Deterrence on edge: How Modi’s gamble backfired in South Asia

On April 22, 2025, terrorists attacked the popular tourist destination of Pahalgam in Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir. Although no evidence was shared either within India or with the international community, New Delhi claimed that the terrorists had cross-border linkages. Islamabad, while condemning the attack, urged New Delhi to refrain from blaming Pakistan without any "credible investigation" or "verifiable evidence." Using the attack as a pretext, New Delhi unilaterally suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), closed the Attari border, and ordered all Pakistani nationals to leave India. India also began military deployments along the Line of Control (LoC) and intensified shelling across it. In a demonstration of its resolve, the Pakistan Navy forced the INS Vikrant to return to India's Karwar port. According to media reports, an IAF sortie of Rafales was repelled when Pakistan jammed their communications, an incident that reportedly led to the sacking of an IAF Air Marshal.

In the early hours of May 6-7, India launched Operation Sindoor, carrying out missile strikes on several cities in Punjab and Azad Kashmir using Rafale jets armed with SCALP missiles and Hammer bombs. During the Indian strikes, Pakistan shot down five Indian fighter jets. In response to this aggression, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanum Marsoos, targeting 26 Indian sites, including air force and aviation bases at Suratgarh and Sirsa; S-400 bases at Adampur and Bhuj; and Indian C2 centres at Barnala, Nalia, Bathinda, Halwara, Avantipura, Srinagar, Jammu, Mamoon, Ambala, Udhampur, and Pathankot. Escalating the conflict, India targeted six Pakistani air bases, including the Nur Khan Air Base in Rawalpindi. Opinions remain divided over India's objectives-whether it was an attempt to escalate after failing to coerce Pakistan in the initial round, or simply a calculated risk to project strength. The reality was that India either had to escalate to maintain the perception of having the upper hand, or risk further destruction. A face-saving exit, denied by New Delhi, came when the United States brokered a ceasefire between the two sides. Secretary Rubio announced on the afternoon of May 10 that India and Pakistan had agreed to an immediate ceasefire. President Trump later took credit for preventing a nuclear conflict.

What exactly did India achieve from Operation Sindoor, and what does it mean for deterrence and strategic stability between the two countries? According to the Indian narrative, the operation employed an "escalate to de-escalate" approach. This strategy had two elements: first, to pressure the international community—particularly the United States—into persuading Islamabad that continued retaliation would be counterproductive; second, to use the fear of nuclear escalation to India's advantage if Washington truly wanted to avoid such a scenario. New Delhi further claimed that throughout Operation Sindoor, it demonstrated escalation dominance. While India showcased first-strike capabilities, including stand-off munitions and rapid ISR integration, its efforts were undermined by an effective Pakistani response. India faced an unfavourable diplomatic environment, information disruption, and contested airspace.

A notable element of India's approach during Operation Sindoor was its adoption of a new deterrence posture. Traditionally, deterrence rests on the threat of force and fear of punishment, with the actual use of force marking the failure of deterrence. However, using force to coerce an adversary is referred to in strategic literature as "cumulative deterrence." India appears to have exercised cumulative deterrence against Pakistan during the operation. Although it failed to secure favourable results in this instance, it is likely to continue pursuing this approach.

Following Operation Sindoor, India made considerable noise about Pakistan's decision not to employ its nuclear capability, claiming it had successfully called Pakistan's nuclear bluff. India argued this proved there was space for a decisive conventional war below the nuclear threshold, and that, in the words of its prime minister, it would no longer tolerate Pakistan's "nuclear blackmail." This claim, however, reflects a flawed understanding of Pakistan's nuclear policy and posture. Commenting on this, Zahir Kazmi observed:

"Speculation that 'space for war has been won under Pakistan's red lines' remains just that-speculation. ... Deterrence here is not a traffic-light system of red, yellow, and green; it is a spectrum of responses shaped by perception, posture, and psychology. It is constructed in the mind of the adversary, not listed in declaratory policy. Pakistan's decision to avoid civilian targets, limit platform use, and prevent escalation was not weakness-it was disciplined strategic calculation. ... Pakistan's full-spectrum deterrence capability held firm. Restraint was not imposed by external actors; it was internally calibrated, and rightly so. ... It reinforced Pakistan's full-spectrum deterrence credibility while denying India the ability to redefine engagement norms. In doing so, Pakistan conveyed a clear message: deterrence is about measured capability, not performative risk. The crisis reaffirmed that escalation control is a strategic asset-not a sign of hesitation."

Evidence suggests that Pakistan learned the right lessons from the 2019 Indo-Pak crisis. That is why, during Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, it was fully prepared-not only ready to respond to Indian actions but also to outmatch them. In the intervening period, many military drills and war games were conducted under similar scenarios. Pakistan operated from a posture of readiness and demonstrated the ability to conduct multi-domain warfare while controlling the pace of escalation.

Former Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sohail Aman (Retd), stated in a keynote address that "PAF, despite its numerical inferiority, entered the conflict with a high state of readiness. ... PAF's edge came from its superior electronic warfare capabilities, which included jamming the Rafale data links and disrupting communications across the IAF's command structure. As a result, Indian pilots lacked situational awareness, were unable to communicate effectively, and suffered significant operational disorientation. ... PAF's edge was also evident in the cyber domain, with darkened runways and jammed communications severing links between field units and command structures."

India failed to achieve any of its stated objectives, yet it insists it achieved all it set out to do-without "a single glass broken" on its side, as claimed by NSA Ajit Doval, who even challenged the Indian media to show proof otherwise. The troubling aspect is that both countries have drawn sharply opposing conclusions from this round of conflict. Despite the evidence, New Delhi maintains that Operation Sindoor was a success. This, coupled with its different interpretation of risk thresholds and escalation dynamics, poses a fundamental challenge to strategic stability between India and Pakistan. Such a lack of shared understanding not only makes lasting peace elusive but also increases the likelihood of future confrontations spiralling out of control. This is where the real impediment to stability in South Asia lies.

—The author is a Karachi based academic.