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n its chequered history of consolidating democracy, alternating between long martial laws and interludes of democratic dispensations, the state of Pakistan has seen a lot of the doctrine of necessity and constitutional engineering. This has often led to a diarchic power sharing arrangement and the presidentialising of the parliamentary form of government. Meanwhile, decades of intense ideological socialisation of the people have led to the circumvention of the process of legal socialisation. This, in turn, has hampered the process of citizen formation and lessened the intensity and level of meaningful societal input into the process of constitutional development. Consequently, for nearly a decade now, the country is under a ruling framework described as a hybrid regime.
It is therefore not shocking to see Pakistan being placed very low on the ladder of global democracy indices such as The Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom House. In reports appearing in February 2025, Pakistan’s democracy ranking slipped down six spots during 2024 to rank among the 10 worst performers in the EIU. The index examines countries on five indicators: electoral process and pluralism; functioning of government; political participation; political culture; and civil liberties available to citizens. Drawing on scores in these areas, each country is categorised into four kinds of regimes: full democracy; flawed democracy; hybrid regime; and authoritarian regime. Pakistan has been ranked 124 in the global ranking and categorised as an ‘authoritarian regime.’ The Freedom House index describes it as ‘partly free.’
In theory, the constitution provides a framework of laws and institutions that result in the separation of institutional powers. However, various institutional, ideological and political developments have reduced the arbitration capacity of the constitution and laws in Pakistan. In issues relating to power sharing and adjudicating issues of parliamentary sovereignty, the courts have generally held the Executive above the Legislature. The history of this symbiosis between the Judiciary and unelected institutions, such as the civil and military bureaucracy, against the elected institutions dates back to the first decade of the country. In the 1954 Tamizuddin case and the 1958 Dosso case, the highest court legitimised a coup by the bureaucracy and the military, respectively.
In reports appearing in February 2025, Pakistan’s democracy ranking slipped down six spots during 2024 and ranked among the 10 worst performers.
The 1990s witnessed repeated interventions by the extra-parliamentary forces. This power struggle produced the so-called ‘rule of troika’ that lasted for around eleven years (1988-99). The ‘troika’ consisted of the chief of army staff, the president and the prime minister. The prime ministers were thus unable to uphold parliamentary sovereignty. A different ‘troika’ followed the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in 2009. It comprised the army chief, the president and the chief justice (2009-2013). The arrangement was so obvious that Shahbaz Sharif, then Punjab’s chief minister, publicly demanded that the Army and the Judiciary be brought in to settle the intractable issues of governance.
After the signing of the Charter of Democracy by political parties in 2006, the ouster of Gen Pervez Musharraf in 2008, and the passing of the 18th Amendment in 2010, the powerful establishment supported Imran Khan. The dharnas (sit-in protests) staged by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf and the Pakistan Awami Tehreek in 2014, and later, were command performances in support of the former to bring it to power with the support of the establishment. This resulted in the formation of a PTI-led government in 2018, which soon became known as a hybrid regime. The government claimed, time and again, that the civil authority and military establishment were “on the same page.” When the civil-military relations deteriorated the PTI led government was removed.
One of the major problems of a hybrid regime is the elected-non-representative imbalance as the establishment retains disproportionate influence over foreign policy priorities, national security and eventually domestic politics that undermines elected governments, reducing their autonomy, legitimacy and effectiveness. The elected governments then end up clashing with the establishment leading to dismissals, forced resignations and policy disruptions. The state of affairs weakens democratic institutions including the parliament, the judiciary and the Election Commission and hinders institutional development and accountability. Those responsible for significant commissions and omissions cannot be held accountable.
The story of constitutionalism in Pakistan over its more than seven decades “is one of a struggle between the political elite and the state elite to make the written law conform to their respective preferences and priorities.” “The central issue in this conflict revolved around the question of parliamentary sovereignty,” argues Mohammad Waseem in his treatise Political Conflict in Pakistan. The establishment shapes legislation according to its own whims and wishes while lobbying from outside the parliament. The creation of military courts to hold terrorism trials, for example, weakens the rule of law.
Hybrid regimes seek to control the media and suppress dissent through censorship, intimidation and imposed narratives that limit the flow of unbiased information and weaken public discourse in the domain of politics and public policy. Resultantly, journalists belonging to media houses criticising the governments face bans, harassment and shutdowns. The Jang group, for instance, faced hardships and persecution during the PTI government. Electoral engineering is yet another characteristic of hybrid regimes. Pre-poll rigging is standard. There is selective accountability. Sometimes all-out support is lent to favourite political parties. This affects the electoral outcomes and undermines the legitimacy of the governments. For example, the 2018 elections were viewed as engineered in favour of the PTI and the 2024 elections in favour of the PML-N and the PPP.
The popular image of hybrid-regime governments is one of illegitimate puppets. This erodes public trust and leads to the weakening of democratic culture, declining voter turnout and increasing political cynicism. Hybrid regimes initiate a vicious cycle where democracy cannot deliver effectively. Consequently, civilian governments are weakened, democratic institutions get undermined and the establishment footprint expands, hampering genuine democratic consolidation. What needs to be understood here is that building democratic institutions is what nation building is all about.
The writer heads the History Department at University of Sargodha. He has worked as a research fellow at Royal Holloway College, University of London. He can be reached at abrar.zahoorhotmail.com His X handle: AbrarZahoor1