How to sustain Afghan trust

Pakistan has been pushing very hard to build strategically dependable relations with Afghanistan for the past 10 years. The efforts are not motivated merely by impulses of seeking uninterrupted access to the Central Asian Republics to compensate for the loss of East Pakistan and for economic reasons.
These are now more to do with preventing the spill-over impact of the disintegration of the Taliban government in Kabul and subsequent unchecked growth of militancy first in Fata and later all over Pakistan. As the US alliance achieved success, militants projected it as the triumph of infidels which should be avenged by Muslims.
Since Pakistan and Afghanistan aligned themselves with the US-led western alliance, they were considered enemies by the Taliban – to be dealt with ruthlessly. The armed forces being stronger in Pakistan, the militants focused on softer targets through suicide attacks while sheltering their own leadership safely in inaccessible places in Fata. The suicide attacks were sustained by indoctrination of young students in religious seminaries in rural Punjab and cities like Karachi, Lahore etc.
In the meanwhile, geostrategic pulls and pressures started creeping into the relations of the two governments, damaging them enormously. Countries like India, Iran and Saudi Arabia fought proxy wars in Afghanistan for their own interests. This phenomenon led to further complicating and muddying the situation.
Consequently, the two terms of former president Karzai saw dramatic ups and downs in Pak-Afghan relations. Both countries exchanged a high number of VVIP visits. These should have helped smooth the rough edges but that did not happen. The basic flaw was deficit of trust among the leadership of the two neighbours.
On the other hand, India and Iran gained considerable influence which Pakistan looked at as a threat. India was accused of using its investments in Afghanistan to fuel insurgency in Balochistan. Iran’s influence unwittingly unnerved other forces and a new sectarian war started. Gradually it moved into Pakistan.
Former president Hamid Karzai assiduously complained against Pakistan not keeping its promise of non-interference in Afghanistan. He repeatedly alleged that Pakistan wanted to keep his country instable and underdeveloped in order to use its resources to outreach its strategic objectives in the Central Asian Republics. What Pakistan did during the eight years of Karzai’s presidency was divulged by former Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf when he admitted that during his time Pakistan fought a proxy war against India in Afghanistan. He declared Karzai pro-India and referred to the Indian role in promoting insurgency in Balochistan.
There has been a qualitative change after the election of Ashraf Ghani as the new Afghan president in the Afghan policy towards Pakistan. Though he shares the government with Abdullah Abdullah whose hostility towards Pakistan is well known, Ashraf Ghani has not hesitated to transform the bilateral relations. President Ghani has turned down the offer to buy Indian weapons and sent Afghan army personnel for training to Pakistan.
These are crucial developments that can affect Afghanistan’s relations with India. It may be recalled that in 2011 India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement which included training of Afghan military personnel by India. Pakistan was not happy then over this agreement and offered training facility to Afghan military cadets, but Karzai persistently declined. If seen against this background, the training of Afghan military cadets in Pakistan and the continued policy to refrain from blame game are indeed seminal developments. Pakistan feels confident that with the political and logistic support of Afghanistan, it will be able to neutralise the TTP and may one day manage to capture Mullah Fazlullah who is in Afghanistan.
The hope to get Fazlullah or his close aids is not entirely misplaced. The Afghan government has already arrested six culprits involved in the December 16 tragedy. It has even allowed Pakistani intelligence officials to interrogate them in Afghan prisons. The successful visits of our army chief to Afghanistan and his clear statement that the enemies of Afghanistan were the enemies of Pakistan gratified the Afghan leaders. They feel comfortable dealing with Nawaz Sharif and his new army chief. Even Abdullah Abdullah hailed the visit of General Raheel Sharif to Kabul and welcomed his statement.
Undoubtedly, no other Afghan leader has invested so much political capital in rebuilding the fractured relations between the two countries. What exactly prompted Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah to effect the remarkable change in Kabul’s stance towards Pakistan? Afghanistan continues to suffer from violence, instability and widespread army desertions for which Pakistan was always blamed in the past. In fact, the security situation in certain areas of Afghanistan has deteriorated more as Taliban have been emboldened by the drawdown of the US combative forces.
Ghani has also praised Pakistan for “recent efforts in paving the ground for peace and reconciliation.” Ghani cited two major recent attacks that led to the countries coming together – one in Yahya Khel in Afghanistan in November 2014 that left nearly 50 people dead, and a Taliban massacre in December 2014 that killed 153, mostly children. What then is the sustaining factor? Collaboration on security issues? In my view, the other motivation is Pakistan’s critical role in securing the Taliban’s agreement to start negotiations with the Kabul government.
Perhaps, Pakistan has already delivered its critical input. The process has been ramped up in recent weeks, According to Abdullah Abdullah, negotiations may begin soon. China has been roped in too to use its influence to bring the Taliban to the table. The request to this effect was made by President Ghani in his visit to Beijing. Accordingly, China boosted its contacts with the Taliban and received their delegations to explore modalities for their possible accommodation in the new setup in Afghanistan. Pakistan may be coordinating with China and Afghanistan on this account. This possibility is rightly being referred to as the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan nexus for peace and development in the region.
However, the perception about Pakistan remains negative in certain influential quarters in Kabul. If Pakistan fails to respond effectively to the core Afghan aspirations, the existing harmonious relations can soon revert to past acrimony. Pakistan will have to be vigilant while dealing with Afghanistan’s related issues including repatriation of Afghan refugees, transit trade matters, Taliban activities and movement of militants from the tribal areas.
Afghanistan thinks that in the past Pakistan did not help despite promises. For instance, at Karzai’s request then prime minister Yusuf Raza Gilani called upon the Taliban leadership as well as all other Afghan groups, including Hizb-e Islami, to participate in an intra-Afghan process for national reconciliation and peace. But his government did nothing to realise this objective.
The peace process is fundamental to the survival of Afghanistan as one unit and also for the government which is still struggling with internal strife and failures to overcome security lapses. Objectively we have to assess if Pakistan can bring the Taliban to the negotiation table, maybe as some think that its its military exercises some influence on them. But can it force them to sign on a dotted line?
The Afghan government and the US continue to believe that Pakistan has a central role in bringing the Taliban to Qatar and in shaping their views about peace negotiations. Pakistan has to come clean about its understanding and collaboration with the Taliban. There is no room for so-called strategic ambiguity on this score.
The writer is a former ambassador. Email: mian.sana@gmail.com