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he Indian government has made an announcement to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam besides firing missiles inside Pakistan that caused a four-day standoff between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Pakistan has condemned the announcement saying that if the decision is not revoked, it could be interpreted as “an act of war.” As the two countries navigate this difficult complex situation, the potential for conflict over shared water resources looms large, with profound implications for millions of people who depend on the rivers of the Indus Basin.
The IWT, signed in 1960 was facilitated by the World Bank after India stopped canal water supplies to Pakistan after Partition. It is regarded as a fundamental element of trans-boundary water diplomacy. The treaty regulates the sharing of water from the six rivers that flow through Indian-occupied Kashmir, granting India unrestricted use of the three eastern rivers: the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Pakistan is allocated most of the flows in the three western rivers: the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. The average annual flow of the western rivers is nearly 135.6 million acre-feet, more than four times that of the eastern rivers’ about 32.6 million acre-feet.
The IWT has substantial importance for both nations. It holds even greater significance for Charrhda (Indian) Punjab and Lehnda (Pakistani) Punjab, which together constitute a partitioned Punjab that historical, cultural and geopolitical dynamics have shaped over millennia. The Punjab is reliant on the rivers for agriculture and sustenance. The treaty provisions are therefore vital for ensuring water security and economic stability and for fostering cooperative relations in an otherwise complex and often fraught bilateral context.
The word “Punjab” means “five waters.” It was originally referred to a region with five doabs, not just five rivers. Historically, various terms were used for the area, including the Rigvedic Sapta Sindhu, meaning “land of seven rivers.” The Indus River, also known as Sindhu, was the most significant. Its tributaries were identified as the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. The Kabul River in eastern Afghanistan is sometimes counted as the seventh river, rather than the mythical Sarasvati. The Rigveda mentions seven rivers more frequently than a land of seven rivers.
It has been observed recently that whereas the Sapta Sindhavah in the Rigveda are still seven rivers, the Hapta Hendu in the Avesta (a Zoroastrian text) is a territorial entity, now called the Punjab. However, the Hapta Hendu did not cover the Satluj-Yamuna Divide. Different terms, including Vahika and MadraDesh, have been used to refer to territorial identities in the region over time.
Although there is no uniformity in the territorial entities, even when the term used is the same, they tend to overlap. The river Yamuna is never crossed and the Himalayas and Sindh remain outside. The region thus appears to emerge as the area surrounded by the Himalayas to the north and north-west, the River Yamuna to the east, and the Aravalli hills and Thar Desert to the south and south-west.
The Punjab has one of the largest man-made canal systems in the world. The roots of this effort can be traced back to the rule of Firuz Shah Tughluq (1351-1388 AD). Canal irrigation was enhanced by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan (1628-1658 AD) by constructing the Shah Nahr in the upper Bari Doab and the Yamuna canal for the Yamuna-Sutlej Divide.
The British significantly expanded this system in the 19th and the 20th Centuries, establishing a network of nine canals in the inter-fluvial regions west of the Beas and Sutlej rivers, and east of the Jhelum River. These were known as the Punjab canal colonies, between 1885 and 1940. These colonies are located in western and southern Punjab. This period led to a substantial agrarian transformation, shifting from arid subsistence production to a focus on commercial crops such as wheat, cotton and sugar.
Following this development, the region east of the Ravi River became more densely populated and cultivated than it had been in the Mughal and Sikh periods. After 1947, this trend continued in Charrhda Punjab. The trend was driven by advancements in irrigation methods, particularly the use of electricity. In the Lehnda Punjab, too, the area under cultivation expanded.
With the extensive canal irrigation system, alongside the introduction of modern technology, improved seeds and fertilisers, both the Charrhda and the Lehnda Punjab developed as key agricultural regions, particularly during the Green Revolution initiatives from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, and came to be known as the “breadbasket” for both India and Pakistan.
Had there been no IWT, the course of agriculture in the Punjab and its contribution to the national GDPs, would have been different. The IWT has withstood two wars between India and Pakistan and is regarded as a model of effective trans-boundary water management.
According to the terms of the agreement, India has the right to utilise the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes, such as hydropower generation and limited irrigation. However, it is prohibited from storing the water or diverting the flows in a manner that would adversely affect downstream access. These stipulations are precise and enforceable. The regulatory framework assures Pakistan of more than just the water resource; it also delivers the predictability essential for constructing a comprehensive irrigation and water management system.
Indian has been alleging for several years that Pakistan has not been acting in good faith and has approached nearly all Indian initiatives related to the western rivers as an opportunity to internationalise the dispute. It India has been pushing for a review and modification of the treaty, citing evolving requirements related to irrigation, drinking water and hydropower, particularly in the context of climate change. The treaty includes provisions for modification under specific circumstances, but it does not contain any clauses for unilateral exit or suspension of the treaty.
While India has placed the treaty in “abeyance,” it cannot stop the flow of tens of billions of cubic metres of water from the western rivers during periods of high flow. According to the terms of the agreement, India has the right to utilise the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes, such as hydropower generation and limited irrigation. However, it is prohibited from storing the water or diverting the flows in a manner that would adversely affect downstream access.
However, India has now announced that it will no longer abide by the IWT. It says is has placed the agreement in “abeyance” until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably renounces terrorism. This is the first instance of neither nation declaring a suspension of the treaty.
India’s act of placing the IWT in abeyance and accelerating the development of four new hydropower projects on rivers that flow into Pakistan has alarmed international legal experts and elicited a strong reaction from Islamabad, which has denounced this decision as “an act of war.”
While India says it has placed the treaty in “abeyance”, it cannot stop the flow of tens of billions of cubic metres of water in the western rivers particularly during periods of high flow. For now, it lacks the necessary storage infrastructure as well as canal systems required to divert such substantial volumes. The current infrastructure consists primarily of run-of-the-river hydropower plants that do not necessitate large-scale water storage. Some Indian specialists have contended that the ‘inadequate’ infrastructure has hindered India’s utilisation of its share of the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus rivers water.
The treaty was originally reached to maintain the separation of water resource management from political and military tensions. When the agreement was formulated, the objective was to protect water cooperation from security conflicts between the two nations. The first significant disruption occurred in 2016 following a terrorist attack on Indian soldiers in Uri. It was at this juncture that the Bharatiya Janata Party first mentioned the possibility of revoking the treaty. “Blood and water cannot flow together,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi notably said in the aftermath of the 2016 attack. He reiterated the view in a subsequent address to the nation following a more recent incident.
Experts caution that the Indian government is increasingly trying to use river water as a tool for political leverage, suggesting that the issue of Kashmir is now more intricately connected to water resource management than to identity alone. According to the provisions of the treaty, India is permitted to construct hydroelectric projects, provided that the water continues to flow freely into Pakistan. Currently, India is building four dams on the Chenab River, the waters of which are primarily intended for Pakistan.
While there has been no restriction historically on the construction of hydroelectric power projects, conflicts did arise when India modified the infrastructure surrounding these dams to facilitate greater water storage. Such alterations could enable India to divert water and exert control the volume and timing of water flowing into Pakistan.
A suspension of the treaty also allows India to withhold water flow data and manage dam sediment flushing at its discretion. This could influence agriculture, power generation and consumption and cause flooding in Pakistan. Previously, substantial releases of water, such as during sediment flushing, were strictly regulated to occur only during the monsoon season to prevent disruptions to Pakistan’s irrigation systems. The lack of access to real-time data will also hamper Pakistan’s ability to plan plantation and irrigation. If developed and operated without consulting Pakistan, these dams may evolve into strategic assets that could exacerbate tensions in future conflicts.
Agriculture has a crucial role in Pakistan’s economy, employing more than half of the population and contributing approximately 25 per cent of the nation’s GDP. Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries globally. Disruptions to its river systems could have significant repercussions for both the economy and the livelihoods of its citizens. Any shortfall or alteration in the timing of river flows will necessitate difficult decisions regarding water allocation. Such circumstances may exacerbate inter-provincial tensions, particularly between the Punjab and Sindh, where discussions surrounding water-sharing are already politically sensitive.
Farmers in Pakistan have expressed growing concerns about the unpredictable water supply originating from India. They want the government to engage international organisations, particularly in view of potential reductions in water distribution by India. Experts argue that Pakistan has legal avenues available under the current treaty framework. The nation may pursue an appeal to the World Bank, seek arbitration or request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that extended timelines and considerable political sensitivity characterise each of these options.
Previous disputes related to infrastructure projects, such as the Kishanganga dam, were resolved through international panels that permitted construction while imposing minimum flow requirements. In the current context, with the treaty’s suspension, even those protective measures may be rendered ineffective. The absence of the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms makes Pakistan vulnerable to unilateral alterations in water flows by India that could jeopardise its water security.
Pakistan’s reliance on the Indus Basin waters is substantial, as 80 per cent of its water resources come from it. This issue extends beyond the perceived disadvantages faced by India due to the treaty; it fundamentally pertains to Pakistan’s food and water security. The situation represents a complex conflict involving terrorism between two nuclear powers, with water serving as a secondary leverage point, which introduces significant risks. If the international community allows a state to suspend a water-sharing treaty unilaterally, this may lead to future disputes in which water becomes a primary source of contention, particularly in the context of escalating climate stress.
Just as the Indus Waters Treaty transformed the Charrhda and the Lehnda Punjab into vital agricultural production areas for both India and Pakistan, its suspension could escalate tensions, potentially leading to conflict between these two nuclear-armed nations. The waters that currently flow through the rivers and canals could, under strained circumstances, become emblematic of bloodshed. Therefore, the imminent crisis surrounding the possibility of such a conflict requires immediate and focused attention.
Mazhar Abbas, author of The Aftermath of the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971: Enduring Impact (Routledge, 2024), has a PhD in history from Shanghai University. He is a lecturer at GCU, Faisalabad, and a research fellow at PIDE, Islamabad. He can be contacted at mazharabbasgondal87gmail.com. His X-handle is MazharGondal87.