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he recent surge in terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reflects a complex interplay of regional instability, ideological resurgence and local vulnerabilities. After 2021, the province has witnessed a sharp rise in militant attacks. These attacks targeted security forces, law enforcement agencies and civilians without discrimination. Despite Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan’s claim that they only target LEAs, civilian causalities indicate there is no restraint when it comes to them targeting civilians.
The sharp escalation marks a serious reversal of the relative calm that followed Pakistan’s extensive counterterrorism campaigns in the mid-2010s. In his recent presser in Peshawar, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, the Inter-Services Public Relations director general, shared the numbers of operations taking place in the country in 2025.
He said that in 2024, more than 14,535 intelligence-based operations were conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 10,115 had already been carried out in 2025, averaging around 40 operations per day. He also said that 769 terrorists were killed in 2024 while 917 were eliminated so far this year.
“In 2024, 577 Pakistanis were martyred, including 140 police personnel, 272 soldiers and FC officials and 165 civilians. In 2025, 516 lives have been lost: 311 military personnel, 73 police officials and 132 civilians,” he added.
According to The Khorasan Diary’s in-house data, incidents of terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have more than doubled compared to 2022 levels. The highest incidence of violence has been in the tribal districts—particularly North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Kurram, Dera Ismail Khan and Khyber.
The attacks have also shifted from isolated ones to coordinated bombings and using multi-dimensional gadgets that involve locally made drones and vehicle-borne suicide attempts. Attacks on police stations, military convoys and police check posts have become more frequent. This not just indicates the tactical revival of hard militancy but also the strategic coordination amongst various militant factions operating from within or outside the country. We are now seeing a conglomerate of terrorist outfits as new groups keep coming up.
At the moment, TTP is the biggest umbrella for smaller groups. More than 80 groups, small and large, have joined it since 2021. Pakistan has asked Kabul to hand over the TTP leaders or take strong action against them.
At the moment, TTP is the biggest umbrella for small groups. More than 80 groups, small and large, have joined it since 2021.
Causes for the current situation are complex. Rapid changes in Pakistan’s Afghan policy are one of the main causes of the unrest. After the Taliban takeover of Kabul four years ago, Pakistan initially pursued a policy of negotiating with the TTP. When the negotiation failed—2022 marked a turning point—ceasefire violations led to an immediate spike in the attacks. The next two years saw frequent visits to Kabul by Pakistani officials, who tried to persuade the Taliban government to rein in the TTP. However, the Taliban took no concrete steps and only offered excuses for their lack of action.
According to an official familiar with the efforts, “The Taliban did arrest some foot soldiers of the TTP, but then you cannot trust them with their promises considering there was so little tangible progress.”
Weak border management has been another cause of unrest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The fencing and border management system meant to be functional by 2022 has yet to be completed. Although in some areas fencing is nearly impossible due to difficult terrain, effective management can be implemented along most of the frontier.
The merger of the tribal districts has also imposed financial strain on the already weak local governance, policing and development. Socioeconomic marginalisation, unemployment and displacement have made certain communities susceptible to extremist propaganda.
Aware of the importance of hammering their narrative, the militants have upped their media presence and content generation. Reviving religious ideologies to exploit grievances against the state, while trying to portray themselves as custodians of the sharia, has given them the space to create a connection with the tribal people.
On several occasions over the last two decades, Pakistan has celebrated its successes against terrorism. But over the last four years, it has once again become an epicentre of militant activity. Already burdened with economic hardship and unstable administrative control in its merged districts, it is now grappling with renewed violence that threatens to undo years of progress.
In the press conference, the ISPR director general also highlighted some governance issues. He mentioned that there were only 3,200 personnel in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Counter Terrorism Department left to fight against highly equipped militants, who are now becoming more tech savvy. Between 2015 and 2020, the security situation in the province had largely stabilised due to Operations Zarb-i-Azb and Radd-ul Fasaad, which dismantled militant networks and pushed insurgents across the Afghan border.
With the recent escalation on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is evident that non-state actors can pull both countries into war. There are no substantial guarantees that Kabul will rein in the TTP. Afghanistan may remain a proxy war zone while the Taliban rule it. Meanwhile India seems intent on fuelling the fire. More war seems to be on the horizon.
The writer is the editor of The Khorasan Diary. He can be reached on X iftikharfirdous.