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Missing water infrastructure

By Magazine Desk
23 February, 2015

­Sindh being the lower riparian of Indus River system is the most vulnerable to a variety of environmental, economic, and social costs associated with upstream water development. The Indus Delta has shrunken unbelievably.

­Sindh being the lower riparian of Indus River system is the most vulnerable to a variety of environmental, economic, and social costs associated with upstream water development. The Indus Delta has shrunken unbelievably.

A report of Indus Consortium said that the natural drainage system was disrupted and deteriorated. “While the benefits of artificial drainage go to upstream areas, the Indus Delta ironically remains the main site of induced environmental and social catastrophe. The design failure of the Left Bank Outfall Drainage Project (LBOD) has further escalated the risk of flooding and sea intrusion to the deltaic region and coastal belt of Sindh,” the report said.

Water infrastructure, especially Sukkur barrage and associated canal network needs immediate maintenance and rehabilitation in order to keep it efficient and free of risks. It has significantly lost its capacity from 1.5 million cusecs once to 900,000 cusecs now. The latest reports suggest that 13 out of 65 barrage gates are dysfunctional.

Maintenance of canals and barrages is met through the amount received under ‘Abiana’. The general assessment is that the collection of irrigation tax (Abiana) does not even cover the modest 20 percent of the overall operation and maintenance costs.

Water expert and former Secretary Irrigation Sindh, Idrees Rajput said that the original capacity of Sukkur Barrage was 1.5 million cusecs, but the right bank canals’ 10 doors were closed during the British period and it was reduced to 900,000 cusecs. However, “We had passed 1.2 million cusecs of water through it during the floods of 1976,” he said. “Thus, its capacity is 1.2 million cusecs.”

Rajput said that the barrage was 82 years old and its rehabilitation work could cause hindrance in water supply to the canals, thus, they had suggested to the Sindh government for preparing feasibility of a new barrage instead of rehabilitation.

There is no water policy at the provincial level while there was a policy at the federal level that suggested only for conservation of water and building up of dams, he said.

The problem of water shortage further compounds due to the uncertain transition of institutional structure of water control and management. After the establishment of Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA), the prevalent institutional structure of irrigation management is built upon the principle of duality. Management of some canal areas has been transferred to Area Water Boards (AWBs) and Farmers’ Organisations (FOs) under the SIDA Ordinance of 1997 and then Sindh Water Management Ordinance of 2001, while other remaining canal areas are still being managed by Sindh Irrigation Department.

Sindh claims that it has become the most vulnerable region in terms of risks pertaining to ecology, water availability, crop production, and natural drainage, mainly due to the building of river basin. “Until and unless, the provincial government does not formulate its own provincial water policy and provides the guidelines for future, its claim would not have much political weightage,” said the Indus Consortium report. “Moreover, the region has long history for supporting the claims and cause of provincial autonomy. The formulation of provincial water policy would certainly bolster that cause as well.”

The list of water woes faced by Sindh is long, but there’s one message that survival and well-being of Sindh is dependent upon the fixing of these problems and, for that purpose, the provincial government needs to initiate study to identify and evaluate in detail the key policy issues in the first place, the report suggests.

The optimal water withdrawal from the Indus resulted into the disintegration and closure of river basin. The immediate casualty was the Indus Delta, which experienced serious and, in many ways, irreparable environmental and social deterioration. The active Indus delta has been now reduced to about one tenth of its original size. One of the major reasons is the indiscriminate cutting of mangroves and clearing lands for infrastructure development. Seawater intrusion has been significantly increased, mainly because of extended zero flow periods during the winter season. Millions of the people, particularly fisher folk, cattle herders and subsistence farmers, who earlier depended on flood recession agriculture, are now deprived of their means of subsistence.

Realising this situation, the IUCN recommended in one of its studies conducted in 2004 that the continued well-being of the deltaic ecosystem would require releases of 27 million acre feet (MAF) below Kotri Barrage. However, Water Accord in 1991 recommended at least 10 MAF environmental flows for the downstream deltaic ecosystem. The recent studies have even suggested much less flows to the tune of 3.6 to 5 MAF but assured flows.

What is the most impending in this regard is the reduction of zero flows downstream of Kotri Barrage in winter season.

Moreover, the risk of critical failure of barrages-the most crucial element in the irrigation system- can put the whole region into turmoil, thereby exposing it to a variety of catastrophes.

The present crisis has been caused due to the disintegration of river basin, massive disruption in natural drainage and slow death of the Indus Delta. Moreover, canal irrigation system is increasingly becoming less productive, mainly due to the lack of proper operation and maintenance, institutional uncertainties and absence of future vision. Both climatic change and enhanced risks of flooding add to this crisis.

In addition, the growers of the province are also facing internal problems with the tail enders receiving less or no water that reflects ‘might is right’, while irrigation officials remain helpless in front of influential feudal lords who take more than the due share.

Some circles in media as well as think tanks are of the view that water discharged below Kotri downstream was a waste, conveniently forgetting millions of people living below Kotri whose only source of water is the Indus, for drinking as well as irrigation purposes and also for their livestock.

The writer is a staff member