On October 18, 2025, the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) of Pakistan issued a press release mentioning some complaints but without specifying which judges’ cases had been dismissed and which remained under consideration.
Without commenting on the merits of that statement or any pending matter, I wish to take a careful and factual look at the history of the Supreme Judicial Council itself. My intention is not to judge ongoing proceedings but simply to trace how this constitutional body has evolved and functioned over time.
The idea of the Supreme Judicial Council was born out of a genuine desire to protect judicial independence while ensuring accountability. Before its creation, under the 1956 constitution, judges of the Supreme Court could be removed by the president after a resolution of the National Assembly. That mechanism made the security of tenure of judges conditional in the hands of politicians and the ruling regime; this, therefore, was not considered satisfactory.
The 1962 constitution, framed under Ayub Khan, introduced a new system. It established a formal Supreme Judicial Council to deal with complaints of misconduct or incapacity against judges. The Council consisted of the chief justice of Pakistan, the next two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, and the chief justices of the high courts (under the One Unit there was only the West and East Pakistan High Courts). This arrangement was meant to keep the process internal to the judiciary, avoiding political influence. Ironically, it also created a structure that could be shaped by the executive, as history tells us.
After Ayub Khan resigned in March 1969 and General Yahya Khan imposed martial law, the judiciary was made to declare its loyalty to the new king. A presidential order required every superior court judge to submit a declaration of assets to the SJC, not only for themselves but also for their spouses, children, and even parents. The Council was tasked with verifying these statements and reporting its findings to the president. The order may have been presented as a move for transparency, but in practice it served as a tool for pressure.
Several judges were investigated; one resigned under scrutiny, while one was formally found guilty of misconduct and removed on the Council’s recommendation. Both were considered to be judges not liked by the ruling military regime. These early cases showed how the SJC, although created to safeguard independence, could be used to discipline judges in times of executive dominance.
The interim constitution of 1972 largely preserved the same framework, and the 1973 constitution then embedded the SJC as a permanent institution under Article 209. It provided that a judge could be removed only by the president, acting on a report of the SJC after due inquiry and a fair opportunity of defence. The Council was composed of the chief justice of Pakistan, two next senior-most Supreme Court judges, and the two senior-most chief justices of the high courts. On paper, this appeared to be a well-balanced system that blended accountability with independence. However, subsequent events revealed that the SJC’s structure left it vulnerable to manipulation whenever the judiciary faced pressure from military regimes or political executives.
During General Ziaul Haq’s martial law in 1977, this vulnerability became stark. After the Supreme Court admitted Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s petition challenging the detention of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the regime grew anxious. To ensure compliance, Zia’s administration required all judges to take a new oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order. The new oath omitted any reference to upholding or defending the constitution. Judges who refused to take it lost their positions overnight.
On September 22, 1977, the SJC was used to screen appointments and to force the resignations of judges the military junta suspected of being pro-democracy (all the removed judges were appointed during Bhutto’s government). Three Lahore High Court judges and two Sindh High Court judges were made to resign, while one was demoted. These steps were justified as administrative measures, but they effectively removed judges considered unreliable or insufficiently compliant with the military regime. The judiciary’s cooperation with these actions symbolised how the SJC’s authority could be used to suppress rather than support judicial independence.
Under General Pervez Musharraf, the SJC once again became central to questions of judicial autonomy. The Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 2002 amended Article 209, granting the SJC the power to initiate inquiries into judicial misconduct on its own motion. This was a good amendment, however soon the fire of executive interference erupted, and once again the SJC was used as the cannon.
The most dramatic test of this system came on March 9, 2007, when Musharraf filed a reference against then-CJ Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. The chief justice was accused of misconduct and misuse of authority, but no prior notice was given before the SJC convened. The Council immediately suspended Chaudhry from performing his duties. The proceedings sparked widespread outrage among lawyers, academics and civil society, who viewed the move as an attack on judicial independence. The suspension triggered the lawyers’ movement, which became one of Pakistan’s most significant civil resistance campaigns.
On July 20, 2007, a full bench of the Supreme Court struck down the reference as unconstitutional, restoring Chief Justice Chaudhry and marking the judiciary’s reassertion of independence.
In the decade that followed, the SJC’s role remained contested. Its constitutional mandate to hold judges accountable was clear, but its operations often coincided with times when judges took positions that displeased powerful institutions. Several notable cases illustrate this continuing pattern.
Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui of the Islamabad High Court was removed in October 2018. Siddiqui challenged his removal, and in March 2024 the Supreme Court unanimously reinstated him, holding that his removal had violated the principles of due process and fair trial under Article 10-A. Justice Qazi Faez Isa’s experience followed a similar trajectory. After authoring the 2019 Faizabad Dharna judgment, a presidential reference was filed against him, alleging nondisclosure of foreign properties. In 2021, the Supreme Court quashed the reference, describing it as legally flawed and motivated by mala fides.
Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi’s case in 2023–2024 reflected a recurring pattern. After he sat on a bench that directed that provincial elections be held within ninety days as mandated by the constitution, the SJC issued notices accusing him of financial misconduct. Despite his denial and complaints of procedural unfairness, the Council found him guilty and recommended his removal in March 2024. Bar associations criticised the opaque manner in which the Council proceeded, reinforcing perceptions of selective accountability.
The same concerns resurfaced in 2025 with the case of Justice Tariq Mehmood Jahangiri of the Islamabad High Court, who was barred by the high court from performing duties pending the SJC’s inquiry. The Supreme Court later ruled that such suspension was unlawful while the SJC was still considering the matter. It is unclear from the press release whether the reference remains or is dismissed.
In theory, the SJC exists to ensure integrity within the judiciary. In practice, it has at times functioned as a mechanism through which pressure is applied to those who refuse to conform. The lack of transparency in its proceedings and the absence of consistent procedural safeguards have contributed to this perception.
The concept of the Supreme Judicial Council was inspired by the late Manzoor Qadir, who believed that a body of senior judges, not politicians, should oversee judicial accountability. This model, first adopted in 1962 and reaffirmed in 1973, was intended to strengthen independence by keeping political branches out of the removal process. Yet Pakistan’s experience over more than 63 years shows that the SJC’s independence depends less on its design and more on the broader political environment. When the judiciary as an institution is strong and confident, the SJC can uphold genuine accountability. When the judiciary is divided or under pressure, the same body can become an instrument of control.
The writer is a barrister.
