Unwarranted optimism?

There is a sense of déjà vu whenever top leaders of Pakistan and India meet either formally or just ‘by chance’. The two sides agree on the need to thrash out all outstanding issues. At times, they also ink treaties.

Such ‘ice-breaking’ dialogue generates tremendous euphoria and a lot of expectations. But no tangible headway is made. Then one incident comes along that sweeps aside all the apparent warmth in bilateral relations – and things are back to square one.

What generates all this optimism about the outcome of the current interaction between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan? Yes, the interaction shows that Indian Prime Minister Modi, who had earlier shunned his western neighbour, has shifted gears and is prepared to engage Islamabad through a ‘comprehensive’ dialogue. But will this engagement help address bilateral issues?

These New Delhi overtures towards Islamabad may be seen as an expression of earnestness or as a cosmetic exercise aimed at parading that India being the big brother went out of its way in trying to mend ties with Pakistan. One can go on debating the Modi government’s real intention. But, as they say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Therefore, we’ll have to wait for resumption of a formal dialogue between the two governments.

It’s not that only India holds the key to affecting a thaw in bilateral ties. To produce such an effect, Pakistan’s willingness is equally important. It takes two, not one, to tango. Yet India being a stable democracy and a rising economic power carries a greater responsibility, as well as has a greater policy space available, than Pakistan for securing durable peace in the region.

But what does the durable peace depend on? On maintaining the status quo or making an earnest effort to sort out the contentious issues: Kashmir and Siachen, Sir Creek and the Wullar Barrage, trade and economic normalisation, cross-border militancy and external interference?

So far each country has preferred maintaining the equilibrium to taking any bold step. However, the equilibrium in Indo-Pak relations is an unstable one. If the problems are left unresolved, something nasty crops up, antagonism escalates and the so-called confidence-building measures come to naught. This is what happened in November 2008, when in the wake of the Mumbai killings, the Pak-India composite dialogue came to a halt.

But what prevents the two sides from carrying out result-oriented negotiations? The answer is that the bilateral relationship is remarkably deficient in utility and replete with sentiments. It has been exploited, in the name of national interest and religion, by elements on either side who fear to be the losers in case of détente. Any departure from the ‘principled’ position on any issue is deemed as making a big concession to the other side. An Indian or Pakistani government that is suspected of making such a concession comes in for adverse criticism from the hawks.

Surprisingly, over the last several years, it is only Islamabad that made – or tried to make – a substantial concession. First, the government of military ruler Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) indicated its willingness to move away from the principled Kashmir position, which calls for implementation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on the territory. In a display of tremendous flexibility, Islamabad seemed well disposed towards the ‘out-of-the-box’ solution of making the two parts of Kashmir fully autonomous, with the two countries jointly controlling their defence and foreign affairs. But the willingness did not translate into reality.

On the second occasion, Pakistan decided to normalise trade with India, which was to culminate in granting the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to the latter by the end of 2012. As part of the overture, the positive list for imports from India was replaced with a negative list comprising about 1,200 goods out of more than 6,000 importable products. The move was bold for two reasons.

One, it marked a significant deviation from Islamabad’s strategic argument for restricted trade with India, which made normalisation of commercial ties with the eastern neighbour contingent upon settlement of the ‘core’ Kashmir problem. India, on the other hand, has all along insisted that the political problems – including the Kashmir – should not bear upon commercial relations, and that restoration of normal trade ties between the two countries would create common stakes, which in turn would contribute to addressing the political issues.

Two, the trade balance has heavily been in favour of India – understandably so due to the country’s better economic indicators. By agreeing to open imports from India, Pakistan risked running an even greater trade deficit. But, again, the momentum in trade liberalisation could not be maintained and New Delhi is yet to get MNF status from Pakistan.

Although in each case the goal could not be achieved, the important thing was that Pakistan showed the flexibility to tone down its stated position on two key issues. Regrettably, India is yet to come out with such flexibility despite being better placed to do so.

Not only do the two sides have a host of contentious issues, they also differ on the relative importance of the issues. To India, what holds the key to revival of relations with its western neighbour is stepped up action by the latter against militants based inside its (Pakistani) territory, particularly the alleged perpetrators of the Mumbai act of terrorism. India has also been pressing Pakistan to extradite the persons allegedly behind the Mumbai carnage. Islamabad hasn’t obliged, because it has no extradition treaty with New Delhi.

Pakistan, on its part, regards the Kashmir issue together with diversion of the waters of River Indus by its eastern neighbour, in violation of the 1960 Indus Basin Treaty, as the core issues. Islamabad believes that relations between the two countries should not be held hostage to one issue.

For quite some time Indo-Pak talks, whether they are on the political or eve or not, have remained inconclusive. That has led to the impression that the dignitaries don’t mean business and meet just for the fun of it. A case in point is Prime Minister Modi’s recent stopover in Lahore.

The talks have achieved nothing save for the agreement to remain in touch. That said, it’s exceedingly important that the channels of communication between the two countries remain open. Pak-India relations are inherently unstable and even a small move or incident can undo the good work that has been done. That’s why more often than not their leaders have to start from scratch. For this reason, parleys – whether formal or informal, political or official – should be welcomed for this is the only way to settle the issues.

The way forward in Pak-India relations is for both sides to leave aside their smug attitudes, be willing to make concessions and set out to resolving issues rather than just taking them up. In particular, they have to shun the rhetoric of making the talks hostage to what they call the core issues.

The writer is a graduate from a western European university.

Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com