The fall of Kabul and beyond

Kabul has fallen in a spectacular fashion and the sway of the Taliban over the whole of Afghanistan is complete. The sheer pace of the collapse of the Afghan state as it existed has been astounding. The world remains bewildered at the pace of events leading to a bloodless capture of the Afghan capital.

The melting of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which were touted as well-armed, well-trained by none other than the Americans themselves and having numerical superiority over the Taliban militia, allowed the latter almost a free passage across the various cities, districts and even provincial capitals.

The assessment of the American intelligence community about the fall of Kabul, revised from the earlier six months to the ninety days, fell flat, showing how detached, lazy and casual the United States has been about what was happening on the ground in the war-torn country.

The United States lost almost complete interest in Afghan affairs after the Biden Administration announced the withdrawal plan in April. The hasty withdrawal decision gave the Taliban the green light to go for the kill – as long as they did not attack the US and Nato forces.

Lost in the bargain was any concern for the Afghan people who feared the breaking out of yet another protracted but deadlier period of intra-Afghan fighting. Confronted with all-round criticism over the manner his administration has cut loose from the Afghan imbroglio, President Biden may shift the blame to his predecessor over the deficiencies in the design of the Doha agreement.

However, the fact remains that the Trump Administration did manage to get the Taliban to agree to an intra-Afghan dialogue leading to the formation of a provisional government and reduction in violence as a condition for the deal to go through. It may, however, be added that this was too little too late, particularly when no mechanism for the quantifiable enforcement of the deal was provided for.

If the manner of reaching the Doha deal with the Taliban’s political Shura served as a dampener for the increasingly worried Afghan government, the hurried withdrawal plan made the Ghani regime a sitting duck, only counting the days towards its collapse. All of his pleas, including a visit to Washington, could not make the Biden Administration budge from its stated goal – except for some necessary lip service.

The world is stunned by the suddenness of how a 20-year old multinational Afghan project led by the world’s sole superpower could be wound up in a span of a few weeks – and that too by a ragtag militia.

While the immediate reactions to the Taliban takeover could be driven by emotion, and a sense of jubilation and hurt, depending upon which side one is on, it will take the world some time to begin to process the deeper implications and imagine a whole spectrum of consequences to flow out of the epoch-making event.

Among all the stakeholders, no one has been affected by the apocalypse as profoundly as the Afghan people whose dream of living a normal life in relative peace and seeking a better future for their children has been shattered beyond recognition.

The images and video clips of the prevailing chaos and anarchy in the streets, roads, bus stops, and airport of Kabul are heartbreaking. These scenes of human helplessness and pessimism will continue to shame the world for failing the people of Afghanistan.

When the history books get written, the myopic and lopsided policies pursued by the Biden Administration will characterize the legacy of the ‘experienced’ president for all the wrong reasons. He will not be able to shrug off the questions about the Americans leaving the people of Afghanistan to fend off for themselves.

Worthy of equal blame is the now-deposed Ghani administration that kowtowed to its foreign masters and built up an empire of corruption, incompetence, and sleaze, practically alienating the Afghan people. The sight of him fleeing the country along with a coterie when he needed to show leadership destroyed whatever infrastructure of the government existed.

If one honorable thing Ghani could have done was to make his resignation conditional on some kind of transitional arrangement being in place to ensure an orderly transfer of power and stop chaos from reigning. This is the least he could have done in the interest of his country and fellow Afghans.

The Taliban takeover is being celebrated by some people in Pakistan; we see this on full display in heated debates on various social media platforms. One argument presented is the supposed expansion in the worldview of the Taliban informed by an experience of the last two decades and a greater understanding of governing as complex a country as Afghanistan.

If anything, the competing positions on the Taliban had and have deepened the polarisation in our society. On the face of it, the argument of the Taliban having reformed themselves makes a bit of sense. However, it flies in the face of history and those peddling such notions seem to be devoid of perspective.

While the Taliban’s political Shura may be making all the right noises and passing politically correct statements, the root of the problem lies in the kind of regressive ideology professed by the Taliban that is the very basis of their existence and guarantee of their longevity.

The idea of an Islamic Emirate is deeply rooted in their ethos and mindsets, and represents the very essence of their struggle. The concept of an Islamic Emirate does not accept the validity of republic and democracy as governing principles of a modern nation state. Inspired by this ideology, the Taliban have characteristic and often inelastic positions on the role of women, minorities and would very much like to export their brand of religiously inspired state system.

It is here the statement of the Pakistani Taliban to carve out formerly federally administered areas of Pakistan into an independent region acquires significance whose motivation could be ascribed to the overall Taliban’s ideological mission.

There is another angle to this debate. As discussed by experts of the region, how effectively the Taliban’s political leaders can pass on their instructions to the field commanders remains to be seen. It will take the top leadership quite an effort to bring about harmony and ownership of the decision-making, especially the way forward for an inclusive Afghanistan.

With Kabul overtaken by the Taliban, all the previous peace deals including the Doha agreement and regional efforts as well as the expectation from the Taliban to keep themselves dissociated from terror outfits such as Al-Qaeda are dead.

The Afghan imbroglio needs to be approached differently now in light of the prevalent realities. A Taliban-run Afghanistan needs international legitimacy and financial assistance to be viable.

This is where the international community, as well as the regional countries, can leverage their position to influence the Taliban to agree to a political arrangement that is inclusive, and broad-based, and gives primacy to the security, interests and survival of the Afghans. As noted by Mullah Baradar, the Taliban’s test has just begun.

Email: amanatchpk@gmail.com

Twitter: @Amanat222

The writer, a Chevening scholar, studied International Journalism at the University of Sussex.