Where not to mess with Pak-US relations

The PTI government's outbursts on foreign policy issues stem from a lack of nuanced understanding of determining factors and drivers which underpin Pakistan's relations with the outside powers. It is more noticeable in the context of Pakistan-US relations.

The latest pronouncements like "absolutely no" and "partner in peace and not in war" by Prime Minister Imran Khan are political rhetoric and a public snub to the US, not subtle diplomatic messaging, bordering arrogance which tends to hurt Pakistan's objectives in foreign policy, strategic orientation and its posture in international relations towards dealing with still the dominant superpower. They aim at only securing brownie points with his galleries. It is even more degrading to weaponise Pakistan-US bilaterals for public point-scoring when Washington has not even asked for bases as PM's NSA Moeed Yousuf clarified.

The hyperbole of the PM would have aptly a logical foreign policy talking point, had our national power not been so frail: a weak economy, almost risking bankruptcy, locked in perennial adversarial relations (with India) as national security dilemma and scant resources to modernize defense, invest in infrastructure and human capital. Adding to it, now Pakistan is being snarled through FATF, IMF economic coercion, elevating India to "net security provider status" in South Asia, and last but not the least, sanctions under the pretext of use of child soldier protocol.

Whereas the power differential with the US is astronomical, the PM again failed to appreciate how Pakistan's frailty in national power, its quest for a strategy to balance ties and drive a geostrategic advantage in Islamabad-Washington relations, is a relentless struggle by Pakistani policy practitioners over a span of decades.

Historically, this asymmetrical power differential between Pakistan and America has led to a heavy squeeze on Pakistan — from Kerry Lugar legislation to the latest coercive measure like FATF, IMF conditionalities, and now Child Soldiers protocol which have only underscored Islamabad's attempts of offsetting vulnerability to manage the 1000 ponds panda in a way a) to spare itself of any harm, and b) ensure some geopolitical advantage. Thus comes the leverage of Islamabad’s geostrategic heft in Afghanistan that has ensured some modicum of engagement–transactional the most in its geopolitical alliance with Washington. And this objective has been achieved with some degree of collaboration (whether it was post 9/11 decision to join WOT or the Doha talks, e.g, bringing the Taliban to the table, or now Pakistan’s acquiescence to allow the use of GLOC or ALOC by the US.

Here is why the PM misses the point: The above thinking simultaneously implied a degree of parallel policy to secure its national security and strategic interests on western and eastern borders by hedging groups such as the Taliban — opposed to the US objectives in Afghanistan. It may be a duplicitous act to Washington, but it is a cold calculation for Pakistan not to be checkmated by an adversary India’s snarling on two fronts. Such calculation of realpolitik cannot be drive on the back of populist motives and imperatives as Mr. Khan understands.

Two things the PM should urgently contemplate are: first, differentiate where the national interest militates against his populist impulse, his simplistic worldview of foreign policy and various balancing acts a country like Pakistan is forced to undertake; second, to figure out the reason behind the failure of his team, lobbying prowess and leverage in charming the Biden administration — why this snub from President Biden not to make a call to him so far? What if IMF, FATF relations are reeling under his stance?

The PM can start from the sore point (the Biden administration is not interacting with him). Here is the candid explanation:

1) One version of facts says Biden is angry, as per some folks, over the Omar Sheikh/Daniel Pearl issue; others think it’s because he (Imran Khan) has no say in formulating strategic policies.

2) But the fact is PM Khan, his aides and our ambassador in Washington unwittingly put all eggs in one basket: Support for President Trump during the US election campaign in the run-up to President Biden’s victory. The optics of messaging were conspicuous to all conveying to the Pakistani diaspora that Trump should be supported. Even another democratic contender Bernie Sanders complained through a Pakistani origin adviser why Pakistan is lobbying for President Trump and when Sanders had adopted an anti-Indian stance on IOK.

3) Mr. Khan’s team missed the boat. Now his phrase like “Absolutely not” is in part a reflection of his frustration over President Biden not calling him, instead the entire administration dealing with the Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa on Afghanistan.

While the PTI govt needs not fuel controversies in bilateral relations with the US that are beyond the diplomatic and strategic capacities of Pakistan, here is what we should be doing instead, as cold geopolitical rationale dictates:

1) Any possibility of assistance towards the US CT needs after Afghan pull-out should be explored.

2) Afghanistan and the greater Middle East region still fall within the core if not the primary interest of the US — Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel/Gaza conflict are a few issues the US cannot retract its security momentum from. We must find a space for convergence in these geopolitical fault lines as a new area for engagement.

3) We should attempt to expand bilateral relations to people’s contacts, medical, trade, education, and culture. Other development projects not on the scale Pakistan may expect yet are available.

4) The following driver ought to inform our thinking: The bigger picture of Pakistan-China relations i.e. strategic and political alliance with Beijing, should be balanced with some sort of continuation of geopolitical alliance with America in order we are not caught in the crosshairs of increasing Sino-US rivalry.

The immediate challenge Pakistan’s foreign policy is facing is the potential fallout from the Taliban’s impending capture of Afghanistan. The PM and his team must be worried that, aside from the regional and global power brokers — the US, the Europeans, Japan, Canada — could lurch to a negative view of Pakistan if things get ugly in Afghanistan, for not doing more to avoid that, whether or not that perception is deserved?

And the first step is not to couch foreign policy positions in the populist lense. Whatever damage is accrued due to his public narratives, it would have a negative impact on Pakistan and run at cross purposes with the robust military diplomacy undertaken by the Army Chief Gen Bajwa which is always in overdrive to save the country from such negative consequences.

(Jan Achakzai is a geopolitical analyst, a politician from Balochistan, and ex-adviser to the Balochistan Government on media and strategic communication. He is also Chairman of Institute of New Horizons (INH) & Balochistan. He tweets @Jan_Achakzai)