Our security muddle

The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. He is a Rhodes scholar and has an LL.M from Harvard Law School

Pakistan's defence and security policy appears to be a labyrinth of contradictions and confusion. What is our security policy and how do Afghanistan (our strategic hinterland), the United States (our war-on-terror ally) and the Taliban (our divorced friends) fit into it? Who is in charge of this policy and what political, economic and military strategies have been devised to bring it to fruition?

On paper Pakistan has a three-pronged policy that has military, political and socio-economic components: generate negotiation leverage by use of military muscle; negotiate from a position of strength with Taliban groups and militants willing to renounce violence; and undertake socio-economic development in the tribal areas to raise the standards of living of the tribes and give them a stake in maintaining peace. This story would make for a perfect Power-Point presentation in a simulation session. But this is a real-life situation.

The tribal areas remain amongst the most underdeveloped regions of Pakistan, and having lived with death of near ones and destruction of personal properties, residents who remain have nothing more to lose except their own lives. While fancy ideas abound, the socio-economic development on the ground amounts to naught. For example, the architects of our indigenous "three-pronged policy" are yet to exhibit their power of persuasion that would convince local industry to move its business units to export promotion zones in the tribal areas where even Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan doesn't get safe passage.

The military and political components of our security policy are not poised either. Our stated defence and security policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan is to have friendly relations with our neighbour and fight along with coalition forces to weed out Al Qaeda and the Taliban from the region and deny them sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas. But our traditional security doctrine views Afghanistan as a vital hinterland capable of providing Pakistan strategic depth in a conflict dispute with India. And there seems to have been no reconsideration of the policy itself and the strategies devised to realise the policy amid transformed regional realities. Afghanistan is no longer a discarded Cold War battlefield of the 1990s or a regional backyard used by India and Pakistan to undermine each other's interests. But let's beware. Now the big boys are here to play as well.

9/11 and the refusal of the Taliban government to hand over Al Qaeda operatives provided the US with an opportunity and a reason to occupy Afghanistan. The country has nothing appealing to offer the world at present except its geo-strategic location. Having set up a watch post in this vital Asian energy corridor with the added ability to monitor Iran and China up close, the US would find a reason to stick around even if bin Laden called it quits tomorrow and handed himself over. In this backdrop Pakistan can ill-afford to continue with a policy whereby on the one hand we are openly allied with the US in fighting a war that is extremely unpopular and enrages the entire populace, and on the other go soft on the Taliban to protect our conventionally perceived strategic interests. Such a conflicted policy undermines the efficacy, morale and credibility of our military instruments and weakens the state by encouraging extremists of all hues, from tribal outposts to Dera, Hangu and Lal Masjid, to create their respective fiefdoms, while subjecting our sovereignty and national honour to an ally that not only continues to threaten us with military action but also attacks our soldiers at will.

On June 9, the RAND Corporation issued a report funded by the US Department of Defence entitled "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," which asserted that, "the Taliban and other groups are getting help from individuals within the Pakistan government, and until that ends, the region's long-term security is in jeopardy." On June 10, the US launched laser-guided strikes on an FC border check-post in Goraparai that killed 11 Pakistani soldiers. While the US regretted the incident, it also insisted that the bombs hit their designated targets, meaning thereby that the strike on the check-post was deliberate. This is also in line with the US military's rules of engagement in Afghanistan, which authorise the US military to take out anyone perceived to be shooting at US military assets. And US forces assert that they fired at the check-post because coalition forces were receiving fire from the post. While a tripartite commission comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan and coalition forces has been constituted to investigate the incident, its report can only be a window-dressing measure that won't say much.

For if the commission finds that the US strike was "unprovoked and cowardly" as the Pakistani army has claimed, the US will need to lay the blame on the shoulders of a field commander that will adversely affect the morale of US troops. In any event, the US has no history of undertaking military accountability even in face of graver disasters during its war on terror. And if the commission finds that Pakistani soldiers were actually firing at the coalition forces alongside the Taliban, it will establish that in the fight between the coalition forces and the Taliban, Pakistan's military actively sides with the latter. Notwithstanding the commission report and its expected lame findings, the incident itself highlights the precariousness of the Pakistan-US alliance. First, how effective can their joint effort against Al Qaeda and the Taliban be if there is no real-time information-sharing between them capable of preventing them from killing each other? And second, what is the nature of this alliance if the US soldiers are legally mandated to fire at Pakistani forces?

But blaming the US alone for its madness and bravado doesn't help, because it is the Pakistani army that is responsible for protecting the lives of its own and it is this army that has chosen to ally itself with the US war effort. Our failing military operations raise serious questions about our military strategy as well. We reportedly have 85,000 troops patrolling the Pakistani-Afghan border. Does the military have the capacity to back up each post comprising 15-16 soldiers even against attacks from the Taliban in our backyard? Why were there no reinforcements available to back up the FC post attacked by the US and surrounded by the Taliban and why did local civilians need to rescue and recover the bodies of the soldiers? The rules of engagement for coalition forces are unambiguous. What are the rules of engagement for Pakistani soldiers? In fighting the war and the insurgency and risking their lives, are they authorised to attack those who attack them? If our soldiers are authorised to act in self-defence, how does one explain the shameful incident of September 2007 when some 30 militants abducted 300 armed soldiers without a single gunshot being fired?

There is a need for Pakistan to recalibrate its defence and security policy and ground it a political roadmap for the future of the tribal areas. On the political front we need to set a timeline for making the federally administered tribal areas an intrinsic part of the country and endow its residents with all the rights and responsibilities provided under the Constitution. Unless we move towards clarifying the legal status of Pakistan's tribal areas and implementing constitutional rule with all its benefits, sustainable peace will remain a forlorn hope and mischief-rewarding peace deals will continue to blow up in the face of the state. And on the military front we need to reconsider the strategic depth doctrine in this age of digital warfare, and completely abandon the tactic of appeasing and keeping in store militarily trained, ideologically motivated zealots to help pursue the strategic goals of the state.

Even if the lessons from our involvement in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union are lost on us, let us understand that the death of 1,100 soldiers since 2002, the killing of thousands of civilians in suicide bombings and terror attacks, as well as the loss of security of life and liberty of citizens across Pakistan is not an acceptable cost for pursuing misconceived strategic goals of the state. The jihadi project must be dumped once and for all and government agencies purged of its supporters and sympathisers. There can be nothing more dangerous for the future of this country than its decision makers remaining stuck in old, outdated and failed ideas.



Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu