Bangladesh’s war of attrition

The conviction and sentence awarded to Khaleda Zia, Bangladesh’s former prime minister and the opposition leader, for graft has not sprung up anyone by surprise. Since she started her third term in 2014, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid made it abundantly clear that she would deal with the opposition by taking the bull by the horn. At the same time, Khaleda’s conviction brings to light the dichotomy between rule of law and political rights that pulls immature democracies into its vortex.

Bangladesh has a great deal in common with Pakistan, its erstwhile parent state. In both countries, democracy has had a chequered history, with the armed forces calling the shots most of the time. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, dynasties have dominated politics and taken turns in the exercise of power. In each state, politics has been characterised by the scorching acrimony between key players. This has polarised society and made the democratic facade resemble a house of cards.

Bangladesh’s constitution was introduced in 1972, making the country a parliamentary democracy. However, the events that surfaced barely three years later upset the applecart of democracy. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of the country, was assassinated and the armed forces took control of the country. After a brief hiatus, Major General Ziaur Rahman emerged as the undisputed ruler. As fate would have it, the general, who was accused of having a hand in Mujib’s murder, was put to death by a band of army officers in 1981.

Sheikh Mujib had not only spearheaded the creation of Bangladesh, but, as a typical South Asian patriarch, had also laid the foundation of a political dynasty. After his demise, his daughter Sheikh Hasina Wajid took control of the Awami League (AL). By the same token, the demise of Gen Ziaur Rahman catapulted his spouse Khaleda Zia into politics as the head of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The war to the knife between both women, which was punctuated by a willingness to rub shoulders against a common enemy, shaped subsequent political developments in the country.

Since 1990, when Gen Hussein Mohammad Ershad was forced to call it quits, Bangladeshi politics has played host to a game of musical chairs in which both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajid have been the leading players. The 1991 elections brought Khaleda Zia to power. Although she completed her constitutional term, she remained preoccupied with grappling with the Hasina Wajid-led opposition’s agitation politics for the most part of her tenure. Her party won the 1996 polls as well after the AL chose to stay away from the electoral fray. But that turned out to be a pyrrhic victory as in less than two months, Khaleda was forced to step down, paving the way for Hasina Wajid to have her first taste of power.

In the continuing game of musical chairs, Khaleda returned to power after winning the 2001 election. She governed the country until 2006 when she stepped down. The caretaker government, backed by the powerful military establishment and blessed by the superior judiciary – the ‘Bangladesh model’ as it is called – put both women behind bars on corruption charges in the course of its clean-up drive. At the time, rumours ran rife that a similar drive would be initiated in Pakistan and Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif – who were then living in exile and trying to plan their return – would be the prime targets. This did not happen. However, some sections of Pakistani society are still enamoured of the model and see it as a panacea for Pakistan’s problems.

Be that as it may, the ‘Bangladesh model’ made little difference to national politics. Both women were released from prison a year after they were arrested as the country braced itself for the next electoral battle. The December 2008 polls once again brought the AL to power. The party maintained its position in the disputed 2014 elections, which were boycotted by the BNP.

In recent years, one of the most significant and controversial decisions made by Prime Minister Hasina Wajid was to set up a tribunal to try war crimes committed during the 1971 war. The BNP along with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the nation’s largest religio-political party, strongly opposed the decision to constitute the tribunal and contended that such a move would divide the nation.

However, their opposition to the tribunal has been set down to the alleged involvement of some of the frontline leaders of both parties, particularly the JI, in war crimes. The BNP also feared that the AL government would put its top leadership on trial on corruption charges during its terms. Such apprehensions were not baseless. Khaleda Zia is facing several corruption charges, including a case involving the misuse of fund that were meant for an orphanage – in which she has been found guilty.

The constitution of Bangladesh renders a person who is sentenced for more than two years in prison ineligible to run for a public office. With the next general elections less than a year away, Khaleda will not be qualified to run for a parliamentary seat until her conviction has been overturned. The conviction has been seen differently by the government and the opposition. For the former, the judicial decision will promote rule of law and strengthen democracy. But for the latter, it reflects the political victimisation of an opposition leader. In the same case, Khaleda’s self-exiled son Tarique Rehman, who has been groomed as her successor, has been sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Though Bangladesh is a largely homogeneous society, it has characteristics that are shared by other less developed countries. These include political instability and polarisation; the fragility of democratic institutions; and a culture of corruption, crony capitalism and endemic poverty – a catch-22.

Khaleda’s conviction will ruffle the feathers of her supporters and exacerbate political polarisation. The collision course, which the sentence has set the country on, will – at least in the short-run – also cast its shadow on the economy.

If the BNP goes to the wall, the AL will be the major beneficiary. The former premier’s ineligibility, as well as that of her heir-apparent, to contest the elections may compel her party to stay away from the electoral exercise. While this will put the credibility of the elections under question, it will also provide an open goalpost to the ruling party, as it did in 2014 when almost half of the total seats went uncontested.

In a larger contest, Khaleda’s conviction points towards one of the perennial problems faced by post-imperial polities. Is corruption a legitimate ground for removing the holder of a public office or debarring someone from holding a public office? The right to vote entails the right to vote for the candidate of one’s choice. The same question was raised by the disqualification of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif.

In a mature democracy, such questions don’t normally arise. A leader who faces graft charges will, as a rule, either bow out or present himself to accountability – in both cases of his own accord, much like a vanquished Samurai who wishes to die with honour. But immature democracies have their own dynamics.

The answer to this question turns on another question: are political rights, such as the right to take part in the political process, absolute or conditional? Such questions can be, and have been in Sharif and Khaleda’s cases, settled legally. The obvious answer is that all rights, as creations of the law, are subject to the law and are thus conditional. However, it is doubtful whether these questions can be settled politically.

Benazir Bhutto was sacked twice (1990 and 1996) on corruption charges. On each occasion, her dismissal was upheld by the courts. But to date, it has not been settled politically. By the same token, Sharif’s or, for that matter, Khaleda’s disqualification will continue to divide the nation until their popularity tapers off and the question becomes politically – though not necessarily legally – insignificant. Politics and laws, though related, are different worlds.

The writer is a freelance contributor.

Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com