After Pahalgam: Pakistan’s tactical gains and the imperative for peace

Undoubtedly, Pakistan emerged stronger both on the war as well as diplomatic front following the April 22nd Pahalgam incident in Indian-held Kashmir. While war rarely brings joy, when a country faces aggression and responds decisively, it can offer a momentary sense of relief and national pride.

As always, truth is the first casualty in any conflict. Objectivity is compromised, and narratives are shaped by emotions and agendas. But the way Pakistan handled the crisis-militarily, diplomatically, and through the media-led many to believe that India committed a strategic blunder. It not only suffered losses on the battlefield but also found its leadership, particularly Prime Minister Narendra Modi, under political pressure unless he attempts another “misadventure.”

War brings suffering, economic strain, and human loss. Still, in its immediate aftermath, unity emerges. Yet this unity is fragile and doesn’t always reflect long-term political trends.

Pakistan gained an edge for several reasons. India reportedly lost six aircrafts, including a Rafale, while Pakistan’s Air Force remained intact. Diplomatically, India failed to garner the international support it once enjoyed-particularly compared to the Kargil conflict. On the media front, Pakistani outlets appeared more restrained and objective, in contrast to India’s sensationalist, sometimes irresponsible media coverage. As a result, national morale in Pakistan surged, echoing a unity not seen in years.

Modi’s political narrative has long revolved around hostility towards Pakistan and internal minorities, particularly Muslims. This strategy has worked electorally, but it may be reaching its limits. Following the Pahalgam episode, India’s global isolation was evident. Questions need to be asked-why did India fail to win international support this time? Why take such a confrontational path now, when it had avoided war after more severe provocations like the Mumbai attacks or the assault on its Parliament?

Wartime unity is often fleeting. It is up to leadership to channel it into long-term national cohesion.

Despite India’s democratic edge-where elections are more transparent and generally unquestioned-Pakistan can learn from this by strengthening its own electoral credibility. Unlike the unprovoked Kargil war, where Pakistan faced immense pressure, especially from the United States and President Clinton, the current situation played out more favourably for Islamabad. That war resulted in political fallout and the eventual ouster of Nawaz Sharif by General Musharraf.

In contrast, the recent confrontation saw broad public backing and even a rare political ceasefire between government and opposition. Though it’s too early for a definitive assessment, international responses-especially from the U.S. and President Trump, who acknowledged the Kashmir issue-marked a shift from the usual diplomatic climate.

Modi now finds himself in a bind. The war hysteria he created has backfired. His series of missteps could haunt him politically, as it did in 2001 when BJP lost crucial elections after similar aggression. Pakistan’s swift and measured military response contrasted sharply with India’s overreach, including an inability to substantiate its accusations over the Pahalgam incident.

From my own memories-being a child during the 1965 war and a student during 1971-I’ve witnessed how war initially unites but later gives way to division and blame. After 1971, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing not because India won, but due to internal political failings, national unity evaporated quickly. That loss was a product of political mismanagement following the 1970 elections, not merely a military failure.

The lessons of 1971 remain relevant. Unity forged in battle is unsustainable without smart governance and reconciliation. Even as Pakistan celebrated its recent military and diplomatic performance, leaders must avoid triumphalism. Shahbaz Sharif’s claim that Pakistan “took revenge for 1971” was both inaccurate and unhelpful. Pakistan didn’t lose 1971 to India; it lost it to itself.

Today’s media landscape-especially in India-is driven by ratings and sensationalism. The spread of fake news and war propaganda has poisoned public discourse. There’s an urgent need to rethink this financial and editorial model, or we risk being hostages to hysteria, not truth.

Ultimately, war is not a solution. Peace is. The current ceasefire should be a stepping stone to dialogue-perhaps beginning with backchannel diplomacy or Track-II initiatives. Both Pakistan and India need to wage a different kind of war: against poverty, illiteracy, and extremism. The question is: can we rise to the challenge?

The writer is a senior analyst and columnist for GEO, Jang, and The New X. Follow him on X: @MazharAbbas.Geo