Talks with the Taliban

Pakistan has again tried diplomacy – this time in Istanbul – to stop a dangerous slide towards a wider confrontation with Afghanistan. Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban regime kicked off the third round of talks in Istanbul on Thursday in an effort to ease escalating tensions. From Doha to Istanbul, Islamabad has repeatedly put evidence on the table: Pakistan handed over evidence of cross-border terrorism by the TTP and the BLA. The Afghan Taliban regime, however, seems to be in denial – a posture that helps explain why earlier rounds collapsed and why Islamabad has been obliged to press the matter again under third-party mediation. This time, Pakistan’s position has been unambiguous and evidence-based. In Istanbul, Islamabad submitted an evidence-based list of demands for specific action against any anti-Pakistan elements operating from Afghanistan and a statement from the Afghan Taliban disassociating themselves from the TTP. Pakistan has made plain that it expects either direct Taliban action against the TTP, or if the Afghan authorities lack the capacity, a willingness to allow Pakistan to take targeted action, or for both sides to undertake coordinated operations.

The problem is the Afghan Taliban’s refusal to accept the facts on the ground. Islamabad, which so far has shown a great deal of restraint and pursued a largely diplomatic course, is now understandably running out of patience. Observers note more than 60 terrorist attacks inside Pakistan since the Doha and Istanbul talks began, and even as talks continued we witnessed fresh bloodshed. This fragility exposes the limits of third-party guarantees. Qatar and Turkiye have mediated these talks and may well produce joint statements promising to continue the ceasefire, reopen crossings and establish a mechanism to stop infiltration. But most regional experts are rightly sceptical that such a mechanism will deliver anything substantial without the Taliban’s will to act against militants operating on Afghan soil. Some in Islamabad are already weighing harder options: closing borders to inflict economic and social pain on Afghanistan, or authorising kinetic measures if cross-border attacks persist. That is a dangerous road. Economic pressure will hurt ordinary Afghans more than the militants and kinetic action risks escalation into outright confrontation between two neighbours whose ties are already frayed. Yet there is also a simple, painful truth: when diplomatic engagement fails to stop attacks, deterrence – including the threat of force – becomes hard to avoid. Pakistan’s carrot-and-stick calculus is shifting; observers say the carrots may be taken away and the stick used more readily in the foreseeable future.

Why have the Afghan Taliban been so reluctant to act? Part of the answer lies in ideology and history. The TTP and the Afghan Taliban movement are bound by shared doctrinal affinities; many TTP fighters previously fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against Nato forces. That connection makes Kabul’s denials appear less credible to Islamabad. Whatever the reasons, denial in the face of mounting evidence is a recipe for mistrust and, eventually, confrontation. So what should Islamabad do next? There are no easy choices. Pakistan has rightly exhausted diplomatic avenues and must continue to work with credible mediators – but mediation cannot be a substitute for results. Islamabad should tighten diplomatic pressure and make the costs of inaction clear, while calibrating measures so they target the militant networks and their enablers rather than ordinary Afghans. Simultaneously, Pakistan must bolster domestic resilience to reduce the urgency of last-resort options. And the international community, particularly the mediators who brokered the ceasefire, must hold Kabul accountable for any failure to act on concrete demands. Ultimately, the Taliban should smell the coffee before it is too late. The continuation of attacks while negotiations limp on will only narrow the space for diplomacy and raise the risk of a more damaging conflict. For the sake of regional stability, for the protection of civilians on both sides, and for whatever fragile trust remains between these neighbours, deeds must follow words.