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akistan’s hybrid governance model has operated and coexisted with the rituals of an electoral democracy under a constitutional structure and the rise of authoritarian tendencies in a hegemonic establishment. The country has witnessed a backsliding of democratic institutions and traditions in recent years. The Economist Intelligence Unit reported in its democratic rankings for 2024 that Pakistan has dropped six spots and is now ranked 124 out of 165 states.
The recent wave of autocratisation is a global trend. South Asia has emerged as the worst-affected region due to the rise of autocratic tendencies, including in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Pakistan is listed in the category of authoritarian regimes and has emerged as one of the ten worst performers along with Bangladesh and South Korea. Political repression; the absence of a free, fair and transparent electoral process; the absence of freedom of speech and a free media; and the issue of the independence of the judiciary have effectively derailed the democratic processes in Pakistan. The shrinking of an already limited democratic space for elected regimes is undermining the democratic credentials of the state.
Defence Minister Khwaja Asif’s recent endorsement of the hybrid model and its praise as the most viable de facto model of power structure with authority and responsibility shared between the representative government and the establishment has caused quite a stir. He admitted that the de facto arrangement had operated without constitutional cover and as a transitional phase to manage the economic and governance crises. The civilian regime has conceded space to the powerful establishment which enjoys hegemonic control over state security, foreign policy and economic decision-making. This has radically transformed the governance and the hybrid power structure.
Pakistan’s democratic deficit is rooted in its history. The colonial power structure maintained bureaucratic control under the patronage structure. The loyalist political elite shared some limited and controlled channels of power. Pakistan inherited a vice-regal structure in the initial years. The Centre continued to increase its control over the provincial political elite. After Liaquat Khan’s death in 1951, the supremacy of political elites gave way to the civil and military bureaucratic elite. The political leaders lost the status of political masters and became the clients of power. The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved in October 1954 due to the controversy over the way the power was to be shared. The bureaucracy outdid the political leadership with the support of the judiciary. However, the facade of democracy was maintained through political compromises.
During these years, the military emerged as an overdeveloped institution. At first, in collaboration with the civil bureaucracy, the military leaders checked the political leaders. Next, they also subordinated the bureaucratic elite. Through massive financial allocations, modernisation and technological advancement, the military assumed the role of senior partner in power. The imposition of October 1958 martial law was the culmination of this process.
Ayub Khan radically transformed the state’s power structure. Through structural changes in the constitution, it became a centralised and personalised power structure. The democrats fought back to reclaim the lost space. This resulted in partial success in March 1969 when Ayub Khan submitted his resignation and invited Yahya Khan to impose a martial law.
Yahya Khan, after holding free and fair elections, refused to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. The elite’s failure to evolve a political consensus on the future constitution and power sharing formulae and the mishandling of the political crisis resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan.
Under ZA Bhutto, political consensus was reached on the 1973 constitution, providing for a parliamentary form of government. Civilian supremacy was established through constitutional arrangements and safeguards. However, the civilian supremacy proved short-lived with the imposition of Zia’s martial law against the backdrop of electoral rigging controversy of 1977. Zia’s regime maintained authoritarian control. The establishment not only controlled the security and foreign policy but also ventured into the economic and governance structures of the state. Zia radically altered the constitutional arrangement through the 8th Amendment so that the balance of power shifted in favour of the president.
The restoration of democracy after 1988 was incomplete. The concept of a power troika, consisting of the president, the prime minister and the army chief emerged. Zia’s legacy haunted the political system, and the elected governments were dismissed through the Article 58(2)b. The superior courts mostly extended legitimacy to the establishment actions, including derailment of elected governments. The kingmaker establishment mostly operated behind the scenes. It exercised authority without accountability. The political leaders had to strike deals with it to enter the power corridors. In July 1993, Gen Kakar intervened directly, securing the resignation of the prime minister and extending leave to the president.
In his second tenure, Nawaz Sharif removed Article 58(2)b from the constitution to block the establishment’s intervention. Gen Karamat’s suggestion to formalise the military’s role through the National Security Council led to his resignation. Gen Musharraf’s imposition of martial law followed a tussle between the political and military leaders.
Musharraf restored the old power structures. However, the democratic forces effectively restored civilian supremacy through the 18th Amendment.
In the post-18th Amendment era, the establishment adopted new strategies to assert its authority and protect the institutional interests. The hyper judicial activism also played an effective role in the new power structure. The judiciary extended support to the establishment by removing two elected prime ministers.
The political leaders have struck deals and bargains with the powerful establishment to capture power. Imran Khan’s victory in the 2018 elections resulted in the emergence of a new hybrid power structure. The ‘one page’ mantra reflected a sharing of powers. The arrangement failed to sustain itself due to a trust deficit and the potential of new alignments among powerful individuals.
The old political elite have since revived their position by accepting a subordinate role under the tutelage of the establishment. The crisis of popular legitimacy since the 2024 elections has effectively disabled the new government.
The notion of civilian supremacy is closely linked to popular legitimacy of the regime. The hybrid system is rooted in our power structure and embedded in the political culture. Effective service delivery in governance and economic spheres and sustained struggle by the political elite and civil society are required to reverse this hybrid arrangement.
The writer is an assistant professor in the Department of Pakistan Studies at the Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad. He has a PhD from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. His area of expertise is electoral politics of Pakistan. He can be reached at sajidkhanhistoriangmail.com and on X: sajidkhanqau