We are a nation plagued by division, discord, mistrust, political polarisation and violence. Nowhere is this more visible than in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where terrorist violence has surged again. In both these provinces, security forces have made invaluable sacrifices to hold the line against militancy.
Today, the country is fighting a long, exhausting, nerve-wracking war against an enemy that refuses to relent. This is not a conventional battle fought on clear frontlines but a shadow war of infiltration, ambushes and terror. Our soldiers and security personnel have blocked the enemy’s advance, but at a heavy cost in lives. While the military response has been necessary, experts say it cannot be the sole pillar of a lasting strategy. The authorities, they argue, must explore other options lest the conflict should go on for yet another decade.
When it comes to eliminating terrorism, especially in the tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pashtun population stands divided into two camps. The presence of large numbers of banned outfit members and their local facilitators has not only disrupted daily life in Khyber, Bajaur and Waziristan districts but also spilled over into neighbouring areas. The militants have repeatedly challenged the writ of the state, turning once-thriving towns into zones of fear and uncertainty. The insurgents now possess some of the most advanced and lethal weapons.
Officials say that a decisive operation to clear an area of militant presence will require the displacement of large sections of the civilian population. Civilian presence in combat zones hampers effectiveness of military interventions and unacceptable casualties. However, the residents of the tribal belt have bitter memories of past displacement. Once resident were evacuated from the contested towns, homes were reduced to rubble and livelihoods destroyed. Long years were then spent in tented camps with little more than promises of rehabilitation.
Today there are those who insist on all-out military operations, arguing that half-measures have failed before and that only uncompromising force can dismantle militant networks. The other side is equally adamant in its rejection of military action as a recipe for mass misery, economic collapse and another lost decade. They argue that military operations in the past did not fully eradicate terrorism and that tens of thousands of the people displaced then are still struggling to rebuild their lives.
The fact is that there is no realistic alternative to military action. Considering the terrorists are entrenched in fortified hideouts across the tribal and southern districts, armed to the teeth and capable of striking at will, doing nothing amounts to capitulation.
The presence of large numbers of banned outfit members and their local facilitators has not only disrupted daily life in Khyber, Bajaur and Waziristan districts; the militancy has also spilled over into neighbouring areas. The militants have repeatedly challenged the writ of the state, turning once-thriving towns into zones of fear and uncertainty.
If the military action is delayed to avoid displacement, the consequences can be catastrophic. Unchallenged militant rule, targeted killing of not only military personnel and police but also civil servants, journalists and social workers; mass extortion; and the collapse of normal life cannot go on. Who then will safeguard the lives, property and dignity of the people?
It seems that both immediate all-out war and total inaction are impractical. Each risks causing more harm than good. Between these lies a viable way forward, a middle path that can secure the state while protecting the people. This requires empowered negotiations led by a credible jirga of tribal elders, political leaders and business representatives, with full backing of the provincial and federal governments. Such a jirga should have decision-making authority. It should visit Kabul to meet with TTP leaders in the presence of Afghan officials. The latter should act as guarantors. The jirga should listen to the militants’ demands and state its minimum conditions.
Even if a detailed agreement is not achieved in the first meeting, more rounds could yield progress. Suggestions by the Afghan government such as relocating Pakistani militants to Afghanistan’s western and northern provinces deserve consideration.
Negotiations also serve the purpose of establishing that every peaceful avenue was explored before military action. If talks fail, the state will have both the political and moral grounds for use of decisive force.
The jirga system itself should be strengthened in the merged districts to serve as a permanent mediator between the state and local communities. Provincial legislation should establish a Levies Act along the Malakand model, empowering local security forces. Economic measures must address unemployment and poverty, which directly feed instability. Once peace is restored, the army should withdraw to the barracks. Policing of the area should be handed back to local police or the Frontier Corps.
This can help rebuild the badly frayed trust between the people and the armed forces. Development projects must be completed and local governments empowered to end the deprivation and neglect that the extremists exploit.
Pakistan can neither afford the unchecked spread of terrorism nor return to a military-first approach that has already shown its limitations. The middle path - comprehensive, inclusive negotiations backed by credible enforcement - is the only realistic route to sustainable peace. This will require patience, persistence and political courage, as well as an honest partnership with the people whose lives are most at risk. Peace, after all, cannot be imposed. It must be built with the consent, trust and participation of those who will live it.
The writer is a freelance journalist