The shadow war

While most of the week’s headlines focused on India’s direct assault on Pakistan, its indirect, clandestine attacks also went on in the shadows all the while. A CTD official was martyred in a firing incident in the Hassankhel area of Peshawar on Wednesday (May 7). The area has reportedly witnessed several attacks on police and other security forces in the last few years. Prior to this attack, seven soldiers were martyred by a blast from an improvised explosive device (IED) in Balochistan’s Kacchi District on Tuesday (May 6). The IED was planted by terrorists belonging to Indian proxy Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), per a press release from the ISPR. The ISPR has also accused India of activating its assets inside Pakistan to intensify terror attacks, indicating a potential surge in terrorist activity in the wake of India’s baseless blaming of Pakistan for the Pahalgam attack and its ongoing illegal assault on the country. There was also the arrest of a trained Indian terrorist named Abdul Majeed from Jhelum city on April 25 when he was about to place an improvised explosive device (IED). Per investigations, Majeed used to receive drones and IEDs from his Indian handlers and would conduct IED terror attacks. While it is understandable that most of the national attention focused on the Indian missile strikes and drones launched against Pakistan before Saturday’s (May 10) ceasefire, the use of terror groups for the same purpose is arguably the more insidious strategy.

India’s attempts to directly confront Pakistan’s security forces were repelled. Pakistan downed multiple Indian jets, including at least one state-of-the-art French Rafale, dozens of drones that crossed into the country’s borders. It also hit several military sites in India. While India’s cowardly assault has, tragically, led to the martyrdom of over 30 innocent civilians, Pakistan has proven that India lacks the edge to win a direct fight. As such, being beaten in the open, India is likely to go back to fighting from the shadows. Resorting to clandestine terror attacks and attacking Pakistan indirectly is probably the long-term Indian strategy. And while this approach does not carry the destructive potential of launching jets, missiles and drones, it is, in many ways, harder to deal with.

According to some reports, there has been an 81 per cent surge in terrorism related incidents in Pakistan in the first quarter of 2025, highlighting the increasing severity of the terror problem. Dealing with this issue is also complicated by the fact that there are more players involved, with the Afghan Taliban thus far refusing to deny use of their soil to anti-Pakistan terror groups. They must be made to change their approach and more must also be done to counter India’s ability to finance, arm and communicate with terror groups in Pakistan. At the same time, the country’s overall anti-terror infrastructure needs a boost, particularly the police. It is quite dangerous that the force which is most directly impacted by terrorism is arguably the least equipped to deal with it. This has to change. Beyond the security approach, the country must also be wary of terror propaganda that uses the alienation of young people in underprivileged areas to attract recruits. These efforts must be addressed and the country must do more to counter the socioeconomic and political exclusion that exacerbates terror.