The recently commissioned Army Rocket Force Command is the cornerstone of a bold new strategy to counter India’s conventional military superiority. By threatening precision strikes deep into India’s economic heartland, Islamabad is fundamentally reshaping the calculus of deterrence in South Asia.
Tensions have only deepened since the May round. India insists that its Operation Saindoor remains unfinished. Pakistan has pointed out incidents of Indian-backed militancy on its soil. The escalation has spilled into critical domains. India is also holding the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance. Pakistan has already declared this an act of war. Together India’s proxy war in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the weaponisation of river waters are converging into a volatile flashpoint that threatens South Asia’s fragile stability.
Analysts warn that India’s recurring resort to false flag operations—such as in Pulwama (2019) and Pahalgam (May 2025)—may resurface ahead of the November 2025 Bihar state elections, when the BJP seeks a high-profile show of strength.
Hawkish Indian signalling has raised the specter of a maritime front. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has spoken of “maritime-first” options. Pakistan has vowed to defend Karachi and its naval bases with full force. Analysts caution that this mix of military posturing and domestic political pressure could easily tip the rivalry into another crisis.
While India’s domestic political and electoral climate risks fuelling more aggressive posturing, Pakistan has begun signalling its red lines more explicitly. ISPR DG Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry highlighted the potential for attacking India ‘deeper,’ particularly its industrial base in the east. He warned that in the event of any Indian misadventure, Pakistan could retaliate by conducting deeper, precision strikes against counter-value targets in India’s military-industrial complex, starting from eastern economic hubs such as Kolkata, Jamshedpur and Bhubaneswar.
This warning underscores a pivotal shift in Pakistan’s deterrence strategy, embodied by the recent establishment of the Army Rocket Force Command, announced by Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif on August 13, during Pakistan’s 78th Independence Day celebrations. Prof Dr Rabia Akhtar, University of Lahore Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research director, says: “Modelled on China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the ARFC bridges the gap between short-range tactical artillery and strategic nuclear missiles, enabling precise, non-nuclear strikes deep into adversary territory while elevating Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.”
The Army Rocket Force Command, Dr Akhtar says, will operate under a dedicated system designed solely for conventional strikes, existing parallel to—but outside—Pakistan’s nuclear command.
The ARFC’s credibility derives not just from command structure, but also from the induction of a new missile system, the Fatah-IV, a stand-alone Land Attack Cruise Missile with a range likely exceeding 750 kilometres.
Alongside precision-guided rockets like the Fatah-1 (140 km range) and Fatah-2 (400 km range), they provide a potent mix of “volume fires” and long-range standoff strikes against critical enemy infrastructure, including airbases, command centres (C4ISR nodes) and logistics hubs, she says.
The Army Rocket Force Command will operate under a dedicated system designed solely for conventional strikes, existing parallel to — but outside — Pakistan’s nuclear command.
Each Fatah-1 battery carries 8 missiles, delivering rapid salvos with pinpoint accuracy. With a 300 kg warhead per missile, a full salvo unleashes ~2.4 tonnes of TNT equivalent, making it a highly effective saturated attack against hardened targets like India’s S-400 systems. Combined, these systems can overwhelm enemy air defences through sheer volume, serving as a cost-effective force multiplier.
“Designed for shoot-and-scoot tactics, the missiles can disperse, reload and re-engage from new locations within minutes, evading counterstrikes. The diversified rocket and cruise missile arsenal is designed for swift operations across multiple fronts, complicating India’s preemptive attack doctrine. “
These missiles can impose costs on Indian air and missile defence systems, forcing resource diversion and reducing confidence in successful counterforce operations. At the same time, they expand the options for a proportionate response, while also strengthening its deterrence stability, says Dr Akhtar.
Compared to India’s dual-purpose BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (2.8 Mach), which lacks salvo-firing capability, Pakistan’s rapid, high-volume missile systems offer greater flexibility. Despite India’s $74 billion defence budget, Pakistan’s advancements shift the regional balance. The Rocket Force’s tactical, conventional nature reduces reliance on foreign technology, enhancing strategic autonomy and enabling sustained strikes to overwhelm defences, thereby elevating the nuclear threshold, neutralising India’s efforts to dominate the conventional balance under a nuclear overhang.
Defence Analyst Brig Haris Nawaz (retired) says India’s long-held assumption that a conflict with Pakistan will be geographically confined to the western front has been rendered obsolete. India’s military strength is underpinned by a vast industrial network that supports weapons production, logistics, fuel supply and technology. Deep missile attacks, facilitated by the ARFC, will not be random—they will target India’s “economic-military complex.” By threatening such attacks, Pakistan seeks to offset India’s conventional military advantage and force Delhi to defend not just Delhi and the Punjab, but also guard factories in Odisha or Andhra Pradesh, stretching its resources. These missiles could cripple arms production, disrupt naval operations and cut energy supply, Brig Nawaz says.
“Together, these signals form a ‘deterrence package.” This counters India’s advantages: India has a bigger army and more depth (space to fall back), but Pakistan’s missiles land straight in the east. This forces India to spread thin to defend. This isn’t about conquering land; it’s about making an Indian attack too costly to start.”
The Pakistan Air Force complements this with standoff weapons like the H-2 and H-4 missiles, proven since the 2019 Swift Retort operation. The Pakistan Navy demonstrated its conventional reach in May 2025 by forcing the Indian aircraft carrier’s withdrawal to its base, through strategic signalling.
Hitting India’s industrial base would hurt global trade (India supplies information technology products, steel), so US firms lobby against war. Europe and the UN worry about nukes and refugees. They’d push mediation through Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
Overall, these reactions create a “deterrence shield”: In the end, Pakistan’s signals—including the new Rocket Force and ISPR’s stark warnings—are a bold way to stop Indian attacks by making them too painful.
The writer is a senior The News staffer in Karachi