Blighted democracy?

The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.

Asif Zardari's reputation, his performance in office and his disposition towards rival political actors, as well as the media, is blighting the future of the PPP and democracy, we hear. But an unpopular and misdirected president leading a mal-performing government cannot single-handedly "derail the system."

That, together with our collective impatience with the political process and rule of law, and our proclivity to readily accepting illegal doctrines of necessity is what jeopardises the future of democracy in Pakistan. Our eagerness to contrive any means to hasten Zardari's exit from the Presidency cannot be a measure of our allegiance to democracy and constitutionalism. What will reflect our fidelity to the foundational principles of our Constitution and democracy is our commitment to due process (in the realm of politics and law) in dealing with a head of state who has come to personify all that is wrong with our politics and society.

The ascent of Asif Zardari to the office of president of Pakistan was a historical accident. A man of no political following and a thoroughly sullied name, Zardari assumed leadership of the country's largest political party upon the demise of his wife. It was the name and legacy of Benazir Bhutto that led the party to electoral success in 2008. Once the electoral numbers had been secured, Zardari certainly brought into play his skill in political deal-making to sidetrack the PML-N and get elected as head of state. Since then the PPP has chosen to formulate policies and adopt positions on national issues that are against overwhelming public opinion in the country. The party position against the restoration of the judges, the unconditional defence of the Kerry-Lugar law and the no-holds-barred effort to get the NRO stamped by the parliament are obvious examples.

The unfortunate lesson that Zardari seems to have learnt from the manner in which he elevated himself to the presidency is that one does not need genuine political support resulting from an attractive agenda and the ability to implement it effectively in order to sustain oneself in office. What is required instead is the unconditional loyalty of cronies and superior skills in wheeling-dealing, together with active support from the US and acquiescence of the army.

Only such a myopic mindset can explain the Zardari-led PPP's apathy to expounding a consensual vision and agenda for the future of the country, unconditional adherence to US diktat, continuing reliance on inept and tainted buffoons to run key government departments, and further entrenchment of our corrupt political ethic of "making hay while the sun shines," while denouncing the deafening calls for accountability and transparency in government as conspiracies against democracy.

Asif Zardari has been controversial from day one, not just for those opposed to the PPP but also within the party. One set of his detractors within and outside the PPP believed that he could never change. Others were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt in the hope that his years in jail and exile and the experience of losing his wife and having leadership thrust upon him might have reformed him.

But deceitful political deals, un-kept promises, growing corruption scams, blatant cronyism combined with resentful self-righteousness and nauseating tales of victimhood seem to confirm that our quintessential Zardari is his old self. His detractors are now convinced that his presence in the Presidency is baneful for democracy and, with its ISPR release over the Kerry-Lugar issue, the army is making no bones about the fact that it doesn't see eye-to-eye with the commander-in-chief.

As for the security establishment, there are at least three obvious reasons why it dislikes Zardari: one, his approach to peace with India and insistence that Pakistan perceives no threat from its eastern neighbour is in conflict with the country's strategic and operational defence policy; two, his offer to adhere to a no-first-use nuclear policy contradicts Pakistan's doctrine of minimum nuclear deterrence in relation to India; and three, his eagerness to interfere with the working and control of the ISI and willingness to subject the functioning of the army and the state to greater US scrutiny.

There is absolutely no reason why the military should have a monopoly over how we perceive, define and secure our national security interests or why our intelligence-gathering machinery should not be subjected to effective civilian oversight. Our civil-military imbalance and the absolute autonomy traditionally enjoyed by our army high command are inimical to both democracy and constitutionalism in Pakistan.

But readjustment of this balance in favour of civilian institutions will have to be incremental. A prerequisite for such change is not just continuity of the political process, but also uncompromised performing political governments that enjoy widespread public support for their reform agenda. Thus, in order to succeed, any change sought by the elected civilian leadership in our national approach towards India, the nuclear policy, and the command, control and functioning of intelligence agencies will have to be the product of a deliberative process that is backed by the public.

No matter how desirable an instant shift in our lopsided civil-military power equation, a president with a credibility deficit as high as the K2 can never usher such change. Zardari's clumsy attempts to interfere with strategic and operational matters have alienated our khakis that are presently reluctant to interfere directly with politics (not out of their commitment to democracy but to focus on the war in the tribal areas and rehabilitate the loss of reputation suffered during the Musharraf era). His trickery has offended his political allies and adversaries alike. And the rudderless PPP-led government under his command has extinguished the flame of hope amongst ordinary people that the return to democracy had ignited across Pakistan.

But notwithstanding the widespread desire to see Zardari go, let us remember that there is no legal mechanism to oust a president other than through the impeachment process laid out by our Constitution. Let us also remember that, despite the 17th Amendment and the powers it vests in the president to sack the government and make some crucial executive appointments, the president does not even have the legal authority to summon a federal secretary to brief him on the functioning of a ministry.

The fact that Zardari is able to run the government from the Presidency is because the prime minister has willingly surrendered his legal authority to Zardari, the party head. This, in turn, highlights an ill larger than Zardari, Gilani and the ruling regime: the autocratic nature of our political parties and the peremptory political culture they instil where disagreement with the top party leader is tantamount to disloyalty.

Zardari might be an undesirable president, but his incumbency will not result in the sky caving in and his removal is not an elixir likely to prolong our life and prosperity as a nation. In the immediate term we should amend Article 248 of our Constitution and rid the president of the extraordinary protections afforded to him against legal liability and bring pressure to bear on the prime minister to take responsibility for the exercise of powers that he has outsourced to the presidency. In the long term, we need to establish effective civilian control of the military, undertake reform of our political institutions and strengthen our legal processes to sustain and strengthen democracy.

But none of this is possible if we circumscribe the political process, the continuity of which is desirable not because it comes with the promise of instantly transforming compromised politicians into angels, but because it provides a mechanism to rid ourselves of such politicians over time and nurture and groom better ones.

If we value democracy, rule of law and constitutionalism, we do not have the luxury to get impatient with due process, even if that means enduring Zardari for an extended period.



Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu