This is an encyclopedic account of Pakistan’s foreign policy not just limited to Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri’s time in office. Having read the book, it must be said that his heart is in the right place, and the priorities of a foreign policy with its emphasis on a peaceful and non-confrontational relationship with India cannot be doubted and quaralleled with. It could be further said in the same breath that the account is unusually long with plenty of repetitious material placed under different subheadings, at times reading like the daily roster of his days at the foreign office.
All this prioritisation must have come from his background which is better informed about the way history unfolded or choices made in the shaping of history in the Indian subcontinent. He discusses the factors leading to partition and certain intractable issues which then cast their long shadow on the India Pakistan relationship in the decades to follow. He has drawn a correct perspective of the initial decisions taken by the Pakistan government of aligning itself with the West rather than powers closer to home.
It must have taken a lot of courage and effort for going all out for a workable solution to the Kashmir issue without compromising on the basic principled stand and he seemed to solicit plenty of appreciation and credit for almost clinching a deal. These included confidence-building measures, establishing back channel diplomatic links, creating and restoration of road and rail routes, travel without passport/visa across the line of control for Kashmiris, involving Kashmiri leadership in the peacemaking process, greater understanding on Siachin and Sir Creek.
But there were Freudian slips all along that exposed the limitations involved in putting the relationship on the right track. It appears from the narrative that there was a constant undercurrent, a refrain that there was another force or an institution that was bearing upon policy making in the country. He mentions that often but expresses the inability of confirming it. He has discussed the relationship of ISI and CIA but does not ascertain that the foreign policy was not formulated where it should have been. Not surprisingly, the perception about the equation of terrorism and the question of self-determination could not be changed.
He does not discount the factor that he was able to achieve whatever he did as foreign minister of the country because he had the chief of the army staff as president. This critical factor should never be overlooked in any political dispensation in the country. Politicians who have to operate on their own without the backing of the right quarters face a totally different prospect than those who play second fiddle and play ball without developing an alternative paradigm of what constitutes the national interest.
Like most politicians in Pakistan, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, too, has been guilty of changing his political loyalties. These days, he is in the Tehreek-i-Insaf, most probably in its core committee, and has extended reasons for him being in that party in his write-up on Imran Khan.
He agrees that Imran Khan’s views on Pakistan India relationship were quite similar to those of his own. Imran Khan wanted a close India Pakistan ties almost like that of the United States and Canada, and it could only be achieved through negotiations. And he points out that the framework that he as foreign minister had worked on was the closest that one got to the resolution of the Kashmir problem. While driving together in a car to a rally, a briefing on the salient points of the agreement was given to Imran Khan who appreciated it calling it a good agreement.
They first met when Khurshid Kasuri delivered a letter from the PML-N inviting Imran Khan to join the party which, of course, he refused calling it a compromise if he did so in 2007. But later, instead, Khurshid Kasuri joined the party because he had reservations about Nawaz Sharif when the latter wanting to garner support exploited the religious sentiment in becoming amirul momineen. He also had doubts about Nawaz Sharif’s financial integrity.
Imran Khan supported talks with the Taliban but then after an about-turn started to support the military action against them. Kasuri brushes this about-turn under the table by calling terrorism a complicated affair.
He claims to have been impressed by the very long debates held in the party (PTI) before any decision was taken. About the launching of the agitation on the elections rigging, he claims the PTI had garnered great public support in getting the party’s message across the country for the need of a just and fair society, electoral reforms, greater attention paid to education, health, women, minority rights, ending corruption and all generalities constantly being mouthed.
Other than his days at the foreign office, he gives an account of the ten year agreement that Nawaz Sharif had signed with the assurance of the Saudi Government and how the Saudi authorities were concerned when he took the initials steps to move out of Saudia to go to England under the pretext of his son’s severe illness. At the same time, he signed the agreement with Benazir Bhutto that allowed her to come back to Pakistan after her exile abroad. And once that was struck, there was no moral justification to keep him out of the country. This was some kind of a master maneuver on the part of Nawaz Sharif.
Being guilty and sheepish in joining a government led by the chief of the army staff, the burden seemed to have been lifted off his chest when he had the opportunity to offer his resignation to the government during the Lawyers’ Movement in the country. He expiated his guilt by walking away from a setup that all his life he had accused others of having towed -- that of being the B team in running the government. How long will he be able to keep away from it in the Tehreek-i-Insaf, while being a politician who matters, is yet to be seen.
But it seems, in this country, being effective and to able to be a mover and shaker one has to be a good player in the B team. This apartheid prevails and persists unfortunately at the top level.