GHQ and dangerous binaries

One of the cardinal rules of public life is that every opportunity to communicate is golden, none should ever be wasted. In the age of information overload, with dozens of news channels, Facebook, Twitter and blogs galore, this principle is even more important. “Every time you say something, make it count”.
Reading the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) press release of June 9, 2011 therefore was a bit of a disappointment. Though it claimed to be summarising the 139th Corps Commanders’ Conference, this press release was supposed to do more. It was supposed to send a message of assurance and comfort, to Pakistan’s people, as well as to the international community. This was an opportunity for the Pakistani military leadership to address domestic and international worries about the future of Pakistan. It was an opportunity lost. Whatever the military wanted to say got buried under self-consciousness, faux religiosity and a less than stellar grammatical performance.
One could quite easily pile on more criticism to the significant chunk that the military and the ISI have been receiving. Beyond the satisfaction of lashing out however, it is not entirely clear that the criticism is helping the military leadership of Pakistan understand how deep the crisis of confidence in it really is. The 139th Corps Commanders’ Conference should have produced a contrition-laden missive that announced a series of short and long term measures designed to address the emerging nervousness that exists in Pakistan about the internal coherence and overarching competence of the military. Instead, it produced a statement that conveys confusion, fear and the growing impatience of a military high-command with a wave of criticism at home and abroad.
The twin-pronged pressure – strong and well-deserved criticism of the military and the ISI at home, and constant shellacking for not doing enough, in the US – is unprecedented. But just because something has never happened before, doesn’t necessarily mean it is a good thing. Clearly, pressure on the military leadership has built up to a point that borders on the unbearable. The 139th Corps Commanders’ Conference press release is not the work of a self-confident high command that has a clear and comprehensive plan. It is the product of hardworking and committed generals worried sick as they stare down at a crisis whose size, duration and depth is confounding and beyond any single institution’s capacity to deal with alone.
The indignity of being maligned and scrutinized is new for Pakistan’s soldiers. But Pakistani women, truck drivers, journalists, doctors, Barelvis, Seraiki-speakers, Sargodhans, Shias, lawyers, Pakhtuns, children, Baloch, clerks, Hindus, Okarans, civil servants, judges, Hazarans, politicians, Sindhis, Christians, Mohajirs, Sikhs, Deobandis, Sunnis, Ahmedis, teachers, rickshaw wallahs – all know this feeling.
Every group in Pakistan knows what it is like to be humiliated, in one way, or another. Every group except one.
The Pakistani military is supposed to be the most coherent and humiliation-proof group identity in the country. Always has been. Pakistanis that seek to help make this country a more democratic, more equal, more tolerant and more vibrant place almost uniformly want a military that is subservient to the rule of law, as defined by a parliament of freely-elected civilian representatives. What we do not want is a humiliation of Pakistani soldiers. A humiliated, weak, and delegitimized military should be unacceptable to reasonable Pakistanis.
The implicit understanding between the Pakistani military and Pakistani people is quite simple. In return for being a national institution that inspires confidence, the ordinary Pakistani will offer an astounding degree of reverence. And hardly ask any questions at all. Whether it is the costs of the almost decade-long conflict Pakistan has had with violent extremists taking their toll, or the burden of three decades long military dictatorships finally showing up, the bottom line is that mainstream Pakistan is no longer expressing much confidence in the military.
The historical narrative of national security – whether looked at through a New Delhi-Sringar lens, or a Kabul-Kandahar lens, basically paints the picture of a strategically outmanoeuvred Pakistan. The internal coherence of Pakistani identity – whether one attempts to stuff it into religious clothing (Zia), or irreligious (Musharraf), is weak and threatened.
Ironically the most urgent threats all emanate from military actions. Islamist extremists feed on anger in the tribal belt and beyond. Baloch nationalists feed on the anger stimulated by the thoughtlessness with which the province has been dealt with. Karachi boils over, as undulating waves of Pakhtun and Mohajir anger manifest themselves alternatively. In Southern KPK and Northern Punjab, a Hazara identity is stirred. In Southern Punjab, a Seraiki one awakens. At the heart of every spark of anger and rage right across the country we find the same thing, over and over and over again: implicit and explicit military interventions.
Of course, these interventions were not meant to weaken Pakistan. They were meant to make it stronger. It’s a tough neighborhood and the military’s job has always been to pre-empt danger. In its simplistic self-righteousness however, as an institution over many years, the military has produced a culture of binaries. If the military was true to Pakistan, then anyone opposing the military viewpoint was naturally untrue to Pakistan. Or so goes the thinking. Oversimplified binaries are always dangerous. They are especially dangerous in complex environments where, complexity, by definition, requires multifarious approaches. The culture of binaries has infected the Pakistani discourse to the point of paralysis.
Opposing the provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code that deal with blasphemy, asking questions about the degree of Islamist extremism within the military, advocating peace with India, opposing air strikes against the people of the tribal areas, promoting the notion of an autonomous and independent Afghanistan, speaking out for victims of army heavy handedness in Balochistan, demanding greater scrutiny of the military budget – on every issue that the military either implicitly or explicitly endorses, the contrarian position becomes a dangerous one to take. In a culture of binaries, asking any of these questions necessarily puts Pakistanis at cross-purposes with the military. That’s not how things should be. Each one of those questions is inspired by a desire to live in a better and stronger Pakistan – a shared Pakistani vision, no matter whether civilian or military.
There is a deep and diverse set of long-term actions required to correct the course. But the 139th Corps Commanders’ conference was not meant to address those. It was looking for some quick fixes and short-term measures. That press release was not the answer. In the future, the military leadership may consider a number of small, but important short-term measures that would have real impact. For example, it could announce an inquiry to examine both the GHQ and the PNS Mehran attacks with a commission made up of both civilians (ex-cops and rights activists) and soldiers. It could announce a community outreach programme in Balochistan, including civilian members. It could easily scrap plans for the new GHQ in Islamabad and give up the land to the CDA, to auction and help pay off part of the national debt.
Pakistanis all listen carefully when the GHQ speaks. Is the GHQ listening to Pakistanis speak?

The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy.