After Bonn, all eyes on Belem

The climate talks in Bonn (Subsidiary Body Meeting - SB62) last month, meant to lay the groundwork and finalise the agenda for COP30 in Brazil later this year, concluded on a familiar note: procedural gridlock, a fragile compromise and growing frustration among developing nations.

While heatwaves scorched Bonn outside the conference venue, the temperature inside rose over a different kind of climate crisis. Once again, climate finance became the fault line across adaptation (preparing for and responding to climate impacts), just transition (shifting to clean energy while safeguarding workers and communities), the Global Stocktake (the five-year review of global climate pledges) and the Loss and Damage Fund.

The negotiations concluded without any decisive outcomes, except for a few symbolic gains. The main gain was the reduction of the financial uncertainty from the UNFCCC. The countries agreed to a modest 10 per cent increase in the UNFCCC core budget for 2026-27, taking it to 81.5 million euros. Significantly, this depended on China raising its contribution to 20 per cent. Bloomberg Philanthropies stepped in to cover the 22 per cent that the US had to contribute before it withdrew from the COP process.

Developing countries arrived in Bonn with clear demands: to restore Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement to the formal agenda; the article mandates that developed countries provide climate finance to the developing world. Their ask was rebuffed. Instead, the topic was confined to a short consultation session. It infuriated low- and middle-income countries already disillusioned by COP29's vague $300 billion annual pledge and the open-ended Baku to Belem Roadmap aimed at mobilising $1.3 trillion from "all actors," including the private sector.

This finance fatigue prompted some nations to suggest alternative ideas: global taxes on luxury goods, high-emission sectors and ultra-wealthy individuals. Once seen as politically risky, these ideas are now gaining popularity, signalling a fundamental rethink of climate finance sources beyond traditional donor grants.

In the negotiations over the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), parties struggled to narrow down a list of 500 indicators to a manageable 100. A breakthrough came late in the second week: countries agreed to include Means of Implementation (MoI) in the indicators – metrics to assess not only adaptation outcomes but also the finance, technology and capacity-building support provided to developing countries.

Yet, this came at a cost. Developing countries had to relinquish references to transformational adaptation and the Biennial Assessment and Review of Climate Finance Flows (BAR), previously regarded as cornerstones of transparency and ambition. Like always, technical consensus came at the expense of political aspirations.

Regarding National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), progress on these was limited. The draft text was still full of parentheses, indicating unresolved issues in multilateral negotiations. Developed countries resisted calls to base NAP support on predictable finance flows.

Loss and damage, a vital issue for climate-vulnerable nations, received little attention at Bonn. With the fund already operational under the World Bank, the debate is drifting away from the UNFCCC framework. This risks weakening accountability. NGOs and some country negotiators expressed concern that without UNFCCC oversight, loss and damage financing could become another discretionary aid item – underfunded, unreliable and subject to geopolitical whims.

While the Bonn conference was low on deliverables, it did issue a clear warning: the climate finance system is deteriorating. The process's legitimacy is being tested by ongoing underfunding, a procedural culture that hampers genuine discussion and the deliberate sidelining of key agenda items. That said, the limited progress in Bonn is a sign that multilateralism remains intact despite being battered.

Brazil now faces the unenviable task of picking up the pieces. Its COP30 presidency aims to prioritise implementation, not declarations. Ana Toni, Brazil's lead for COP30, insisted that flashy announcements must give way to credible delivery. Her team is seeking to diversify funding sources, including guarantees, concessional finance and climate-related swaps. Yet she also re-emphasised that public finance remains indispensable.

Beyond formal negotiations, Brazil is also seeking to align its political interests through its membership in BRICS and the G20.

The country has established a ‘Circle of Ministers’, consisting of 30 nations, to inform the Baku to Belem roadmap. However, the process has been opaque. Several countries have reported being excluded or uncertain about how their input will be incorporated into the final text, expected in September.

This lack of transparency could further erode trust. Pakistan and other climate-vulnerable countries should press Brazil for clarity and inclusiveness. If the roadmap is to gain credibility, it must be co-created. Its informal nature does not absolve it from reflecting global consensus.

Meanwhile, just transition negotiations fared relatively better. The work programme received a boost, with countries agreeing to consider long-term institutional arrangements beyond 2026. Civil society actors welcomed provisions linking just transition with NDCs (nationally determined contributions), and the potential establishment of a ‘Belem Action Mechanism’. These developments could help mainstream equity and social safeguards into climate planning, a priority for labour-intensive economies like Pakistan.

Yet, concerns remain. As climate impacts intensify, from floods and droughts to wildfires and heatwaves, the pace of new NDC submissions is alarmingly slow. According to Jesse Lubitz of Devex.com, by June, only 22 countries had submitted their revised pledges. Brazil is conducting bilateral outreach, but time is running out. Without timely NDCs, COP30 may lack the momentum to secure enhanced global ambition.

Jesse also highlights an emerging dynamic to watch: the growing push by city leaders to enter the climate diplomacy arena. It was argued that local governments are more closely connected to their communities and can act more quickly than national governments. While their formal integration into the UNFCCC system remains uncertain, activism by local governments reflects a deeper trend: climate governance is becoming multi-level and cities will play a vital role.

Finally, Bonn witnessed growing recognition that UNFCCC processes are fraying. The delegates floated innovative ideas such as agenda ‘sunsetting’ (retiring old agenda items), and even majority-vote mechanisms to prevent single-party deadlock. There were also discussions about having more efficient, shorter sessions at COP30, so that small delegations could focus on adaptation and finance rather than being consumed by an unlimited agenda.

Pakistan was very capably represented by a delegation comprising officers from the Ministry of Climate Change and the Foreign Office. With an active participation in the last few COPs and SB meetings, what should Pakistan demand in Belem?

For Pakistan, COP30 presents both opportunities and warnings. The space for action remains, but only if it is used strategically. Islamabad should finalise its NDC by September, ensuring it includes quantified mitigation and adaptation targets tied to the provision of finances. It must continue to push for Article 9.1 compliance, advocate for transparent governance of the Baku to Belem roadmap, and promote concrete examples of just transition in sectors such as agriculture and energy.

Pakistan can also leverage its diplomatic capital in the G77 and LMDC groupings to insist that public finance be placed back at the centre of the agenda. It should support innovative finance mechanisms only as a complement, not a substitute, to public funding. Lastly, Pakistan should encourage process reforms within the UNFCCC, such as shorter, more focused agendas, majority decision-making and participation caps, which can help smaller delegations make their voices heard.

COP30 in Belem will be challenging not only in terms of what it delivers but also in terms of its inclusivity. There were many hopes that a left-to-centre Lula government would organise a people-friendly COP. However, by choosing Belem instead of Rio or Sao Paulo, the Brazilian government has made participation (of both official and civil society delegations) increasingly difficult for lower- and lower-middle-income countries. High hotel costs (ranging from $500 to $15,000 per night) and a yacht-level delegation class will limit access.

Let us see if President Lula would like to leave a legacy by delivering or risk another Bonn- --style stalemate.

The writer heads the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and is

a member of the advisory board of the Asian Development Bank Institute.

He tweets/posts @abidsuleri