The jammed door of dialogue

January 31, 2021

Given its past record, India would certainly strive hard to accentuate existing problems for Pakistan, especially restricting discussion on the Kashmir dispute and relief from the FATF

Security and stability in the South Asian region has remained fragile since the British left the subcontinent in 1947. The evolving relationship between the United States (US), China, India, Pakistan and Russia – as well as the consequential conflicts – substantively harmed the security situation in South Asia. There has been no defusing of tensions between India and China, or India and Pakistan. The divergent and competing threat perceptions have rendered the politics and security matrix more precarious.

Each of these countries has argued for a rebalance or a reset in the region with or without the support of its allies. The problem is that the rebalance or reset they seek has to be of their liking. This has kept the specter of instability alive. With short pauses here and there, the phenomenon has continued. The world has meanwhile undergone dramatic changes at a pace never experienced earlier. Unfortunately, the South Asian region was long mired in mistrust and tensions. When it finally experienced change, the region was exposed to complex, if fresh, challenges. Pakistan, India and their relations with their neighbours remain trapped thus in dangerous and asphyxiating spirals of uncertainties.

Pakistan’s current security environment and vulnerabilities are shaped by a combination of events and actions at the global and regional levels. The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan and conventional war between the two rivals under the nuclear hangover have become too risky and too expensive a threat for the world to ignore. It looks like China and the US, in the main, and the European Union, in a supporting role, are going to shape the future world. Their alliances, strategic partnerships and understandings will affect security and political dynamics in South Asia too. There is no easy prescription for relief in such a complex situation.

The new US administration is likely to continue strengthening its strategic partnership with India as its rivalry with China grows. The US is likely to pay scant attention to massive human rights violations in India, as it needs India as a counter weight to China. The Modi government may be left alone to deal with domestic issues. Differences may, however, arise between US and India over the latter’s acquisition of high-tech weapons such as S-400 from Russia. President Biden is not expected in any case to rock the strategic partnership with India. He is quite familiar with the region and aware of India’s value as a bulwark against China.

India assumed a non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on January 1 and chairmanship of its two important committees. Given its past record, India would certainly strive hard to accentuate existing problems for Pakistan, especially by restricting discussion on the Kashmir dispute and hindering relief from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Pakistan cannot delude itself into believing that by highlighting Hindutva fascist practices it can diplomatically isolate India, embarrass the Modi government (or subsequent governments) to the point that they are forced to reverse the August 5, 2019, illegal action in occupied Kashmir or the CAA and the NRC laws.

India considers itself powerful enough to defy Western values and its own commitments / obligations arising from its sham plural democracy. There is no likelihood that India would soon wake up from its delusionary self-assumed image of power. Its obsession to diplomatically isolate Pakistan and internally weaken its economy continues unabated. It projects Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism and a dangerous place for investment and tourism. Unfortunately, Pakistan does not have the capacity to expose the full spectrum of Indian hybrid warfare against it.

Emboldened by a measure of success in the Muslim world, its ability to spoil the peace processes in Afghanistan and advanced capability to instigate instability and sectarian strife in various parts of Pakistan, India is in no mood to call off its passive aggression and give diplomacy a chance to unlock the jammed door of dialogue. Can internationally recognised shifting variables such as trade, regional connectivity, and cultural exchanges improve the situation over the coming years? Why not? But the reality is the missing key driver - an international voice or entity that can leverage effectively with the recalcitrant Indian leadership. Even bold statements from the UN secretary general have failed to persuade India to recalibrate its hostility towards Pakistan.

The assertive Hindu power in India unabashedly carries the burden of history and the unfinished agenda of the 1947 vivification of “Bharat Mata.“ This mindset has led to massive atrocities against its Muslim citizens as well as other minorities. Pakistan needs to plan for a long haul. India is not a scarecrow. Its hostility is real and deep seated. Ousting the Modi phenomenon from the Indian polity will not be easy. The miasma of Hindu power and aggression has continued underneath the layer of secularism and democracy even during the Congress rule. Modi has merely used his charm to catalyse the process.

The options for Pakistan depend on how it defines the Indian capability to shape and implement its hegemonic designs. Pakistan may face more pressure in future from the US and the West, despite having taken strong measures against support for terrorism and put in place a prudent policy in the face of Indian threats. The posture does not guarantee peace unless (in India’s view) Pakistan accepts India’s status as a major regional power. If the region remains mired in chaos and instability, there is no chance for regional connectivity projects to materialize. In such a scenario, Pakistan may have to reconcile to a degree of Indian hegemony in some form. China and its partnership with its southern neighbor remain critical for Pakistan’s security and economic prosperity. There is no conventional war on the horizon, mainly because Pakistan’s military is prepared and has tactical weapons.

Given the situation, buying time is not a bad strategy vis a vis India. Stagnation might indeed prove better than having a meaningless dialogue. Countering India in the same coin is not a good option. It may entail a new set of serious risks jeopardising Pakistan’s geo-economic focus. After the ravages of Covid-19, the national economy cannot absorb the additional burden of sustained active hostility while sporadic responses may not dent India’s inimical posture.


The writer is a former ambassador and advisor to CRSS, an Islamabad-based think tank. He can be reached at mian.sana@gmail.com

The jammed door of dialogue