there exists a general perception in Pakistan today that the Army is so far doing a great job in cleaning up Swat and the soldiers are fighting valiantly. But then our soldiers' valour has never been put in doubt by history. It is the vision, competence and candor of our military high command that has been questionable.
While there has been significant reflection on what tactics need to be employed to win the battles against militants in the tribal areas (and such thinking and planning seems to be bearing fruit), there is no evidence of any urge within the military elite or courage within the political elite to understand and document the indigenous factors that led us into the mess we find ourselves in. There is widespread recognition that we are now reaping the crop we sowed in Afghanistan during the 80s and 90s, except on the part of the Pakistani state. Those within the military establishment (of the Hameed Gul variety) who bought into the fiction that the "good jihad" against the Soviets was an ideological war, are now crying hoarse that 9/11 and the US war against Al-Qaeda and Taliban is a sinister design against Pakistan and the Muslim world. Others, more secular in their approach toward the "good Afghan jihad" are rightfully bitter that the West has garnered the benefits of the victory, leaving Pakistan alone to bear the brunt.
But irrespective of the ideological bent, there is shared intransigence within the decision-making quarters of our military establishment when it comes to decisions made during the good Afghan jihad, the policies incorporated and the tactics used, and an insistence that there were no alternatives. We are told that fighting the evil Soviet empire in Afghanistan was imperative to preempt the Russians quest for access to warm waters through Pakistan. Or, alternatively, that it was a holy duty to fight alongside our Afghan brethren in their time of need.
But we are never told why we agreed to help develop and sharpen a religious ideology inspired by the singular zeal to wage jihad, why we set up madrasas and militant training camps on our own soil to indoctrinate and train mercenaries brought over from across the globe, why we allowed militant wings of religious parties to recruit our own impoverished youths to partake in the Afghan jihad, why we permitted the establishment of financial conduits that would enable foreign powers to independently fund the jihadi infrastructure, and why we never considered how an uncontrolled jihadi enterprise housed within our territory will cripple our state and our society in the medium to long term.
The military establishment has had a similar approach towards Musharaf's somersault in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. We are told that had Pakistan not taken an about-turn on its Taliban policy overnight, the Americans would have made minced meat out of us. But we are not told why the Afghan jihad policy was not reviewed and revised during the 90s when the circumstances had changed, the Soviets had retreated, the Americans had lost interest and the warring Afghan factions had established their propensity for in-house fighting despite the repudiation of foreign influence and interest.
Even if the strategic depth argument were ample to keep the erstwhile Afghan jihad policy running on inertia, it is evident that no comprehensive analysis was undertaken by the Musharaf regime on the eve of 9/11 to (i) recognise the evolving international consensus against use of non-state actors as part of the legitimate national security doctrine of a state, (ii) estimate the response of our homegrown and imported non-state militant groups to Pakistan's U-turn on its pro-Taliban Afghan policy, and (iii) develop a comprehensive policy to undo the jihadi infrastructure developed for purposes of successfully waging the good Afghan jihad.
Yet we expect the same security and strategic thinking that informed the blundering Afghan jihad policy during the Zia era and the double-dealing good-Taliban/bad-Taliban policy of the Musharaf regime, to somehow now clean up our Taliban problem. "You cannot solve a problem from the same consciousness that created it," advised Albert Einstein, "you must learn to see the world anew." There is nothing to gainsay that control of our defense policy and components of our foreign policy that have strategic consequences continue to fall squarely within the military's dominion. Thus, when we congratulate the military for waging decisive battles against militants in the tribal areas, are we merely alluding to soldiers willing to lose their lives in the line of duty, or can we celebrate a change in the strategic consciousness and vision of our military establishment that no longer views Pakhtoon and Punjabi Taliban as assets to be kept in harness for future battles in Afghanistan and Kashmir?
As Clemenceau, a wartime prime minister who came to be called the "father of victory," was probably not chiding his military when he asserted that "war is too important a matter to be left to the generals." Today Pakistan is mired in confusion and conflict largely because of the whimsical decisions of two generals: Gen Zia, who constructed the jihadi project and fashioned Pakistan's strategic thinking and military policies accordingly; and Gen Musharaf, who reversed the formal policy vis-à-vis export of militancy without addressing the strategic thinking behind it and by largely leaving the jihadi project intact. Hindsight, they say, is twenty-twenty. But what is our excuse for refusing to learn lessons from history and use them to readjust our strategic vision and formulate notions of national security and national interest accordingly? In 2002, the US set up the 9/11 Commission "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, attacks" and to provide recommendations to guard against future attacks. This past week, Gordon Brown announced the establishment of an independent committee to inquire into the British involvement with the Iraq war in order to learn lessons and strengthen the health of the UK's democracy, diplomacy and military.
It is about time the Parliament appointed a high-powered commission, through statute, comprising individuals with integrity and independence (that form an appropriate mix of military, diplomatic, judicial and political experience), and grant it a wide-ranging mandate to (i) investigate all factors contributing to religious militancy in Pakistan, and (ii) make policy recommendations on how to confront the challenges we face. Such a commission should have access to all citizens of Pakistan and all information in the state's possession, no matter how sensitive, though it can be instructed to keep national-security-related information confidential and not make it part of any formal report.
No matter how well we do in isolated battles against religious banditry being vigorously fought by our brave soldiers, we will not be any closer to victory in our collective war against militancy and obscurantism unless our political, military and bureaucratic elites agree to dispassionately and objectively study the circumstances that abetted the rise of Talibanisation in Pakistan and use the lessons learnt to inform the state's strategic vision as well as domestic, defence and foreign policy.
Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu
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