sudan for decades, and are still smouldering in many areas, with tribal and ethnic hostility rising, sometimes fuelled by political rivalries.

Some factions have felt threatened by the outgoing ruling coalition and feared that it would be more vengeful were it to return to power.

The rising anti-military sentiments have also made the military even more paranoid and fearful of losing power, which would make it more dangerous.

The shaky military coup does not seem to have high chances of ultimate success, given the weak support at home and abroad. However, the situation is so perilous that both its success and failure could be disastrous. Given the proliferation of militias, the collapse of the army threatens a state collapse similar to the ones countries like Liberia have witnessed. This is going to be very costly for both Sudan and the international community.

The quickest way to address the crisis at its roots is by giving priority to forging the broadest cohesive civilian pro-democracy coalition, agreeing to expeditiously enhance the role of an independent judiciary, accelerating the preparation for elections and perhaps holding them early, and negotiating an exit policy for the military. The participation of the army in politics will not be necessary if the civilians are in accord on fundamental issues and if they also give the military leadership assurances about their fate in a democratic future.

Prime Minister Hamdok could play a key role in diffusing the tensions. Hitherto, he has managed to remain a consensus figure by being indecisive and seeking to please everyone.

Now he needs to be more assertive, propose a national unity government with broad support among key constituencies, engage all parties in dialogue with international support.

Excerpted: ‘Sudan’s states of exception’

Aljazeera.com