Prospects for peace

At a time when the US is busy thrashing out a peace deal with the Taliban to end its longest-running war, thousands of miles away in the war-battered country, workers of a Kabul museum are still trying to piece together the artefacts that were destroyed by Taliban fighters in 2001.

A recent picture of the National Museum of Afghanistan, which appeared in the media, shows small statues damaged by the Taliban being laid out on a table for restoration which may take many more years of sustained efforts.

With cultural preservation supposedly on the backburner of the frantic peace negotiations, which are mainly focused on American forces’ pullout and in return the Taliban’s assurances to not let the war-ravaged country be used for global terrorism, historical artefacts and human rights remain vulnerable to another savage attack.

It is widely believed that US President Trump appears to be in haste to hammer out a peace deal ahead of US presidential elections. So much depends on the Taliban, whose rule was excoriated for their harsh interpretation of Islamic values, and how differently they act now in letting a power-sharing setup run smoothly.

However, there is scepticism over the long-term success of any power-sharing arrangement between the Taliban and groups in the Afghan government due to their divergent political and ideological leanings, and the Taliban’s foothold in vast parts of the country.

But the main binding force which spurred both the US and Taliban to mull over an end to the incessant hostilities appears to be the looming spectre of the Islamic State (IS) in the region. The Taliban have till now largely held off the ultra-violent militant outfit, which after the dismantling of its ‘caliphate’ in Syria and Iraq, is now desperately looking for new footholds. This shared interest may serve as a catalyst in any future cooperation between the US and the Taliban.

But any agreement which lacks at least a minimal amount of assurances from the Taliban to not repeat their previous egregious excesses in terms of their threats to Afghan cultural artefacts, women’s rights and hosts of such other issues, is bound to fail. As Churchill said, those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.

The Taliban have, however, expressed willingness – though not unequivocally – to offer some relaxation ostensibly with regards to women’s rights and their interpretation of Islamic values. However, the spotlight will remain on them especially from international rights groups and a sceptical West, which is yet to forget the Taliban rule of the 1990s – when the militants would snub the international community’s calls for necessary reforms in various spheres of life, in particular the rights of women which have historically been under siege in their regime.

There are already many doubts in US circles over an imminent deal with the Taliban that might lead to a quick and complete withdrawal of troops, which many fear could plunge the state into a civil war. They are urging Trump to insist on no deal rather than a bad deal. “Under no circumstances should the Trump administration repeat the mistake its predecessor made in Iraq and agree to a total withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan,” retired general David Petraeus, who used to command those soldiers, warned in a piece for ‘The Wall Street Journal’. He was referring to how the Obama-era withdrawal of US forces from Iraq helped fuel the emergence of the IS group.

The problem is that even if the Taliban decide to shun militancy and demonstrate their will to restore order in violence-infested Afghanistan, it would not be easy for them to ever give in on their ideological leanings as they have been banking on popular support via promises of enforcing their harsh brand of Islam. Turning away from their narrative may lead to their political death. There is a real risk that the IS may benefit from such a dramatic shift as those in the Taliban ranks that are there due to ideological considerations would find a place in the IS.

So the democratic Western world, which wields a lot of influence on world politics and on the finances for development that the war-ravaged country would immensely need to run its affairs, will have to brace itself for Taliban rule. The success of any Taliban-inclusive setup in Afghanistan would rely on how the world, particularly the West, manages to live with the Taliban in the 21st century and keep their political and financial avenues open with patience and prudence to provide them opportunities to integrate gradually in the international system and thwart the rise of the IS in the region.

Any political dispensation with Taliban representation would surely be microscopically judged by the international media and rights groups and any drift towards ‘Shariah’ laws would lead the Taliban into difficulty – both politically and financially.

So, the success of any such Afghan setup would also hinge on Trump’s re-election in 2020 – so as to save his deal by averting any serious impact of hostile propaganda on a future Afghan system and continue to influence the Taliban for reforms so the IS threat to the regions is checked.

Another major challenge would be the role of India in Afghanistan. The central role of Pakistan in the peace negotiations is already troubling New Delhi, which Islamabad blames for using Afghan soil to sow unrest in Balochistan and other parts of the country.

Given the heightened tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbours over the Kashmir issue, the chances of any reconciliation over their political and economic influence in any future Afghan arrangement have been further blighted.

All stakeholders must realise that Pakistan and India’s policies towards each other will complement or complicate the chances of the initiative’s long-term success. Ultimately, neighbouring countries’ and the West’s acceptance of Taliban participation in any future political setup in Afghanistan will determine the destiny of the war-weary Afghans.

The writer is news editor at the London desk, The News.

Email: khurram.mateen@gmail.com