Politicising police

How could the protesters in capital, one fourth in size as compared to police, beat them? Was it because police lack authority?

By Waqar Gillani
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September 07, 2014

Highlights

  • How could the protesters in capital, one fourth in size as compared to police, beat them? Was it because police lack authority?

In the recent clashes in Islamabad between police and charged marchers with batons in their hands, the government had to change two police chiefs and some senior rank officers in the capital after they declined to take severe action without any written instructions, against the protestors.

More than 30,000 policemen were deployed in the most sensitive area of the capital -- Red Zone. In their blue and black uniforms, long boots and holding protective shields, batons and guns, they were far more in number than the protestors. Yet, they were overpowered by the protestors.

Severe tear gas shelling and baton charging by the police triggered violence.

The silence of the administration, especially police, over violent acts of charged mobs, even as they damage public and private property and violate human rights by torturing others, is not new in Pakistan. Though the government invoked Article 245 of Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973, calling the country’s army to help in security matters, it was used as the last option -- for instance, to deal with the invasion of the state run Pakistan Television (PTV) by protestors.

Tasneem Noorani, former interior secretary, says one of the main reasons of police decline is incompetence and lack of equipment. "The police are not trained to deal with the crowds in a modern way," he says, adding, "They have cosmetic appearances, wearing uniforms and holding guns in their hands, standing alert…"

He holds media as a big player in weakening the police because it shows their acts as brutality.

"Though the inquiry would tell who ordered the police to open fire in the Model Town incident outside Pakistan Awami Tehreek office on June 17, the police actually went on back foot after media footage. Media restricts police -- they cannot resort to their old ways to stop a violent or charged mob.

More importantly, Noorani observes, control and command is not clear -- "The role of police seems to have collapsed. The police are demoralised," he stresses.

"The role of police seems to have collapsed. The police are demoralised."

He adds district magistrate system was clear in defining the order. "Now nothing is clear. Chief ministers are directly giving instructions which is bad and, in the capital, interior minister himself is leading the police which is worse. This is just like Chief of Army Staff himself going to North Waziristan and practically leading the operation."

A few years ago, Asia Report of International Crisis Group (ICG), Reforming Pakistan’s Police, stated: "Pakistan retained the British Era Police Act, but under power-hungry bureaucrats and inept rulers, both civilian and military, the criminal justice system in general and the judiciary and the police in particular went into decline, serving neither the state nor the citizens."

It added that the real issue with the police is its politicising; even the changes in Police Order have not effectively and meaningfully improved the force in the way in which it functions. "In military-led government and even democratic regimes in Pakistan, the police are used specifically to crush political dissent countrywide. It is more in dictatorship."

A senior serving Punjab police official, seeking anonymity, tells TNS, the situation has become difficult after the Police Order 2000, which binds police to seek permission from the local magistrate before taking any strict action against protestors.

"Police force has become toothless. It depends on political will, whether they use it rightly or wrongly," he says.

When courts summons the government on such actions, the whole blame is fixed on police. "The demoralised police remain inactive, even if state properties are damaged -- as was evident in last week’s violence in Islamabad," he maintains.

Noorani says in Islamabad three police chiefs and many senior cops have been changed because they sought written orders to act, reluctant to take responsibility of the consequences. "Command and control is not clear -- even the role of inspector general of police is not clear," he observes.

In 2009, after a Muslim extremist mob attacked a Christian colony in Gojra, central Punjab, a one-member high court commission ascertained in its report that police acted as spectators -- had the police acted diligently the tragedy could have been averted.

Shaukat Javed, former Punjab police chief, commenting on this declining role of police, says the deterioration in police started after 2008 when the then interior minister started exercising all powers of police. He used to control everything and would make direct political interventions.

"Responsibility comes with authority. Police force is not given authority, hence is not held responsible," he adds.

Javed points out the notorious case of Sikandar, who months ago, entered Islamabad with gun and ran the show for hours. He says a simple senior rank officer would have dealt with it but people saw the senior cop seeking directions from interior minister all the time. The whole ministry is engaged in this small administrative issue just because they have taken the powers of police.

"We need to define broader parameters and give police the role of decision making but, at the moment, it does not seem police would improve. It is used as makeshift arrangements and for vested interests," he maintains, adding we need to check whether Police Order 2000 has made police weak or strong.