The cross-border attacks by terrorist groups with sanctuary on Afghan soil and facilitation from external actors, including India, have compelled Pakistan to adopt a more assertive stance.
Pakistan’s recent precision strikes in Afghanistan’s Kandahar and Kabul regions indicated both frustration and distrust over the Taliban regime’s intentions. After the ceasefire, the mediated rounds of negotiations between the Taliban and Pakistan have reached some conclusion, but concerns regarding the long-running lack of cooperation on behalf of the Taliban regime still remain.
The current impasse is essentially about the Afghan Taliban’s failure to fulfil the commitments made under the 2021 Doha Agreement, which guaranteed that Afghan soil would not be used to threaten other states. A similar statement has also appeared as part of the current negotiations. However, for the past four years, Afghan soil has been used by terrorist groups, such as the TTP and BLA to launch cross border attacks in Pakistan.
The Afghan Taliban’s apparent insensitivity and inaction on this issue directly undermines Pakistan’s national security. This frustration has pushed Islamabad to the extent that Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has even warned of an open military confrontation if no agreement is reached between the Taliban and Pakistan.
While an immediate challenge remains to reach a functional agreement and tangible results, the deeper concern in Islamabad is regarding the structural drivers of instability. The frustration is beyond reaching an agreement. It is about addressing the factors fuelling the chaos.
Some analysts contend that the Taliban lack central authority, which limits their influence to control non-state actors like TTP, BLA, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Others view the Taliban as cautious of harming their relations with the TTP and reason that disarming the TTP would mean alienating their ideological brethren and could make governing Afghanistan more difficult. UN experts have pointed out that Taliban and TTP leaders have sustained close ties and even have financial linkages as well as training support from transnational networks such as Al Qaeda.
Such uneasy dynamics have forced Islamabad, as well as the international community, to question whether the Taliban regime would sever ties with non-state actors, especially when their interests diverge from Afghanistan and the region’s own stability. The answer to this question is more complex than the question itself, given the unique dynamics of Afghanistan and the region.
Whether it is TTP, BLA, ETIM, Al-Qaeda or ISKP, the Afghan Taliban seem to neither have the capacity nor the political will to neutralise these groups. On the contrary, it appears that factions within the Taliban regime tolerate or covertly support their activities as a form of leverage.
From these assessments, it appears that the Taliban will continue to balance ties with both sides. Pakistan is already aware of the relationship dynamics between the Taliban and the TTP leadership. At times, Pakistani analysts have warned the Taliban to choose between the TTP and Pakistan as ties with both are counterproductive. What further complicates this matrix is the India factor, which adds another critical strategic layer to the issue.
India’s relationship with Afghanistan operates on two distinct but converging levels. First, Pakistan believes India has cultivated links with the terrorist elements, such the TTP, in Afghanistan, and the group benefits from Indian financial, training and logistical support. According to ISPR, members of this terrorist group cross into Pakistan equipped with a large number of foreign-origin weapons, ammunition and explosives to conduct terrorist attacks and espionage activities.
The second level of relationship is with the Taliban regime. During a recent meeting between Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, New Delhi announced plans to upgrade its ‘technical mission’ in Kabul to a ‘diplomatic mission.’ While some analysts interpreted this as a new era of India-Taliban ties, others claimed it as de facto recognition. Either way, this step potentially indicates that India is attempting to expand its intelligence presence in ways that raise genuine concerns in Islamabad regarding covert activity.
Such concerns are not without precedent. Recent allegations against Indian diplomatic staff for interference in Canada’s domestic affairs, the Kulbhushan Jadhav espionage case and Ajit Doval’s ‘offensive defence’ doctrine, which aims to fuel instability in Pakistan via Balochistan, all point to India’s track record of espionage activities. New Delhi also still insists that Operation Sindoor is ‘ongoing’ and there seems to be an urge for payback for the recent Indian losses of fighter jets in the May 2025 conflict. This is pushing New Delhi to deepen ties with the Taliban while tensions with Islamabad continue.
The Afghan Taliban’s reluctance to confront the TTP and BLA, combined with India’s opening of diplomatic channels and covert presence, could push Pakistan towards a harder security posture. Islamabad’s concerns are no longer limited to border management; they now encompass a broader struggle for regional deterrence.
The following months will remain crucial to observe New Delhi’s engagement with the Taliban as it expands diplomatic presence in Afghanistan; the Taliban’s willingness to acquire stronger control over terrorist elements; the potential US role as well as the crucial role played by regional powers such as Turkiye and Qatar; and Pakistan’s patience and prevention of an open conflict.
The writer is a research analyst in emerging technologies and international security. She tweets/posts @MaheenShafeeq
