Comment: From bystander to ‘protector of Palestinians’?

On September 29, President Trump unveiled a 20-point Peace Plan for the Gaza Strip -- framed around three interlinked phases: ending the war, rebuilding the territory and establishing long-term governance. At its core is the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF), to be composed primarily of troops from Muslim-majority nations.

The ISF’s mandate covers three critical domains: maintaining post-ceasefire security, controlling border crossings and administering a $50 billion reconstruction programme. Crucially, these operations are to proceed without any US or Israeli ground presence.

Discussions on troop contributions are underway with Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Egypt, Qatar and the UAE. At the UNGA, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto signalled readiness to deploy 20,000 or more personnel to Gaza.

To be certain, if Pakistan were to join the ISF, the decision could yield significant strategic plus economic dividends. To be sure, Pakistan’s participation would instantly raise Pakistan’s global diplomatic standing plus reaffirm Pakistan’s role as a responsible stakeholder in the Muslim world’s security framework. More importantly, such a deployment would transform words of solidarity into concrete action -- aligning Pakistan directly with the cause of eight million Palestinians across Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel.

Beyond geopolitics, participation in Gaza’s $50 billion reconstruction programme could open lucrative avenues for Pakistan’s engineering, logistics and peacekeeping sectors -- transforming its contribution into both influence and income. Preferential access to reconstruction contracts could yield an estimated $2 billion to $4 billion in FWO-led projects spanning roads, housing and critical infrastructure.

If Pakistan were to join the ISF, the move would serve as a strategic counterweight to the deepening India-Israel partnership. If Pakistan were to join the ISF, it would grant Pakistan access to valuable regional intelligence, logistics networks and potential basing rights at key ports and airfields. If Pakistan were to join the ISF, Gaza missions would offer Pakistan’s armed forces practical experience in urban operations, civilian protection, civil-military coordination and multilateral command environments. Most importantly, if Pakistan were to join the ISF, it would allow Pakistan to translate its security role into tangible economic gains.

If Pakistan were to join the ISF, new economic and strategic opportunities would emerge. If Pakistan were to join the ISF, Gaza’s post-war recovery could open a $1 billion textile and $500 million pharmaceutical export market for Pakistan.

If Pakistan were to join the ISF, participation would strengthen Pakistan’s bargaining position for deposits, concessional loans, and investment MoUs with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. If Pakistan were to join the ISF, the engagement could unlock access to the Red Sea corridor and create openings for military maintenance, training, and defence co-production agreements with Gulf partners.

If Pakistan were to join the ISF, its bargaining power within the OIC, Arab League, UN and donor forums would rise significantly -- enhancing its ability to secure project financing and development packages.

The International Stabilisation Force will have a strictly humanitarian mandate -- operating under UN and OIC oversight, not led by Washington or Tel Aviv.

If Pakistan were to join the ISF, we should send a light, capability-dense formation: engineers (humanitarian), military police, field hospitals, force protection, liaison and intel detachments -- not heavy mechanised brigades.

If Pakistan were to join the ISF, we must link deployment to concrete, time-bound economic deliverables -- deposits, manpower pacts, project financing -- agreed in parallel.

Joining the ISF will be a calculated investment in influence, access and leverage. In Gaza’s reconstruction, Pakistan can find not just a cause to serve, but a future to shape.