NAP as panacea?

Every time there is a surge in terrorist activities, Pakistani authorities invoke the National Action Plan (NAP) as a cure-all solution to counter extremism and restore security. However, a critical examination reveals that NAP, in its current form, is neither a detailed policy nor a strategic framework but rather a checklist of 20 (now 14) objectives aimed at addressing terrorism and extremism.

In 2017, I had pointed out in a background paper published by PILDAT that NAP’s 20 points were quite widespread and related to the phenomenon that is deeply ingrained in our society and system. It is a gigantic task to tackle them. There is neither any quick fix nor is there any magic wand to correct all in one go. A reasonable antidote is to prioritise the most glaring aspects of all points of NAP and focus maximum resources to handle them as per clearly laid out strategies.

The implementation of NAP will remain lackadaisical and sporadic unless a strategy is in place. The same flaws persist. While NAP successfully garnered national consensus and highlighted key areas of concern, it fell short of providing a concrete strategy for implementation.

Formulated hastily after the tragic Army Public School attack on December 16, 2014, NAP was the result of swift deliberations among policymakers who identified 20 pressing issues believed to contribute to the nation's security challenges. The 20-point plan encompasses diverse measures, including executing convicted terrorists, establishing military-supervised special courts, banning militant groups, and strengthening the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta). It also calls for strict controls on extremist propaganda, choking terror financing, and preventing banned outfits from resurfacing.

NAP also stresses regulating religious seminaries, banning terrorist glorification in media, dismantling terrorists' communication networks, and curbing misuse of social media. Administrative reforms in Fata, completing Karachi operations, empowering Balochistan for political reconciliation, dealing firmly with sectarian terrorism and adopting zero-tolerance against militancy in Punjab are also key aspects. Lastly, it highlights formulating a policy on Afghan refugees and urgently revamping the criminal justice system.

It is noteworthy that earlier in 2014, Pakistan had unveiled a comprehensive National Internal Security Policy (NISP) for 2014-2018, which was neither effectively implemented nor considered during the formulation of NAP. Subsequent policies, including the National Internal Security Policy 2018-2023 and the National Security Policy 2022-2026, were also formulated with the intent of addressing the multifaceted security landscape of the country. Despite their comprehensive nature, these policies have largely remained unimplemented, raising questions about the efficacy of policy formulation without corresponding execution.

In 2021, NAP was revised and reduced to 14 points under kinetic and non-kinetic domains. The kinetic measures emphasise zero tolerance towards militancy, dismantling militant, armed, and criminal gangs, curbing the spread of extremist ideology via electronic, print and social media, and disrupting terrorist communication and cyber networks. These include stringent measures against religious and sectarian persecution, choking terrorist financing and proscribed organisations, and curbing the rising illegal trade involving narcotics, weapons and human trafficking.

In the non-kinetic domain, NAP calls for following terrorism-related cases in courts to their logical conclusion, capacity building of Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs), formulating and institutionalising a comprehensive Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy, and regulating religious seminaries. It also stresses the importance of political reconciliation in Balochistan, reforms in merged tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through financial allocations, capacity building, local governance, and land reforms, alongside overhauling the criminal justice system, legislative oversight against espionage and subversion and ensuring repatriation and proper management of Afghan refugees. Many points are debatable and the ‘How’ part is again missing conspicuously.

The recurring reliance on NAP, particularly during surges in terrorist activities, can be attributed to its apparent simplicity and the immediate sense of action it conveys. However, this simplicity is deceptive. The 20 or 14 points outlined in NAP encompass a broad spectrum of issues, each requiring dedicated resources, political commitment, inter-agency coordination, and provincial cooperation. The absence of a structured strategy to address each point has often resulted in fragmented efforts and unmet objectives.

The security situation in Pakistan is an amalgamation of insurgencies, terrorism and extremism fueled by the social media war. All need to be countered by cohesive approaches. NAP does not offer solutions to the complicated conglomerate of these glaring threats. Moreover, while intelligence is the main instrument against terrorism, NAP only talks about strengthening Nacta and CTDs – and that too without a clear strategy detailing the mechanisms for empowerment, resource allocation, and operational autonomy of Nacta. There is a need for massive reforms in intelligence agencies to enable them to play their effective role in countering terrorism and insurgencies. The Jaffar Express incident speaks volumes of intelligence failure.

To learn lessons for the implementation of NAP, the UK’s counterterrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, offers a model of a structured and strategic approach. CONTEST is built around four key pillars: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. Each pillar is supported by specific objectives, detailed plans, and allocated resources, ensuring a coordinated national effort against terrorism. This strategic framework allows for adaptability and clarity in implementation, aspects that NAP currently lacks.

Transforming NAP from a checklist into a strategic policy requires several critical steps. First, recognising that not all points can be addressed simultaneously or with equal intensity, it is essential to identify which objectives require immediate attention and which can follow in a phased manner, allowing for more focused and effective implementation. Second, there should be an officially articulated national counterterrorism strategy clearly outlining the implementation of all NAP points across Pakistan. Third, adequate financial, human, and technological resources must be allocated according to the strategy for each prioritised objective.

Fourth, establishing clear channels of communication and collaboration between federal and provincial agencies is crucial. Fifth, mechanisms should be established to regularly assess the progress of each objective, identify bottlenecks, and recalibrate strategies as needed to ensure that the plan remains dynamic and responsive to evolving challenges. Sixth, keeping citizens informed and engaged is necessary to foster trust and cooperation. These steps if implemented diligently, NAP can indeed become an effective remedy for countering terrorism, extremism and insurgencies.

The writer is the dean of the National Institute of Public Policy (NSPP), Lahore.