End of the endless?

Over the last few years, I have asked a number of people what in their view motivated the US intervention in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, where the obvious explanation is most often deemed insufficient, the responses typically refer to conspiracy theories and speculative reasoning.

I have been told that it is Afghanistan’s natural resources and precious minerals that brought the US to the country. Others, evoking President George Bush’s ill-advised reference to ‘crusade’ in the initial days after September 11, view the American intervention in Afghanistan as another proof of, and a stage in, a civilizational clash. The later American military involvement in the Middle East only strengthened their conviction.

The relatively sane responses offer more strategic explanations: that the purpose of American intervention in Afghanistan is to establish a regional base to counter rising China. Some also cite Russia, Central Asia and Iran. The latter types view the intervention as the ‘New Great Game’ in the region.

The common Pakistani clueless of the situation is worrisome but understandable. There are historical examples in the region of the divergence of purported and real reasons for Western involvement in the region. The more troublesome aspect, however, is not the cluelessness of the Pakistani or even the Afghan man on the street, it is the evident incognizance of the Washington’s policy elite.

Initially, the war in Afghanistan, backed by almost universal international consensus expressed at multilateral forums, started as an effort to dismantle Al-Qaeda, and to deny the group safe havens in Afghanistan. Due to the Taliban refusal to comply with the US demand to hand over Bin Laden, toppling the Taliban regime also became the central goal of the intervention. Even before these objectives could be decisively accomplished, the American focus broadened to include a large-scale state-building project in Afghanistan.

The broad contours of the envisioned Afghan state would include components of a liberal democracy – ethnic inclusivity, some forms of separation of powers, rule of law and fundamental rights especially women rights – in addition to the reconstruction and development of the war-ravaged country.

The obvious explanation for the state-building project is that the removal of the Taliban from power created a vacuum of governance and authority that needed to be filled. Also, to prevent the Taliban from returning to power, the American-led International Security Assistance Force had to remain in Afghanistan. Without an appearance of local involvement in governance, the optics of the military presence would be awfully similar to direct colonization.

However, such an ambitious project, amidst a protracted insurgency, factional rivalries and widespread corruption in Afghanistan meant that the war had no end in sight. It does not mean that no good had been accomplished in Afghanistan: on most human development indicators, Afghanistan currently fares better than it did before 2001.

However, as the cost of intervention grew, ‘the endless war’ grew unpopular in the US. In 2018, the Pew Research Center found that only 45 percent Americans believed that the US had made the right decision by using military force in Afghanistan – declining from nearly 70 percent in 2006. Similarly, whereas 62 percent Americans believed in 2009 that the US would succeed in the war in Afghanistan, the percentage of people who believed the US has been successful in the War in Afghanistan declined to 49 percent in 2018.

Sensing the unpopularity of the war and the improbability of the completion of the state-building project, the US policymakers, it seems, have decided to pull out of Afghanistan. The number of US troops has declined from more than 50,000 in 2009 to about 8,000 currently.

It feels like US officials are presently torn between wishing to leave the country completely and not giving the impression of the Afghan project being a failure. In doing so, the strategy of choice, it appears, is to come to some form of an agreement – a so-called ‘peace deal’ – with the Taliban. The intent is to then use such an agreement as a representation of closure, a settlement if not a resolution of the Afghan question.

Unpopular or not, costly or otherwise, the American war in Afghanistan cannot continue indefinitely. However, the unmistakable haste with which the US government wants to reach an agreement with the Taliban, and the secrecy around the talks between US negotiators and Taliban representatives raise fears in Afghanistan and in the region. Particularly problematic is the Taliban stance on the lack of legitimacy of the President Ghani government.

It is safe to assume that there are a number of issues for which the US government or its representatives in the negotiations do not have clear answers. The elections in Afghanistan have just returned President Ghani to power for another term. It is unclear whether the nature of the system of government in Afghanistan is part of negotiation. Given the Taliban’s history, it is safe to assume that it is. In such a case, what will be the future of the government that has just been elected?

Needless to say, the two parties to the negotiation do not have much trust in each other. And they have a number of important questions to talk about: Will there be international guarantors of an agreement? Who will be these be and what leverage will such guarantors exercise over either party? What will be the future of Afghan forces? Will they exist alongside armed Taliban or will the latter be made part of the Afghan military? And these are only the more strategic questions. The ideological questions, of course, are thornier.

I understand that the answers to these questions are neither easy nor straightforward. However, a settlement of the Afghan conflict will have to take time to address these issues. A hasty deal that avoids these issues, or provides broad and vague directions for the future, will only reinforce the belief that American officials prioritize domestic politics over lives in lands shaped by American intervention.

Mark Twain humorously wrote that “God created war so that Americans would learn geography.” Makes me wonder what war makes other people learn about America.

The writer is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Peshawar.

Email: aameraza@gmail.com

Twitter: @aamer1raza