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tense 48-hour ceasefire went into effect from Wednesday between Pakistani and Afghan forces, following a dangerous flare-up at the border. The brief pause in fighting came after Afghan forces launched attacks that were met with forceful retaliation from Pakistan.
The Pak-Afghan border areas have long been a porous sanctuary for militants, fuelling mutual accusations of harbouring terrorists. The persistent friction boiled over dramatically in 2024, when border tensions escalated into large-scale clashes driven by TTP militants, culminating in Pakistani airstrikes on their hideouts in Khost and Paktika in March. In September 2024, Taliban border guards clashed with Frontier Corps. This time, Pakistan destroyed a Taliban T-62 tank. On December 25, airstrikes on seven TTP locations in Paktika’s Barmal district, killed 20 to 25 militants. The Taliban retaliated on December 28, targeting Pakistani posts in Kurram and North Waziristan, escalating the cycle of violence.
These attacks, among the deadliest in recent years, strained bilateral ties and disrupted border trade.
UN reports (2020-2023) have confirmed Kabul’s symbiotic ties with the TTP, which launched nearly 600 attacks on Pakistani forces in 2024-2025. Tensions escalated last week after Pakistan found evidence of Afghan-based Nur Wali Mehsud’s involvement in terrorist attacks within its borders. Mehsud was then taken out in a precision attack.
The Taliban retaliated by attacking several Pakistani border posts, claiming to have killed dozens of soldiers. The Pakistan Army then captured several Afghan border posts before a lull in fighting. A partial ceasefire occurred on October 16, after six days of intense clashes.
These clashes are the most visible symptoms of a deepening crisis now gripping Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The Taliban government in Kabul is building closer ties with India, a move that challenges Pakistan’s core security interests. Unsurprisingly, this strategic gambit has sent bilateral relations into a tailspin. The core dispute remains the Taliban’s continued harbouring of the TTP and Baloch subnationalists, despite Islamabad’s protests.
Acting Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s statement in India—that “whatever the problems are in each country should be solved by themselves”—is an abdication of his government’s duty under the Doha Accord: to prevent its territory from being used for terrorism.
Ambassador Asif Durrani, Pakistan’s former envoy to Afghanistan, says that Muttaqi’s engagements with India were actually “leveraging” India to “put off” Pakistan: “If you pressure us more on TTP or BLA, we’ll deepen ties with Delhi,” he says. “India seems to have succeeded in its efforts to keep Islamabad engaged on two borders,” he tells The News on Sunday.
Muttaqi’s recent visit to India, following a cancelled trip to Islamabad, signalled a deliberate pivot. In New Delhi, Muttaqi asserted Afghanistan’s sovereign “right to forge ties with any nation, including India, without external interference.” This stance, coupled with a reluctance to engage meaningfully with Pakistan, risks reopening the strategic wounds of the Karzai and Ghani eras, when Indian presence in Kabul fuelled regional tensions.
India is deepening its engagement with the Taliban-led Afghanistan by upgrading its diplomatic mission and providing development aid, despite withholding formal recognition. This pragmatic approach is calculated to revive New Delhi’s pre-2021 influence in Kabul.
India co-sponsored a UNSC resolution in December 2021 condemning the Taliban takeover. It also shut its embassy and consulates following. However, it is now seeking to restore its influence by announcing plans to reopen its embassy.
From Kabul’s perspective, the foreign minister’s trip is a lifeline. Afghanistan craves support only India can readily provide—ambulances for humanitarian optics, educational opportunities, medical visas and potentially weapons and funding to bolster the regime.
From the Hyderabad House, New Delhi, Muttaqi issued a warning to Pakistan, invoking the Taliban’s past struggles against global powers. He cautioned, “If you intend to play games, then see the fate of NATO-America and the Soviet Union.”
The escalating hostility, made evident by Muttaqi’s words and border attacks, has paved the way for an unexpected India-Taliban engagement. Apparently, both view Pakistan as a common adversary.
Ambassador Durrani says that the “Taliban regime has made it amply clear that it will not raise arms against their ideological cousins.” He points out Kabul’s fear that a crackdown on the TTP or the ISIS-K could spark internal dissent.
“In order to address this problem, Pakistan must neutralise the militants,” says Ambassador Durrani. “We must remove the causes of their resurgence on our soil, for good.” Counselling a holistic strategy of military pressure to eliminate the TTP, combined with eradicating root causes through political empowerment and solutions, he says, “Focusing only on military action could lead to endless conflict, as we have seen already. In order to succeed, Pakistan must involve local communities, promote development to turn this security crisis into an opportunity for lasting peace.”
The external challenge is compounded by a critical internal crisis: a collapse of national consensus. Here, the stance of JUI-F and the PTI-led Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government misaligns with state policy and could poses problems.
“Pakistani attacks could weaken the Taliban. Will that force Kabul to bend? It may not be so,” says former foreign secretary Salman Bashir. He says that border flare-ups can complicate things further, making a Taliban retreat on TTP/ BLA backing less likely. “Such pressure will be seen as coercive, hardening Kabul’s position and reinforcing the view that Pakistan is an antagonist, not a partner. The Taliban will likely double down on supporting these groups as a strategic lever to retaliate and maintain the bargaining power, escalating the cycle of hostility rather than ending it.”
“Pakistan is in a tight corner on Afghan-inspired terrorism,” says Bashir. The public accusations and military action have created a cycle of escalation. “These are the realities of being situated in a strategic region where geopolitical rivalries, like that with India, and a neighbour’s ideology align with tolerance for certain militant groups as strategic assets,” he adds. He counsels sustained, quiet but robust diplomacy in improving the situation over the long term.
Facing growing isolation as progress with Iran, Uzbekistan and Russia stalls, Afghanistan finds its diplomatic options narrowing. India could be its sole major partner. Pakistan is a critical trade corridor for Afghanistan, a landlocked nation heavily reliant on its neighbour for economic connectivity. For Afghanistan, the need for stable trade relations with Pakistan is undeniable. This places limits on Indian influence. The Chabahar Port project, once a cornerstone of India’s trade strategy with Afghanistan via Iran, has stalled. This leaves India unable to fully leverage its economic support to Kabul while excluding Pakistan.
Afghanistan is not only landlocked. It is also surrounded by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Besides Pakistan, Afghanistan poses security problems for other regional countries by housing terrorists. Highlighting this, a recent UN report mentioned presence of at least 18 terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic State-Khorasan Province and the TTP in Afghan sanctuaries.
For Pakistan, the ultimate objective is to break the historical cycle of proxy warfare. Pakistan must compel the Taliban to choose diplomacy over terrorism. By wielding a combination of calibrated military deterrence, unshakeable economic leverage and sustained, robust diplomacy, Pakistan can navigate this crisis. The goal is a stable South Asia where the shared interests in trade and development prevail over the politics of confrontation and the scourge of state-sanctioned militancy.
The writer is a senior The News staffer in Karachi.