made the Police Order 2002 ineffective by making it partisan.
Besides putting blame on the former military ruler, it blames the successive PPP government by stating that the devolution of powers to the provincial governments as per the 18 Amendment to the Constitution created further confusion in the implementation of the Police Order 2002. As the provinces assumed the new responsibilities under the 18 Amendment, it, however, also led to the understanding that they could substitute the Police Order 2002 by enacting their own legislation, it report states.
It argues that the mandate given by the people of Pakistan in the election of May 2013 clearly reflected their priorities for good governance and the rule of law. It has, however, given a mixed scorecard to the Nawaz government.
It has scrutinized the federal government and ministry of interior for ineffective implementation of the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) due to poor financial commitments.
It has noted with concern that for more than a year, the federal government could not appoint a professional Counter Terrorism expert as head of the National Counter Terrorism Authority.
Like the ISI and the IB, the NACTA, as per law, is supposed to work under the Prime Minister. However, the Ministry of Interior wants NACTA as one of its organs and this turf battle alone has failed to bring all the military and civilian agencies on the same page in facing internal security challenges. Consequently, there is no counter terrorism strategy and counter extremism plans devised so far. Finally, a civil servant with military background has been appointed the head of NACTA who will indeed face the daunting task of spearheading essentially a professional policing role.
The report also notes that the federal government supported and spearheaded the operation in Karachi in September 2013 against target killings and organized crime. However, the courageous commander of Karachi police was removed under a technical legal matter that was left uncontested. To top it, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could not manage to save an IG or post one according to the choice of the federal government. Thus, Karachi operation got low on the priority list of the federal government with the resultant loss of momentum required to take the operation against the criminals to its logical conclusion.
The writ of the federal government was also severely tested with the onslaught of the PTI and PAT prolonged political protests in the form of sit-ins, processions, rallies and public meetings in Islamabad since August 2014, the report states.
Panic-stricken response to agitations and disorder resulted in frequent change of police commanders and promoted red-tape and uncertainty amongst the ranks of Islamabad police. Bureaucratic meddling and political handling of pure professional matters resulted in policing paralysis in the capital; only massive back-up support of the Punjab police and the Rangers saved the situation from complete breakdown. Unity of command and public order management remain big challenges for the capital Police, the report states. Looking to Punjab, its mentions that law and order for the past year and a half has posed different set of challenges to Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif. Religious extremism and intolerance resulted in many cases of blasphemy and violence against the minorities, especially the Christians. However, a perception that the Punjab government was soft against some banned militant groups was generally considered by some security analysts as a ploy to appease the non-state actors, it observed.
It also notes with concern that 14 murders, 11 incidents of dacoity and 15 robberies on an average per day in the province reflects that violence and guns pose a serious threat in the largest province.
It concludes that June 17 killings in Model Town were unfortunately a blot on the face of the Punjab police and tainted the repute of the ‘strongman’ heading the province. “Brutal use of police force for political vendetta left an indelible mark of ignominy for the Punjab government.”